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Summary 
This document contains the deliverables for the NASA Research and Technology for 
Aerospace Propulsion Systems (RTAPS) regarding the stability, transient response, control, and 
safety study for a high power cryogenic turboelectric distributed propulsion (TeDP) system. The 
objective of this research effort is to enumerate, characterize, and evaluate the critical issues 
facing the development of the N3-X concept aircraft. This includes the proposal of electrical grid 
architecture concepts and an evaluation of any needs for energy storage.  
NASA’s N3-X hybrid wing body aircraft concept promises dramatic improvements to aircraft 
performance pursuant to N+3 targets. A significant portion of these potential improvements are 
attributed to closely coupled integration of propulsion, power, and vehicle aerodynamic design. 
This integration is enabled by an advanced TeDP system1,2. 
The current iteration of this vehicle’s TeDP architecture includes two turboshaft engines 
positioned at the wingtips and a slotted bank of propulsors positioned at the trailing edge of the 
lifting body3,4.  The turboshaft engine drives the superconducting electrical machines used to 
generate power. This power is converted from alternating current (AC) to direct current (DC) 
and distributed to the centrally located propulsors.  
Providing propulsive power in this fashion introduces three distinct benefits. First, DC power 
distribution allows for the decoupling of the fan and engine speeds. There is no need to match 
the speeds of the turbine engines or the propulsor fans. Each propulsor can be individually 
throttled to achieve the optimal pressure ratio. Additionally, higher propulsive efficiency is 
attained by operating at very large effective bypass ratios. Finally, reductions in fuel burn may 
also be achieved through boundary layer ingestion5.  
While the advantages of this concept are attractive, significant design challenges arise from 
this dramatic shift in aircraft systems architecture. For this aircraft, the propulsion system is 
required to produce and distribute 30,000 horsepower (hp) at a minimum to provide thrust 
during takeoff. This requires that the generator or generators drawing power from each 
turboshaft engine be rated to a minimum of 22.4 MVA.  For such a high power electric system, 
the losses from normal conducting electrical components would be significant. To achieve 
maximum efficiency of the electrical system, an entirely superconducting and cryogenic 
electrical system with DC distribution is proposed. In addition to eliminating AC losses, a DC 
distribution system eliminates the need to synchronize multiple AC generators to an AC 
distribution system and also decouples the fan and engine speeds. The additional weight and 
power requirements to cool the superconducting electrical system is not considered in this 
study, although NASA has studied these additional power requirements2,5.  
In addition to being more efficient, superconducting electrical system components have 
higher power density (kW/kg), torque density (Nm/kg), or current density (A/m2/kg) compared to 
conventional normal conducting, room temperature components. These high density 
components enable the weight of the electric propulsion system to be minimized while meeting 
the high power demand.  
This wholly superconducting electrical system must meet all steady-state and transient 
thrust requirements including potential differential yaw control for stability augmentation under 
the same reliability requirements as a traditional tube-and-wing concept with podded propulsion. 
Reliability and fail-safe requirements must be met at minimal weight penalty and acceptable 
levels of system complexity.  
The research presented in this report focuses exclusively on the electrical power systems for 
this aircraft. All cryogenic support for the cold components is assumed to be sufficiently 
redundant and is not considered in the issue assessment, architecture definition, and system 
modeling.  Additionally, detailed modeling of the superconducting machines and the cryogenic 
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inverters is not considered to be a part of this Task. As will be discussed in this report, the 
models generated for system analysis are generic dynamic representations of component 
responses to power demands.  
Although mass and performance models were not generated in association with this task, 
component and system weights were approximated to differentiate between candidate 
architecture concepts. The primary objectives of this study were to explore architecture 
solutions for providing vehicle propulsion power.  Therefore, the nonpropulsive electrical system 
for the aircraft was neglected for the purposes of this study. 
The project tasks delivered for this research effort are presented in three main parts of this 
document. The first part of this work is the identification and prioritization of TeDP electrical grid 
issues to be explored with system modeling and simulation. This effort is discussed in Sections 
1 and 2 of this report. Section 1 reviews the fundamental issues that may be encountered in the 
design and operation of this system. In Section 2, the prioritization and selection schemes are 
described. Exogenous (source of disturbances external to system) and endogenous (source of 
the disturbances internal to system) events are evaluated in terms of the severity of the 
consequences of the event, probability of occurrence, complexity/triviality of the design solution, 
and whether the event fits within the scope of this study. Following prioritization, several issues 
were identified for further evaluation. Issues of interest included engine and generator failure 
scenarios and aircraft performance requirements (acceleration and flight control).  
The second part of this research task involved the definition of a promising electrical power 
distribution concept architecture to be modeled and analyzed. Sections 3 through 6 address this 
effort. Four architecture concepts are introduced for comparison. These architectures are 
discussed in terms of redundancy, interconnectivity, and capacity. Since failure scenarios drive 
the sizing of systems architectures, Section 3 of this report introduces the method used for 
identifying sizing critical contingency requirements. The critical failure scenarios and fail-safe 
requirements were used to determine the sizing critical requirements for each architecture 
concept.  
Following the architecture concept discussion, weight comparisons were made between 
these architectures using the component specific power, current, and torque information in 
Section 4. Advantageous application of redundancy and component sizing indicates a potential 
decrease in propulsor weight by over 40% in comparison to initial NASA blended wing body 
(BWB) aircraft level trade studies. Reduction in propulsor weight comes at the cost of 
distribution system weight and complexity. Added redundancy must be included which requires 
additional protection devices rated at very high current and voltage levels.  
This is followed by a discussion in Section 5 of specific technologies that may be 
implemented in this architecture. These technologies include the options for superconducting 
machines (flux pinned, flux trapped, and field generated flux) and their control options. Both 
passive and active AC-to-DC power conversion technologies are then discussed in terms of the 
TeDP requirements. Next, the definition of the distribution system is addressed. This includes 
the different configurations available and the definition of the operating voltage. Finally, 
protection equipment and strategy alternatives are discussed which introduce weight penalties 
not initially accounted for during initial architecture trades.  
All of the architectures discussed in this document exhibit promising features or performance 
attributes. Selecting from these architecture concepts depends on the future developments in 
high voltage, superconducting DC breakers, machines, and control technologies. Additionally, 
other less tangible aspects of these architectures must be weighed with respect to each other. 
Attributes like failure response complexity, component count, excess power available, and 
installation issues extrapolated to the 2035 timeframe must influence architecture preferences.  
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The last portion of this research task focuses on assessing the selected architecture. 
Discussion of this process begins with an overview of the Simulink® models developed to 
simulate the transient performance of the selected architecture. Section 7 of this report reviews 
the structure and logic for the component models. In addition, fault insertion, response, and 
requirements management logic are discussed. The capability and limitations of the power flow 
model developed for this study are acknowledged. This includes a discussion of the 
assumptions and limitations of dynamic power flow requirements modeling.  
Section 7 goes on to discuss challenging dynamic characteristics that may limit system 
performance and drive energy storage requirements. This section also reviews the generated 
output form following scenario simulation. Additionally, several of the issues selected in the 
initial sections of this document are precluded from formal sensitivity analysis by observations in 
model performance. The transient impact of generator failure scenarios on thrust performance is 
shown to be dominated by engine failure dynamics. Differential thrust scenarios including cross 
wind, gust, and stability augmentation requirements are also excluded. These issues prove 
challenging to the power flow models developed under this contract due to propulsor control 
related issues and lack of insight into the specific states of the system.  
Section 8 of this document reviews the sensitivity studies performed during this task for the 
thrust response scenario and the engine out failure case. This includes a review of the designs 
of experiments used to characterize factor sensitivities and assess performance trends. The 
regressions of the model outputs are reviewed and the importance factor values are discussed. 
Additionally, the trades between energy storage weight and thrust lapse are presented in terms 
of the effect of technology parameters on energy storage Pareto optimization.  
Finally, Section 9 highlights the conclusions from this work and proposes potential avenues 
of future research to increase concept maturity. Some notable conclusions relate to the need for 
accurate prediction of protection system weights and the need for future integrated trade studies 
regarding the extent to which differential thrust is used to fulfill yaw control requirements. The 
role of energy storage is reduced to that of providing fill-in power for fault conditions. Energy 
storage was shown to be unnecessary to fulfill FAR acceleration requirements. Additionally, it 
was observed that the time constants of the mechanical systems drive thrust response 
performance dynamics. The conclusion reviews potential future work that must be performed to 
mature this concept further. This includes recommendations for technology development areas 
and system integration challenges that must be addressed.  
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1. Turboelectric Distributed Propulsion System Issues 
Task 1: a) The Contractor shall compile an initial list of system issues that must be addressed 
for a system that is made up of turbo-shaft engines driving two or more superconducting 
generators, multi-phase cryogenic rectifiers, multiple superconducting busses, cryogenic 
inverters, superconducting motors and propulsors (e.g. ducted fans or open rotors). At 
minimum, the initial issues list shall include the following: 
a. Transient events (such as intentional accel or decel of the aircraft, gust loading/unloading 
of fans, and propulsor blade loss or bird strike)  
b. Electrical faults (in motors, generator phases, inverters, transmission lines, etc.)  
c. Intentional isolation of faults  
d. Sudden transition to normalcy of motor or generator windings  
e. The need for energy storage (including type and capacity) 
f. Arc and discharge issues  
g. Lightening strike vulnerability 
h. The degree of redundancy required  
i. The degree of isolation required between circuits  
j. Avoidance of total grid failure 
 
Multiple perspectives were required for defining dynamics and safety issues relative to a 
notional superconducting TeDP microgrid system for a blended wing body aircraft. This section 
qualitatively reviews potential issues with this system in terms of multiple perspectives. This 
review is presented here in terms of three categories: System Level Performance/Stability/ 
Safety Issues, Nominal/Off-Nominal Operating Scenario Issues, and Architecture Design 
Decisions/Issues. 
1.1 System Level Performance/Stability/Safety Issues 
The first set of issues identified with this study focuses on the definition and provision of 
appropriate system level behavior. For the purposes of this study, the TeDP system is tasked 
solely with the provision of stable uninterrupted high voltage DC power for aircraft propulsion 
with sufficient response to maintain aircraft stability, control, and response.  
Designing a feasible system towards this aim requires that the architecture performs 
favorably in all nominal and likely off-nominal operating scenarios without incurring undesirable 
side-effects. These side effects may include unacceptable loss of thrust, inadequate response 
rates if Stability Augmentation Systems (SAS) are provided by differential thrust, and the 
exposure of passenger or crew to safety hazards. Therefore, at the system level, the following 
sets of issues were identified. 
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Table 1. System Level Issues 
Type Category System Level Operational Requirements 
D
yn
am
ic
 
C
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
 
Nominal Operations Electrical system stability 
Maintaining component limits 
Failure Isolation/ 
Recovery 
Avoidance of loss of aircraft control 
Avoidance of loss of thrust 
Provision of flight/safety critical functionality under failure conditions 
Minimum required electrical system stability under failure conditions 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
C
on
si
de
ra
tio
ns
 
Physical Limitations 
Mechanical Stresses on Cryogenic distribution systems 
Thermal Isolation between Engine and Generators 
Thermal Isolation between Ground and Onboard Electrical Systems 
Passenger Safety 
Thermal Hazard Protection 
Electrical Hazard Protection 
Fire Hazard Protection 
 
The system level issues are decomposed in two groupings. The first group of issues relates 
to the dynamic electrical system performance of the TeDP architecture. Assessment of the 
architecture performance with respect to these issues requires transient simulation of aircraft 
and system operating scenarios.  
1.1.1 System Level Dynamic Considerations 
At the system level, the focus is on what system level behaviors are acceptable or 
unacceptable? The cryogenic superconducting electrical system must provide for electrical 
system stability during all nominal and off-nominal operations. All component limits must be 
ensured during nominal operations. Component performance limits and the dynamic response 
capabilities must be defined during the architecture definition task. 
The electrical system consisting of the electrical distribution (AC and DC), converters, 
generators, and energy storage is considered stable when all equipment returns to 
corresponding normal, acceptable, or stable operation after being subjected to a disturbance. 
After a disturbance occurs in the system, equipment will experience transient levels of power, 
voltage, current, or frequency. The transient limitations are governed by the equipment normal 
and abnormal operating limits (insulation strength, current-carrying capability), system strength 
(protection and control, redundancy), and system modes (sensitivity to natural oscillations). The 
duration of abnormal transient events so that system stability can be maintained is also 
determined by the equipment abnormal operating limits, system strength, and system modes. 
Additionally, off-nominal scenarios must not produce a total loss of thrust or adversely 
impact aircraft control. Under fault conditions, the TeDP system must ensure flight critical 
electrical loads to enable safe recovery of aircraft and passengers. Blended wing body aircraft 
have been shown to have similar longitudinal flight dynamic performance to the traditional tube 
and wing aircraft design. However, in the lateral frame, tailless BWB aircraft have reported 
deficiencies in providing directional control authority6 and weathercock stability without 
alternative sources of directional stiffness.7 Asymmetric thrust may be utilized for crosswind 
scenarios and additional stability augmentation. If the TeDP system is tasked with assisting with 
damping lateral flight dynamics or responding to transient gust and crosswind scenarios through 
differential thrust, timely thrust response must be made available to support lateral stability. In 
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such an aircraft configuration, more stringent transient requirements are placed on the TeDP 
system.  
1.1.2 Implementation Considerations 
The issues related to implementation do not require electrical transient assessment of the 
TeDP systems. While these issues may present significant design challenges for feasible TeDP 
implementation, they remain external to the purview of the later phases of this task. However, 
these considerations are used when evaluating the impact of unit level failures as discussed in 
section 8 of this document. To this end, these issues are discussed qualitatively here. 
Commercial superconducting cable has a center “former,” typically composed of copper, 
around which there are at least one, if not multiple, superconducting layers of tape wound in 
helical fashion. Around this is the electrical insulation, typically a polyimide on paper, again 
wound in helical fashion. The helical construction allows for the wide variation in thermal 
contraction without mechanical stress to the cable components.8 Around the electrical insulation 
layer is a superconducting shield fabricated in the same manner as the conducting layer. This 
shield rejects magnetic fields from the conducting layer in order to protect from magnetically 
induced “Quench,” or sudden loss of superconductivity. Around the superconducting shield 
there is a mechanical protective layer as the last layer of the core cable. The cable core is then 
surrounded by a layer of cryogenic liquid, typically liquid nitrogen, contained in metallic plumbing 
and a vacuum space or insulating layer contained in metallic plumbing. In a similar manner 
coaxial conductor cable can be constructed with refrigerant counter flow through the former and 
along the periphery of the cable core (Southwire and Nexan type cable). Surrounding the 
cryogenic plumbing is either a vacuum cladding or insulation layer to reduce influx of heat to the 
cryogenic portions.9,10 The stainless steel or aluminum refrigerant pipe and the stainless steel or 
aluminum vacuum/insulation pipe are additional shielding functionality, since in typical 
installations these structures are electrically grounded.  
The components of high temperature superconducting cable increase in elastic modulus in 
comparison to room temperature mechanical properties.11 This effect reduces the plasticity of 
polymers used for dielectrics or insulation in HTS cable, and has not been analyzed for vibration 
and shock environments that would represent an aircraft. However, shock and vibration isolation 
may be sufficient for practical reliability and lifetime considering multiple inherent protective 
layers; including the cryogenic liquid stream, the vacuum or insulation layer, and outer cladding.  
Another system level issue which must be addressed for a cryogenic electrical system is the 
need to thermally isolate system components. This requires a minimization of interfaces 
between components which operate at cryogenic temperatures and components which operate 
at ambient or elevated temperatures. However, some interfaces are unavoidable. These include 
the mechanical interfaces of the engine and propulsors with the electrical machines, and 
connections between onboard and ground-based power systems. Aircraft application 
determines if the electrical interface to the cryogenic system is necessary for ground 
maintenance. The most likely case is that ground power is used to support cryocoolers and 
recharge/maintain charge of any energy storage. For this scenario, the electrical power interface 
to the cryogenic system is low power and could be addressed with either a magnetic coupling 
across a thermal vacuum/insulation gap or through a mechanical intermediary. The “torque 
tube” is a thermally limiting drive shaft from the cryogenic portions to the ambient portions of the 
system. The material selection, cooling method, and cooling capacity should be considered in 
the design of the torque tube.12 Stainless steel is a common material selected for these devices 
for its high stress and low thermal conductivity.  
Sufficient passenger safety must also be provided. Passengers, crew, and flight critical 
equipment must be protected from electrical, fire, and thermal hazards. Electrical hazards 
include electrocution from high or low voltage AC or DC due to exposed conductors or 
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improperly isolated faults. Fire hazards may arise as a result of arcing or short circuits. Improper 
isolation of the cryogenic cooling system may be thermally hazardous. The possibility of 
quenching may also present a thermal hazard. The energy from a quench is released as heat 
and change in air pressure. Asphyxiation may be a hazard from quenching if quenched systems 
are exposed. 
1.2 Nominal/Off-Nominal Operating Scenarios Issues 
System level dynamic issues are the product exogenous or endogenous perturbations to the 
state of the system which result in complex system level behavior. This behavior has the 
potential to breach component operating limits.  
1.2.1 Exogenous Failure Conditions 
Frequent exogenous operating scenarios are decomposed in Table 2. The first column of 
this table indicates the mission segment in which the event may occur. The second column 
indicates a potential transient event. The third column indicates some of the dynamic questions 
which arise with this transient event.  
Table 2. Frequent and Reasonably Probable Exogenous Operating Conditions/Hazards 
Segment Exogenous Requirement/Event Transient Considerations 
Ground Ops 
Engine Start/Warm up Role of Energy Storage 
Propel on taxi (accel, decel) Role of Energy Storage 
Takeoff 
Step change in thrust demand Electrical System Transient Response 
Stability Augmentation, Control, Gust, Crosswind Electrical System Transient Response 
Debris Ingestion Surge or Flameout 
Lightning Strike Likely limited to EMI issues 
Aborted Takeoff Role of Energy Storage 
Climb 
Gradual changes in mach number and altitude Electrical System Transient Response 
Stability Augmentation, Control, Gust, Crosswind Electrical System Transient Response 
Debris Ingestion Surge or Flameout 
Lightning Strike Likely limited to EMI issues 
Cruise 
Stability Augmentation, Control, Gust, Crosswind Electrical System Transient Response 
Lightning Strike Likely limited to EMI issues 
Descent 
Low speed/power Stability Augmentation, Control, 
Gust, Crosswind Electrical System Transient Response 
Bird Ingestion Surge or Flameout 
Lightning Strike Likely limited to EMI issues 
Land 
Reverse Thrust Electrical System Transient Response 
Debris Ingestion Surge or Flameout 
Lightning Strike Likely limited to EMI issues 
Ground Ops 
Propel on Taxi (acceleration, deceleration) Role of Energy Storage 
Engine Shutdown  
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The nominal mission presents a number of transient issues in itself. As discussed in section 
1.1.1, events like gust and crosswind could present scenarios which govern the required 
temporal response from the TeDP system. If the system is tasked with stability augmentation, 
these response rates must be available during nominal operation and failure scenarios. 
The initial issue considered which arises due to exogenous requirements and nominal 
aircraft operations involves the sizing of the energy storage device. The attributes of the energy 
storage device are governed by its defined role during engine start, taxi, takeoff, and engine 
shutdown. The size of the energy storage device depends on the total amount of energy which 
must be stored and the rate at which this energy must be provided or accepted by the device. 
The desired response rate and magnitude, device mission scheduling, and energy budget 
issues must be addressed to accurately predict the size and role of the energy storage device. 
Several aspects impact the design of the TeDP energy storage system with respect to its 
use on a conventional aircraft. Conventional aircraft use energy storage to start either the main 
engines directly or an auxiliary power unit, which is used to start the main engines. The other 
conventional use of energy storage is for emergency electrical power for avionics. The TeDP in 
contrast may use energy storage to assist with fast dynamic thrust response. Section 7.4 will 
discuss the challenges in implementing differential thrust via the TeDP system for flight control, 
failure recovery, and thrust response.  
Furthermore, the energy storage device is required to either operate at cryogenic 
temperatures and to interface, as necessary, with the ambient environment. Energy could also 
be stored in a superconducting flywheel, which would not require additional interfaces between 
cryogenic and ambient environments yet would produce additional stresses under flight 
dynamics.  
The benefits of cryogenic energy storage systems such as the Superconducting Magnetic 
Energy Storage (SMES) include fewer interconnections from the ambient environment to the 
cryogenic. However, they are limited by structural strength.13 Conventional electrochemical 
energy storage, such as Lithium Ion batteries, is not capable of operation in cryogenic 
temperatures.  
Another exogenous issue occurs when debris (such as birds or other FOD) is ingested by 
the turboshaft engines or propulsors during takeoff or climb. Traditional turboshaft engines are 
designed to withstand bird strike issues without catastrophic failures. However, bird ingestion 
may induce surge or flameout conditions which represent a loss of shaft power available from 
the turbomachinery. The altitude threshold for bird strikes is at roughly 10,000 ft with 
approximately 70% of bird strike events happening below 200 ft in altitude, and 95% below 
2,500 ft.14  
FAA regulations require that the ingestion of a large bird (for small inlet area 
engines/propulsors the bird weight is assumed to be roughly 4 lbm) must not yield a sustained 
reduction in maximum rated takeoff power or thrust of more than 50%. The aircraft test schedule 
for this event is represented by a 1 minute without power level movement followed by a 13 
minute period in which more than 50% power is available. This 13 minute period is followed by 
periods of lower required power levels for short periods of time.15 
Bird/debris ingestion at the propulsor presents a non-standard failure condition for the 
electrical system. Assuming that the propulsor is designed so as to prevent fan deflagration due 
to debris/bird ingestion, a bird strike represents a sudden increase in torque, a drop in shaft 
speed, changes to the fan efficiency, and potential flow path blockages. Due to the distributed 
nature of the propulsion system, it may be acceptable that a single bird strike at the propulsor 
may render it useless (e.g. fan loss or generator quench from sudden torque shock). 
Allowing a bird strike to yield the loss of a propulsor may be insufficient under some bird 
strike conditions. When considering flocking bird strikes multiple propulsors may incur damage. 
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Asymmetric bird strike damage may present control and propulsion issues. If the propulsors are 
tasked with yaw control requirement an asymmetric loss of propulsion may essentially cause a 
total loss in thrust capability due to a reduction in the available yaw control moment. In any 
event, the TeDP system and aircraft vehicle systems manager would be required to augment 
the power provided to the affected propulsor and/or increase the thrust provided by the 
remaining unaffected devices.  
The last exogenous failure condition that was considered was a lightning strike. 
Catastrophic damage from a lightning strike is extremely rare for traditional aircraft due to the 
inherent protection provided by the conductive nature of the aircraft skin. Composite aircraft 
protection is provided by inlaying conductive materials in the composite structure of the aircraft 
skin. Assuming adequate protections are in place, it is unlikely that a lightning strike would 
produce high current pulses (100-200 kA) that would be seen by the superconducting electrical 
grid components.  
Additional protections must also be put into place to reduce the risk of quenching due to EMI 
produced by a lightning strike. However, construction of superconducting cable consists of a 
metallic cladding for the vacuum/insulation and cryocooling fluid layers. This composition could 
allow for eddy current cancellation of dynamic magnetic fields induced by lightning strikes. 
Steady-state magnetic fields could be canceled by the non-current carrying superconducting 
shield layer. Further detailed design would dictate whether it is necessary for additional cable 
protections to shield magnetic field and thermal heating produced by localized lightning strikes. 
Preliminary review of the literature does not indicate any specific studies of superconductor 
cable lightning protection. 
1.2.2 Endogenous Failure Conditions 
To address these issues, the architecture was generically decomposed as illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Distributed Electrical Propulsion Power Systems
Power Distribution
(Multiple Instances)
Power Generation
(Multiple Instances)
DC Electrical 
Generation
(Multiple Instances 
per Engine)
Propulsor
(Multiple Instances)
Turboshaf
t Engine
(Multiple 
Instances)
Generator
Inverter
Engine 
Control
Generator 
Controller
Fan
Rectifier
Energy Storage
Aircraft
Distribution
DC Motor
Motor
Motor 
Controller
 
Figure 1. Decomposition of the TeDP system for Endogenous Failure Identification 
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This generic TeDP system is comprised of multiple ducted fans driven by cryogenic 
superconducting generators (propulsors) situated at the trailing edge of a blended wing body 
aircraft. The propulsor elements are comprised of the fan, motor, and associated power 
electronics as seen in Figure 1. Power for these propulsors is generated by turboshaft driven 
superconducting generators which supply power on a superconducting distribution system. 
Energy storage is used to damp electrical instability, provide fill-in power during transient thrust 
requirements, and supply emergency power for failure cases.  
A set of potential faults or failures was identified for each block in this decomposition as 
given in Table 3. Electrical systems failures are discussed in detail in following subsections. 
Table 3. Endogenous Faults/Failures 
Unit Endogenous Event Transient Considerations 
Engine 
Shaft Break (Various Causes) Sudden loss in shaft torque and inertia 
Engine shutdown (Various Causes) Sudden loss in available power 
Disk Burst (Various Causes) Sudden loss in shaft toque and inertia 
Engine loses feedback of speed 
control loop 
Engine runs off-speed 
Generator & 
Propulsor 
Internal short (insulation failure) 
Reduction of power production/consumption 
at rated operating conditions or complete 
fault isolation of propulsor/generator 
Internal open (HTS failure) 
Reduction of power production/consumption 
at rated operating conditions or complete 
fault isolation of propulsor/generator 
Quenching (EMI, Thermal, Over-
current) 
Reduction of power production/consumption 
at rated operating conditions or temporary 
fault isolation of propulsor/generator 
Voltage regulation failure 
Reduction of power transmission at rated 
operating conditions or complete fault 
isolation of distribution bus 
Power 
Distribution, 
Conversion, 
& Storage 
Temporary fault on AC system 
connected to rectifier 
Reduction in distributed power, voltage sag 
Rectifier commutation failure (AC 
system fault connected to rectifier) 
Reduction in distributed power 
Fault on superconducting electrical 
system (AC or DC) 
High fault current and quenching 
Temporary overvoltages (Initiating 
and clearing AC or DC system faults 
using a circuit breaker) 
Overvoltage, reduction in distributed power 
Ground fault on a pole of bipolar DC 
distribution system 
Overvoltage, overcurrent 
Corona Partial discharge  
Quenching of Energy Storage Device Partial or total energy loss 
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1.2.2.1 Generator/Propulsor Motor Failures  More than half of all industrial electric 
machine failures are due to bearing failures.16 These failures can be induced by mechanical 
overload, current flowing through bearings, vibration, etc. The assumption for this study is the 
use of superconducting electromagnetic bearings to replace conventional mechanical bearings. 
Therefore, the mechanical failure mode for this component is eliminated. However, 
electromagnetic bearing will have the same susceptibility to insulation failure modes as the 
electrical machine itself. This implies that winding insulation failures, which are the next most 
frequently occurring, will be the most prominent failure mode. For a superconducting machine 
insulation failure can affect electromagnetic bearing, stator windings, or rotor windings.  
Rotor winding insulation failure could result in reduced air gap magnetic field, or cascading 
failure of the remaining turns. Being superconducting, the short of one turn to the next may 
reduce the reverse electromotive force of the field winding. If the fault is not perceived or the 
reduction in field voltage delayed, the current could escalate beyond the critical rating of the 
superconductor and quench the rotor. Alternatively, a sudden impulse of potential across the 
dielectric due to a turn to turn fault could induce partial discharge and failure of other turns in a 
cascading failure of the entire rotor. The short of a field turn to the rotor could be detrimental, yet 
if the rotor is levitated via electromagnetic bearings or the rotor or bearings are of sufficiently 
electrically insulating material, there would be no ground path for electrical conduction and no 
damage.  
If a stator turn insulation fails and shorts to another turn, then the results are similar to the 
rotor turn to turn failure and there could be minimal impact or a cascading failure of the entire 
winding. If a stator turn insulation fails to the frame, then if the frame is sufficiently insulating, 
there is no effect on the system. If another winding insulation fails to a conducting frame, then 
phase to phase short circuit current will most likely exceed the superconductor critical current 
and quench both phases, if not the whole machine. Alternatively, if the stator frame is designed 
of non conduction material, multiple phase to frame shorts should cause no ill effects.  
Electromagnetic bearing winding insulation failure to a conducting frame should reduce the 
normal axis force capability and possibly cascade through the entire winding. If insufficient 
bearing force is available, then axial misalignment and vibration should soon result in complete 
loss of machine functionality and may impact cryocooling liquid containment. Alternatively, if the 
frame is non-conducting then multiple winding to frame insulation failures should not induce any 
system effects.  
Considering the failure cases and the system repercussions, the failure modes of all 
machines, propulsors or generators, may be modeled with phase loss, partial power loss, or 
complete loss. Phase loss or partial power loss may provide sufficient time for distribution and 
conversion equipment to isolate the machine. Complete failure may be too rapid for 
conventional equipment and require superconducting fault current limiters (SFCLs) for 
reasonable reliability. 
1.2.2.2 Power Distribution/Conversion/Storage Failures The endogenous power 
distribution, conversion, and storage failures considered are outlined in Table 3. These issues 
are different types of faults on the AC or DC distribution system or the power converters. 
One failure may be a temporary fault on the AC distribution system connected to the 
rectifier. During the fault, available DC distribution power may be reduced, voltage may sag, and 
electric machine speed may increase. Standard AC protection equipment can clear and isolate 
a fault in about 40 cycles. Sufficient protection of electrical equipment and distribution as well as 
sufficient redundancy should be designed and used in order to ensure that distributed power to 
critical equipment is not reduced during the fault. Once the fault is cleared, power would be 
restored to pre-fault value.17,18,19 
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Converter commutation failure may result due to an AC system fault connected to the 
converter. Commutation failures occur when the converter switches do not have sufficient time 
to change from conduction to blocking forward voltage. Commutation failures may be caused by 
an increase in DC current or a decrease in AC voltage. Recovery from a commutation failure 
typically takes about 100 cycles, but the recovery time and transient current levels are 
dependent on the converter architecture and control as well as energy storage. Repeated 
commutation failures cause overcurrent in switches, delayed restart after a fault clears, or 
switches may be blocked by protection. The system transient effects of converter commutation 
failure include raising or lowering DC voltage or current levels and loss of power output from the 
converter if it becomes isolated by protection because of damage to a switch. While this issue is 
reasonably probable in the event of DC or AC system faults, converter commutation failure can 
be minimized if the converter control is designed to avoid commutation failure by detecting and 
reacting to fault current and voltage transients that may occur on the system at or near the 
converter.19,20,21 
The high fault current levels due to a fault on a superconducting electrical system present an 
issue unique to superconducting systems. When a fault occurs on a superconducting electrical 
system, fault current may exceed the current-carrying capability of the system and cause a 
quench. In this case, the quenched system’s resistance increases compared to a 
superconducting system and the conductor becomes normally conducting. The high fault 
current resulting from a high current density superconducting system would then flow through a 
normal conductor. It is apparent that the electrical system must have fast and reliable protection 
to minimize damage to the system which would result from superconducting system fault current 
levels as well as capability for the quenched system to handle fault current levels for the 
duration of the fault. If the superconducting system is designed to withstand the fault current and 
does not quench, then the electrical system around the fault must still be able to withstand fault 
current levels and be able to isolate the faulted area if necessary. Using energy storage to 
dampen the amplitude of fault current and shorten the time required to return to normal 
operation after a fault, the time from the end of a fault to normal operation may be around 10 
cycles. Without the use of energy storage to dampen fault current, the time required to return to 
normal operation after a fault is longer.19 
Clearing AC or DC system faults using a circuit breaker may cause temporary overvoltages. 
Overvoltage may damage equipment, in particular metal surge arresters due to excessive 
energy dissipation. If equipment is damaged or isolated as a result of overvoltage, distributed 
power may be reduced. In power systems, overvoltages may be reduced or prevented by 
installing pre-insertion resistors in AC circuit breakers which energize a converter transformer. 22 
A bipolar DC distribution system which consists of a positive conductor at a certain voltage 
magnitude, negative conductor with the same voltage magnitude but with reverse polarity, and a 
neutral or ground conductor may be used to increase the reliability of the distribution system. 
When a ground fault occurs on one pole of a bipolar DC distribution system, several issues may 
occur. DC system overvoltage may occur, or in the case of a DC short circuit across the 
converter terminals, DC current may reach high values, possibly up to five times normal 
operation. Such a fault may damage equipment, require equipment to be isolated, or induce 
large torsional loads and lead to severe shaft damage. The effects of this issue can be 
prevented with the use of surge arresters and sufficient system redundancy and 
protection.18,19,22  
Corona can be an issue in any higher voltage system. Corona reduces system efficiency. 
More importantly, long term effects of corona are partial discharge which can lead to total 
discharge and insulation failure. The duration of a partial discharge event is a few 
microseconds, but the long term effects can be seen after months of years. The magnitude of 
corona depends greatly on the voltage level, air pressure, and temperature. The aircraft bus 
voltage level considerations are addressed in section 1.3.1. Higher voltage levels increase the 
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probability of electrical discharge, but lower pressures and temperatures decrease the 
breakdown voltage threshold. For exposed conductors, corona causes noise and generates 
ozone.23,24 
Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage (SMES) or superconducting flywheels are 
assumed to be the energy storage of choice for this study.25,26 The design criteria would be 
mass and cost, which are not within the scope of this study. SMES failures are typically quench. 
The full energy of the SMES magnetic field is converter to heat when quench occurs, placing 
design constraints for the amount of cryocooled liquid and power of the cryostats to withstand 
such thermal stress. Recovery from quench is possible if the contributing factors are negated, 
yet the energy lost is unrecoverable. Physical failures such as turn to turn shorts will limit the 
voltage applicable to the grid from the SMES. Under charge and discharge at high power, 
physical stress of the superconducting coil and infrastructure could cause failure. A mechanical 
failure of this nature will induce quench and structural damage, which could rupture the 
cryogenic barrier.27  
Conventional flywheel energy storage systems use superconductors only for the magnetic 
levitation benefits.28 It is conceivable that in an entirely superconducting distribution system that 
the rotational force will be applied via superconducting machines. In addition to the magnetic 
bearing and superconducting machine failure modes mentioned elsewhere, there is the risk of a 
mechanical failure of the flywheel rotor, especially in a fully cryogenic environment. Typical high 
stress materials used for flywheel construction will most likely have decreased mechanical 
strength and plasticity at cryogenic temperatures. The failure mode of room temperature 
flywheel rotors is mitigated to a degree by the rotor construction of fiber material that will 
unspool and bring the rotor to a relatively benign stop. However, under cryogenic temperatures, 
the fiber failure mechanism may not provide such mitigation and external containment may be 
required. 
1.3 Architecture Design Decisions/Issues 
Identification of the design driving issues is an iterative process. The existence and severity 
of the issues discussed in the previous section depend on the structure, composition, and 
functionality of the architecture. While architecture definition is required during task 1.d, this 
section discusses several issues which must be considered during this architecture process. 
These issues are not prioritized during task 1.b. Only a few of the items are selected for future 
consideration. However, all architecture design issues must be addressed during the 
architecting task. Several architecture design issues are listed in Table 4. 
Table 4. Architecture Design Decisions 
Category  Design Decision/Issue 
Bus Voltage Voltage Level 
Strategy of Managing Bus Voltage 
System Definition Component Capability Limits 
System Layout 
Component Redundancies  
Component Roles Energy Storage Stability & Bulk Power 
Propulsion System & Aircraft Control 
Failure Response Conversion 
Isolation 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 14 
1.3.1 Bus Voltage Issues 
If properly designed for an aircraft type environment, polymeric dielectrics electrical 
properties tend to greatly benefit from the cryogenic temperatures.29,30 Polymer dielectric 
strength can range from 10-15 kV per millimeter.29 Epoxy bound nanoparticles at cryogenic 
temperatures can range from 25-40 kV per millimeter.31 The liquid nitrogen refrigerant itself 
provides some additional electrical insulation and has been shown to assist polymer electrical 
insulations with mechanical damage as compared to gaseous nitrogen. Typical polymeric 
insulation materials increase in dielectric strength by 5-10X over room temperature capabilities. 
Southwire has tested cables to pulsed potentials greater than 100 kV.32 Although evolving, 
insulation design is progressing towards long term stable, high voltage capability.  
In general, increasing the voltage increases the losses associated with alternating current 
distribution due to dielectric losses and requires more demanding cooling requirements than 
that for direct current distribution. Increased voltage in AC or DC distribution systems requires a 
larger dielectric layer, but is generally accepted over increasing the current, which requires 
increasing the superconducting wire size, the most costly of the cable components. The concern 
of partial discharge is partially mitigated by the fact that most dielectric voids are compressed to 
a negligible volume and the metallic cladding of the cryocooling fluid and vacuum/insulation 
layer are grounded and prevent electric field gradients outside of the cable. The design 
parameters most likely to be considered are mass and cost, which are not within the scope of 
this study. 
1.3.2 Physical Definition Design Issues 
Sizing critical requirements are infrequently the result of demands placed on components 
during nominal operating conditions. The overall weight, volume, and maximum capability levels 
for airborne power systems are determined by the levels of redundancy and oversizing required 
to support flight critical and safety critical loads during off-nominal failure scenarios. Fail-safe 
requirements indicate that no single point failure should yield catastrophic consequences at the 
aircraft level. Additionally, probability constraints are imposed on system functionalities 
depending on the severity of functional losses. Redundancy and individual unit capability limits 
are governed by the maximum loads and levels of reliability required during all feasible 
operating scenarios.  
System layout must also be configured in a fashion which alleviates the safety concerns 
discussed in section 1.1 of this report. Additionally, system layout must consider potential zonal 
common cause failure scenarios which could compound the effects of system faults.  
Various forms of system redundancy, component capability, and systems layout determine 
the magnitude of a given endogenous fault. However, they have little effect on the dynamic 
attributes of a given component (e.g. time constants for response or recovery). These physical 
design issues may not directly affect the stability of the system. However, they must be 
considered to estimate the overall system attributes (weight, volume, reliability) and may have 
some effect dynamic response and limits placed on transient events.  
1.3.3 Definition System/Component Roles 
The issues regarding the role of the propulsors for flight control were addressed in section 
1.1.1 of this report.  
The issues regarding the role of energy storage were addressed in section 1.2.1 of this 
report. 
1.3.4 Failure Response Strategies 
When a fault or disturbance occurs on the electrical system, the system monitoring must be 
able to detect faults or disturbances that can cause instability or damage to equipment. Faults 
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can be isolated on the AC system using circuit breakers designed to operate in a 
superconducting system. Faults on the DC system can be isolated using DC circuit breakers or 
by using the converters. Fault current limiters may also be used to assist in the clearing of a 
fault. 
To isolate a fault using the converter, the power convertor would operate in inverter mode to 
discharge the line. If the fault is cleared, full power is restored to the line. If the fault persists, re-
charging the line may result in a second fault. Ideally, the system monitoring can detect if a fault 
is temporary or persistent so as to avoid re-charging a line on a persistent fault. Clearing the 
fault using a converter, which takes approximately 200-500 ms, is faster than using a circuit 
breaker since mechanical action is not required. 
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2. Issue Prioritization 
Task 1.b Having compiled the initial list of system issues, the Contractor shall make a preliminary 
assessment of the expected severity of each of the system issues and develop a prioritized ranking of 
them. 
 
Task 1.c From the higher priority systems issues, the Contractor shall recommend a minimum of 3 
items for study under the Task.  
 
Issues for the propulsion electric grid of a TeDP system were evaluated in terms of five 
qualitative categories: applicability to electrical grid stability and control, probability of 
occurrence, severity of potential impact, triviality of the design solution, and programmatic 
constraints. The initial category was used to filter out non-transient issues. Numeric significance 
values were then assigned to each issue for the latter four evaluation categories. Weighted 
averages of these significance values were used to quantify the priority of each issue. 
This section outlines the categories used for issue prioritization, discusses the prioritization 
of each of the issues, and presents the final prioritizations. 
2.1 Issue Evaluation Categories 
2.1.1 Applicability to Electrical Grid Stability and Control 
The first classification, ‘applicability to electrical grid stability and control’, was used to 
identify issues which address this project’s fundamental objective; to enumerate, characterize 
and evaluate the critical dynamic and safety issues. Issues which do not affect the dynamic 
performance and which do not represent transient issues to the architecture were eliminated 
from the prioritization effort. Therefore, the issues in sections 1.1 and 1.3 were eliminated from 
the prioritization task. As stated in the introduction to section 1, only nominal/off-nominal 
operating scenarios were prioritized during this task. The other issues categories effect the 
architecting of the system and the assessment of system performance. Architecture design 
issue must be addressed during system definition.  
2.1.2 Probability of Occurrence and Severity of Potential Impact 
Issue prioritization consisted of an informal high level FMECA analysis of failure conditions. 
As such, each operation condition/failure was qualitatively assessed in terms of the probability 
of encountering the event/state and the potential severity of the failure consequences.  
Qualitative ranking for probability of occurrence were assigned on a 1 to 5 scale. Frequent 
occurrence was given a value of 5, reasonably probable issues were given a value of 4, 
remotely probable issues were given a value of 3, extremely remote issues were given a value 
of 2, and extremely improbable issues were given a value of 1.  
The severity of the failure consequences was identified in terms of the impact on the TeDP 
electrical grid’s ability to provide power required for thrust and flight control. This 1 to 5 scale 
was adopted for the remaining prioritization categories. Failures with a large impact system 
performance were assigned a value of 5 and failures with little impact on system performance 
were assigned a value of 1.  
2.1.3 Triviality of the Solution 
This evaluation category allowed prioritization based on the expected difficulty in 
accommodating for this operating scenario. This ranking category responded to the question, 
“Does this issue present challenges which are significantly different than those encountered in 
traditional systems?”  
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Compare the triviality associated with the occurrence of a lightning strike and the loss of 
energy storage. The design solutions for a lightning strike are relatively similar to those applied 
on a traditional aircraft. Design solutions include additional EMI and ground shielding. 
Therefore, the lightning strike issue yields a triviality value of 2.  
In contrast, the loss of energy storage presents significant challenges in terms of the 
responsiveness of the electrical grid. Failures of the SMES system result in loss in fill in current 
during large dynamic loading. This results in much stiffer transient requirements on the 
generators and engines. Solutions to this issue would require tuning of the entire system and its 
requirements. As such, this issue was assigned a triviality value of 4. 
2.1.4 Programmatic Constraints 
Programmatic constraints consider the timeline and budget available for the project. Task 
1.e requires that dynamic system models be generated for evaluation of each of the 
recommended issues for study. However, the depth complexity of this dynamic model varies 
depending on the issue under consideration. Issues which can be addressed with simple 
dynamic models are assigned a priority value of 5, while issues which require highly complex 
dynamic models for accurate assessment are assigned a priority value of 1.  
By illustration, issues such as the loss of energy storage or the dynamics involved in 
nominal acceleration/deceleration may be represented by simple power flow models with 
assumed fixed voltages. However, addressing low level issues like rectifier commutation failures 
due to AC system faults requires voltage, current, and frequency domain considerations. 
Addressing such issues demand considerable increases in the required modeling effort.  
2.2 Issue Rankings 
Final issue rankings are given in Table 5 and shown according to priority in Figure 2.  
It should be noted that 3 of the top 4 prioritized relate to issues in characterizing the effects 
of dynamic performance requirements for a nominal mission for the superconducting TeDP 
electrical system. All of these issues exhibit high probabilities of occurrence, medium 
performance criticality, medium triviality, and do not require complex modeling for dynamic 
analysis. These issues attempt to answer the questions; “What is the expected baseline system 
performance?” and “How does component transient capability impact system level transient 
capability?” 
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Table 5. Issue Prioritization Rankings 
Category Issue 
Probability of  
Occurrence 
Effects on 
power or 
control loss 
Triviality 
of the 
Solution 
Programmatic 
Constraints Sum 
N
om
in
al
 Acceleration/Deceleration  5 3 3 5 16 
Aircraft Control  
(Stability Augmentation) 
5 3 3 4 15 
Gust/Crosswind 5 3 3 4 15 
O
ff-
N
om
in
al
 
Lightning Strike  4 2 2 1 9 
Propulsor Bird/Debris/Foreign 
Object Ingestion  4 2 3 3 12 
Turboshaft 
Bird/Debris/Foreign Object 
Ingestion  
4 4 1 4 13 
Shaft Break 2 4 3 4 13 
Engine shutdown 3 4 4 4 15 
Disk Burst 1 5 1 2 9 
Engine loses feedback of 
speed control loop 1 1 1 4 7 
Internal short on Generator 2 4 5 3 14 
Internal open on Generator 2 2 4 3 11 
Voltage regulation failure 3 2 3 3 11 
Temporary fault on AC system 
connected to rectifier 3 3 3 3 12 
Rectifier commutation failure 
due to AC system fault 
connected to rectifier 
3 3 2 2 10 
Fault on superconducting 
electrical system 3 3 3 3 12 
Temporary overvoltages from 
initiating and clearing AC or 
DC system faults using a 
circuit breaker 
4 1 3 3 11 
Ground fault on a pole of 
bipolar DC distribution system 2 3 4 3 12 
Corona  2 1 2 1 6 
Loss of Energy Storage 2 5 4 3 14 
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Figure 2. Issue Prioritization Comparison 
The other 3 issues in the top 6 are engine shutdown, loss of electrical storage, and internal 
generator short. These off-nominal operating conditions present limitations in system 
performance which must be understood and characterized. Evaluation of these issues informs 
the above questions and identifies undesirable operating modes which must be prevented 
through augmentation of the architecture design.  
The top six prioritized issues listed in Figure 2 are recommended items for further study. 
These selected issues are given in Table 6. The nominal operational scenarios are applied to 
capture the fundamental dynamics of the system. In addition, the off-nominal failure cases begin 
to identify the required operational limits and to refine the architecture concept. These prioritized 
issues were used to inform architecture definition discussed in section 3 and provide the basis 
for the analysis discussed in Section 8.  
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Table 6. Recommended Issues 
Category Questions to be answered Issue 
Nominal 
Operations 
What is the baseline system performance?  
What does the system need to look like? 
Acceleration/Deceleration 
Gust/Crosswind 
Aircraft Control and Stability Augmentation 
What is the role of energy storage? Identifying Energy Storage Requirements 
Off-Nominal 
Operations 
What is the system level effect? 
Is this failure a design show-stopper? 
What additional requirements need to be 
included? 
Engine Shutdown 
Loss of Energy Storage 
Internal Short on Generator 
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3. Architecture Trades 
Task1.d The Contractor shall propose an architecture for the power network, e.g. how many separate 
busses (transmission lines) should be used, how the generators and motors should be segregated or 
isolated from each other to avoid catastrophic faults, how faults should be isolated, etc.  
The Baseline N3-X TeDP Baseline architecture includes two wingtip mounted turboshaft 
engines which drive cryogenically cooled superconducting electrical machines. Power 
electronics convert the Variable Frequency AC power to DC so as to improve distribution 
efficiency and eliminate the requirements to sync the power sources. Each powerplant 
(engine/generator(s)/converter(s) combination) is sized to provide 30,000-hp minimum power 
required at takeoff for the single engine failure scenario as recommended by NASA studies. 
A superconducting electrical system distributes the generated DC power to 14 or 15 
propulsor fans placed at the training edge of the blended wing body. Architecture trades were 
performed for the 14 propulsor architecture concept. Implications of one additional propulsor are 
assumed to be minimal due to the level of redundancy already available. These propulsors 
(motor drive/motor/propulsor fan) provide the necessary propulsive power and assist in aircraft 
yaw control through differential thrust. 
Failure scenarios determine the sizing critical requirements for aircraft power systems. The 
unique role of the TeDP electrical distribution system in supporting flight critical functions 
requires that failure probabilities be less than 10-9. Additionally, fail-safe requirements dictate 
that no single point failure may result in catastrophic consequences. In the event of a unit level 
failure, assuming that the fault is appropriately identified and isolated, sufficient capability must 
be available from the unaffected portions of the architecture. 
For a commercial aircraft, the takeoff scenario presents the most stringent failure 
requirements to the architecture propulsion system. For the N3-X aircraft, a minimum of 
approximately 30,000 hp must be available for safe execution of a rolling takeoff according to 
NASA studies. This was assumed to be the sizing-critical case. As such, this power level 
represents the lower limit for the TeDP electrical system for safe operations. No unit failure or 
statistically significant combination of failures is allowed to yield sustained lapses in power 
below this 30,000-hp threshold. During the architecture definition task a formal contingency 
analysis was performed with steady state capability analysis.  
3.1 Contingency Analysis 
Sizing the architecture components requires a balance between redundancy, unit capacity, 
and unit reliability. Unit capacity typically refers to the nominal power rating of the unit. Typically, 
single point failure scenarios drive unit and architecture sizing. However, all statistically 
significant failure/contingency scenarios must be considered as a potential source of sizing 
critical requirements for some unit in the system.  
In reconfiguring redundancy, the maximum number of generators per engine was limited to 
two (it was assumed that each generator would have a dedicated AC to DC converter). 
Additionally, the maximum number of transmission lines along the wing, from the power plant 
(turboshaft engine, generator, and converter) to the bank of propulsors was two. The two 
transmission lines are physically separated along the leading and trailing edge of the wing. Each 
power plant must be sized for the single engine failure scenario and must therefore be sized to 
provide the 100% of the minimum takeoff power required. 
While 200% minimum power is required, it is not necessary to size all distribution and 
propulsion to the same level. Depending on the number of central distribution buses and the 
interconnectivity between power plant and distribution, the sizing of each bus varies. If multiple 
power sources are made available to the buses, the buses are not sized by single engine failure 
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contingency scenarios, but by single bus failure scenarios. Under these circumstances, a two 
bus architecture sizes the buses to 100% minimum power load each, a three-bus architecture 
sizes buses to 50% minimum power load each, and a four-bus architecture sizes each bus to 
33.33% of the overall load.  
A total of 14 propulsors was assumed for this study. The number of propulsors depends on 
their required diameter and the available width of the propulsor bay. However, due to potential 
propulsor size reductions, the total count may increase. In turn, capacity requirements will be 
affected. 
These trades were highlighted by an analog propulsion reliability analysis of the 
architecture. The architecture was divided into five sub-systems: engine (engine and shaft), 
power generation (electric machines, AC/DC Converter), wing transmission, central bus, and 
propulsor (drive, motor, fan). For an architecture with 2 engines, 2 generator/converter units per 
engine, 2 wing transmission lines per wing, 4 central buses, and 14 propulsors, 28 single point 
failure conditions were assumed. 378 two unit failure scenarios were identified and evaluated by 
applying the following assumptions.  
First, it was assumed that each unit exhibits failure probabilities less than 10-4. Additionally, 
unit failures were assumed independent. Also, it was assumed that protection equipment is able 
to isolate each failure. Finally, common cause failures were also neglected.  
If unit level failure probabilities exceed this level, an additional 3278 (28 choose 3) must be 
evaluated to determine probability of thrust loss. Probability of a given set of unit failures is 
calculated by Equation (1). Here, jF  if the probability of contingency scenario j , where all units 
in failure set jS  fail simultaneously. This failure set, jS , indicates all units which fail in 
scenario j . Additionally, 
iunit
F is the independent failure probability of unit i . 

j
i
Si
unitj FF
∈∀
=  (1) 
A total of 406 contingency failure probabilities were identified (28 single unit failures and 278 
two unit failures). Each contingency scenario results in some loss in thrust available. The 
probability that the TeDP can provide a certain thrust level is given by Equation (2). In this 
equation, the probability of having some thrust available ( AvailT ) is indicated by ( )AvailT TF . This 
probability is the union of all contingency failure set probabilities ( jF ) which cannot provide 
thrust greater than or equal to AvailT  ( Availj TTj ≤∀ : ). 
( ) j
TTj
AvailT FTF
Availj

≤∀
=
:
 (2) 
Analysis of all statistically significant failure scenarios for an architecture results in the blue 
line on the graph in Figure 3. The blue line indicates the probability of having a certain 
percentage of thrust lost based on the identified failure scenarios. Figure 3 graphs this trend for 
one architecture and specific component sizing. A total loss of thrust is much less likely than a 
small loss of thrust. The red line on this graph indicates the required reliability. Availability of 
total power of less than 30,000 hp is limited to 10-9 probability. Losses of power which provide 
more than 30,000 hp may be limited by some other undesirability limits. However, for this study 
no other requirements were explicitly specified. Therefore, loss probabilities of 1 are acceptable 
for non-catastrophic thrust losses. The percentage loss at which the step change in required 
reliability occurs depends on the nominal total thrust available from the system.  
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Figure 3. Contingency Scenario Thrust Loss Probability 
As illustrated in Figure 3, changing the attributes of the system affects the architecture’s 
ability to meet reliability requirements. Increasing unit reliability affects the loss probability and 
increasing redundancy and capacity affect the thrust loss impact of each failure state. The 
reliability and power rating of each component affects the reliability and redundancy of the 
system. 
This analysis was used to identify the required sizing and reliability requirements for each of 
the TeDP systems depending on architecture composition. For this analysis it was assumed that 
all potential relationships within the system were utilized: each wing transmission line can 
receive power from all generators on its corresponding wing side, each central bus can receive 
power from each transmission line, and each central bus can feed any propulsor. While this 
assumption does not represent the ideal architecture in terms of weight and complexity, this 
analysis shows the best case scenario of system sizing.  
3.1.1 Generators/Converters 
To identify the system reliability, failure probabilities for each system were estimated. In 
general, failure probabilities less than 10-5 for the turbo shaft engines and central buses were 
sufficient regardless of the central bus redundancy. However, the required reliability for 
generator/converter systems and wing transmission systems varied based with the level of 
redundancy. Architectures with a single generator per engine required each generator/converter 
combination to have a reliability greater than 10-5. Concepts with two generators per engine 
reduced this reliability requirement to 10-4. The same trend occurs with changes to transmission 
redundancy. Table 7 outlines these trades. 
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Table 7. Power Plant and Transmission Redundancy Options 
1 Generator/Converter 
1 Transmission Line 
2 Generator/Converter 
1 Transmission Line 
 
 
Weights: 
  Generator: 
 
  Transmission: 
 
Reliability Required 
  Generator: 10-5 
  Transmission: 10-5 
 
 
 
Weights: 
  Generator: 
    - Housing Weight 
  Transmission: 
    - Bus Weight 
    o Power Sharing 
Reliability Required 
  Generator: 10-4 
  Transmission: 10-5 
 
1 Generator/Converter 
2 Transmission Line 
2 Generator/Converter 
2 Transmission Line 
 
 
Weights: 
  Generator: 
    - Baseline 
  Transmission: 
    - Bus Weight 
    - Shielding Weight 
Reliability Required 
  Generator: 10-5 
  Transmission: 10-4 
 
 
 
Weights: 
  Generator: 
    - Housing Weight 
  Transmission: 
    -Shielding Weight 
 
Reliability Required 
  Generator: 10-4 
  Transmission: 10-4 
 
 
It is assumed that marginal weight penalties are associated with one generator rated at 22.4 
MVA vs. two generators with a total capability of 22.4 MVA. Note that the generators and motors 
are rated in MVA. Normal conducting electric machines are capable of producing real and 
reactive power, so they are rated in MVA rather than MW or hp. A 22.4 MVA rated generator is 
capable of producing 30,000 hp. If reactive power generation is required in the system, the 
generators should be rated at a higher MVA in order to accommodate this requirement. 
Throughout the rest of the discussion in this document, the ratings of the generators and motors 
will be referred to in hp, which is the real power rating of the machines. These generators are 
situated on the same shaft and could potentially be housed in the same cryogenic housing but 
have separate windings. Therefore, in order to reduce the maintenance/reliability requirements 
of the generators, converter, and transmission lines, dual redundancy per power plant is 
recommended. If these weights become problematic, a single generator and/or single 
distribution line can provide sufficient reliability at a potential expense of unit level maintenance 
costs.  
3.1.2 Distribution 
It is recommended that each engine generator supplies power to an independent wing 
transmission line. Adding a bus and/or bus ties does not change the required system reliability 
and adds weight to the system at the wingtips. The potential benefit of adding a bus tie is the 
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added ability to more evenly distribute propulsor loads between engines/generators during a 
bus or transmission line scenario.  
Each power plant and wing transmission system is sized to provide for the total minimum 
power requirement. With sufficient system interconnections (multiple power sources per bus), 
however, the central buses can be sized by the one bus failure scenario. This sizing represents 
the best case scenario for buses in terms of weight. In such a case, with N  indicating the total 
number of buses, each central bus must carry 
( )1
1
−N
 of the minimum power requirement.  
3.1.3 Propulsors 
Similarly to the distribution system, sufficient interconnections in the distribution system 
allow the propulsors to be sized for propulsor failure scenarios. However, due to the large 
number of propulsors, the propulsors are not sized to a single unit failure scenario. Ideally, for a 
system with 14 propulsors, 12 must be able to support the minimum thrust load. Therefore, each 
propulsor would be sized to 2500 hp instead of the original NASA estimates of approximately 
4300 hp (3200 kW) (each propulsor providing 121  of the minimum power requirement).  
It should be noted that this reliability analysis did not consider the sizing impact of common 
cause failures. Events which have the potential to eliminate benefits of redundant system may 
require further assessment of unit sizing. For example, if propulsor bird strike has the potential 
to disable multiple propulsors, the 
12
1  sizing value may prove insufficient. 
It is also recommended that propulsors be assigned to the buses in a symmetric fashion to 
the largest extent possible. Additionally, as much as possible, power is provided to the 
propulsors so that a loss of an engine results in the same magnitude of available control 
moment from the remaining propulsors. The control surfaces for conventional two engine 
aircraft are typically sized by a single engine failure scenario. Yaw control must be employed 
which counters the asymmetric thrust. A benefit to this TeDP concept is the ability to avoid 
undesirable control moments during propulsion loss.  
This concept is illustrated in Figure 4. This figure shows an architecture in which a single 
feeder provides power to each propulsor. The purple and dark blue buses receive power from 
the left engine and the red and orange buses receive power from the right engine. The bus and 
propulsor assignments are given in the corresponding table. The propulsors are labeled in terms 
of the on which they are situated and their distance from the aircraft axis of symmetry. Outboard 
propulsors are indexed lower than the inboard propulsors.  
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Propulsor Bus Assignments 
Left 
Engine 
Purple 
Bus 
L4, R4 
L7 
Blue Bus L1, R1 
L5, R5 
Right 
Engine 
Red Bus L3, R3 
R7 
Orange 
Bus 
L2, R2 
L6, R6 
 
Figure 4. Symmetric Assignment of the Propulsors to Distribution Buses 
In the event of a right engine failure, the aircraft retains control authority provided by the 
outermost propulsors (R1, L1) and the fourth propulsor from the outside (R4, L4). The moment 
generated by the left wing propulsors is ( )pp xT 10× , where pT is the thrust provided by one 
propulsor and px is the width of each propulsor. This moment is also countered by the propulsor 
on the right wing. Due to the number of buses and propulsors in this concept the only adverse 
moment generated by an engine failure scenario comes from the innermost set of propulsors. 
In the event of a left engine failure, the aircraft retains control authority provided by the 
second propulsors (R2, L2) and the third propulsor from the outside (R3, L3). The moment 
generated by the left wing propulsors for a left engine failure is also ( )pp xT 10× . Left engine 
failure scenarios also present a slight yaw moment from the inboard propulsors. 
3.2 System Level Architecture Concepts 
This section discusses four architecture concepts which vary in complexity, sizing and 
redundancy. All architectures have four embedded generators, independent wing transmission 
lines, and 14 propulsors. The concepts are dissimilar in terms of the distribution system sizing, 
configuration, redundancy, and propulsor sizing. Protection strategies are not discussed in this 
section but will be addressed in section 5.4. The focus here is on overall redundancy required. A 
diagram and layout for each of these architectures are provided in Appendix A. 
The architectures presented here by no means represent all of the potential architecture 
configurations for the TeDP architecture. However, they do represent promising architecture 
solutions and references for weight trades that will be highlighted in further sections.  
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3.2.1 Concept 1: Baseline Architecture 
A baseline architecture concept is illustrated in Figure 5. This concept corresponds to the 
system layout in Figure 4. This baseline consists of four independent electrical systems. Each 
electrical system consists of 1 generator, 1 AC/DC converter, 1 bus with an associated energy 
storage device, and 3 or 4 propulsors.  
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Figure 5. Baseline Architecture Diagram 
Table 8. Baseline Architecture Sizing 
Scenarios 
Sizing Scenarios 
Engine 1 Engine Failure 
Generator/Converter 1 Engine Failure 
(3 or 4 propulsors) 
Transmission Lines 1 Engine Failure 
(3 or 4 propulsors) 
Buses 1 Engine Failure 
(3 or 4 propulsors) 
Feeders 1 Engine Failure 
( )7%100  
Propulsors 
(Drive/Motor/Fan) 
1 Engine Failure 
( )7%100  
 
The table to the right of the diagram (Table 8) indicates the scenario that sizes each element 
in the system. The size of each element is indicated in terms of percentage of 30,000 hp, the 
required power for rolling take-off. As is outlined in the table, a single engine failure scenario 
dominates all other off-nominal operations for the baseline architecture.  
To understand the percentage sizing, consider the single engine failure scenario. In that 
case, seven propulsors are required to provide the minimum power requirements. Therefore, 
each propulsor must account for roughly 14.3% (approximately 4,300 hp (3,200 kW)) of the 
minimum power. The two inner buses support 3 of the propulsors and the outer buses support 4 
propulsor and must be rated to approximately 12,900 hp (9,600 kW) and 17,200 hp (12,800 kW) 
respectively. The power ratings of the generators, converters, and transmission lines 
correspond to the rating of each bus for which they are responsible.  
While this architecture is attractive in terms of simplicity, it is evident that the components 
must have a large capacity. It was earlier observed that a propulsor rating of 2,500 hp 
(1,900 kW) is achievable with sufficient interconnectivity and redundancy. This represents a 
70% capacity of the propulsors.  
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3.2.2 Concept 2: Inner Bus Tie 
This second architecture concept reduces the propulsor capacity by adding a bus tie 
between the two inner buses. The architecture diagram and sizing scenarios are indicated in 
Figure 6 and Table 9. 
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Figure 6. Inner Bus Tie Architecture Diagram 
Table 9. Inner Bus Tie Architecture 
Sizing Scenarios 
Sizing Scenarios 
Engine 1 Engine Failure 
Generator/Converter 1 Engine Failure 
(3 or 4 propulsors) 
Transmission Lines 1 Engine Failure 
(3 or 4 propulsors) 
Buses 1 Engine Failure 
(6 or 4 propulsors) 
Feeders 1 Engine Failure 
( )10%100  
Propulsors 
(Drive/Motor/Fan) 
1 Engine Failure 
( )10%100  
 
The addition of a single bus tie between the inner buses allow for a reduction in propulsor 
capacity by over 30%. During the 1 engine failure scenario the bus tie is engaged allowing 
power to be provided to the propulsors on the red bus. In this configuration, 10 propulsors are 
tasked to provide the minimum requirements. Each propulsor is, therefore, sized at roughly 
3,000 hp (2,250 kW). This represents a significant reduction in propulsor weight.  
The minimum propulsor sizing is not yet achieved with this architecture and the buses are 
rated to have a higher capacity. Each bus is sized relative to the number of propulsors 
assigned. Additionally, weight penalties are also associated with the connection equipment 
which engages the two buses. This equipment must include some high voltage/power switching 
devices and a fault current limiter (FCL). A discussion of the necessary bus tie equipment is 
given in section 5.4. 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 29 
3.2.3 Concept 3: 3-Bus Multi-Feeder Architecture 
In an effort to further reduce the propulsor and bus weight, a 3-Bus configuration was 
defined. The architecture diagram and sizing scenarios are indicated in Figure 7 and Table 10. 
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Figure 7. 3-Bus Multi-Feeder Architecture Diagram 
Table 10. 3-Bus Multi-Feeder 
Architecture Sizing Scenarios 
Sizing Scenarios 
Engine 1 Engine Failure 
Generator/Converter 1 Engine Failure 
( )2%100  
Transmission Lines 1 Engine Failure 
( )2%100  
Buses 1 Bus/Engine 
Failure 
( )



−1
%100
N  
Primary Feeders 1 Bus Failure 
( )12%100  
Propulsors 
(Drive/Motor/Fan) 
2 Propulsor 
Failure 
( )12%100  
N: bus count 
All components in the previous architectures are sized by the 1 engine failure scenario. 
Elements in the 3-Bus Multi-Feeder Architecture, however, are sized by alternative sizing 
scenarios. Increasing the connectivity between bus and propulsor allows the propulsors to be 
optimally sized for their levels of redundancy. The propulsors are sized for the 1 engine failure 
scenario, and the buses are sized for the 1 bus failure scenario. Propulsors are sized to 
approximately 2,500 hp (1,900 kW) and the buses are sized to 15,000 hp (approximately 
11,200 kW). 
Redundant feeder lines do not need to be sized to the same rating as the primary lines. 
Feeders are sized for the 1 bus failure scenario. The propulsors are sized to support 
approximately 8.33% of the minimum power requirement. Therefore, when an outer bus is lost, 
the inner bus must be capable of supporting two of the buses originally allocated to the outer 
bus, or all of the failed bus’s propulsors must be partially supported to the level of two fully 
operating propulsors (this sizing is illustrated in Figure 6). When the inner bus is lost, each outer 
bus is responsible for supporting two of the propulsors originally assigned to the inner bus or 
partially supporting three of the remaining propulsors to the same load level. 
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3.2.4 Concept 4: Cross-Redundant Multi-Feeder Architecture 
The cross redundant architecture allows the wing transmission lines to support multiple 
central distribution buses. As such, the bus and feeder capacity can be decreased. The 
architecture and sizing scenarios are given in Figure 8 and Table 11. 
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Figure 8. Cross-Redundant Multi-Feeder Architecture 
Diagram 
Table 11. Cross-Redundant Multi-Feeder 
Architecture Sizing Scenarios 
Sizing Scenarios 
Engine 1 Engine Failure 
Generator/Converter 1 Engine Failure 
( )2%100  
Transmission Lines 1 Engine Failure 
( )
( )
( )











−
−
−
12
3
1
%100
N
N
N
 
Buses 1 Bus Failure 
( )



−1
%100
N  
Primary Feeders 2 Propulsor Failure 
( )12%100  
Propulsors 
(Drive/Motor/Fan) 
2 Propulsor Failure 
( )12%100  
N: bus count 
The significant different between this and the three other architectures discussed previously 
is the ability to route portions of a generators power to multiple buses. During an engine failure 
scenario the generator continues to support its primary bus to its maximum capacity (33.33%). 
The remainder of the generator capability (16.67%) supports a secondary bus. The secondary 
bus for the inner left generator is the primary bus for the outer right generator and the secondary 
bus for the outer right generator is the primary bus for the inner left generator. Under this 
configuration a single engine can support all propulsors by providing power to all of the buses.  
This cross-redundancy configuration, coupled with an asymmetric feeder redundancy 
routing takes advantage of all the capability available without having to increase the capacity of 
each component. The asymmetric feeder redundancy is configured as follows: the blue bus 
supports red’s primary propulsors, the red bus supports purple’s primary propulsors, the purple 
bus supports orange’s primary propulsor, and the orange bus supports the blue bus’s primary 
propulsors.  
While this architecture may exhibit advantages in terms of capacity, off-nominal operations 
require more complex rerouting of power. Asymmetric feeder routing requires that unique 
contingency strategies be employed for each bus failure, generator failure, and engine failure.  
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3.3 Architecture Component Breakdown 
Table 12 breaks down each of the four architecture concepts in terms of the number and 
power rating of each component. The component ratings outlined in this table and the power, 
torque, and current density values are used to estimate overall architecture weight. In addition, 
operating voltages must be defined in order to size the distribution equipment. Engine and 
propulsor speeds must also be defined to estimate machine weights. The assumed length of 
each cable is also given in this table for the transmission and feeder lines.  
 
Table 12. Architecture Component Breakdown 
Components 
 
Arch1:  
Baseline 
 
Arch2:  
Inner Bus Tie 
 
Arch3: 
3-Bus Multi-Feeder 
 
Arch4:  
Cross-Redundant Multi-
Feeder 
Count Rating (MW) Count 
Rating 
(MW) Count 
Rating 
(MW) Count 
Rating (MW) 
Electric 
Machines 
Generator  
2 12.79 2 13.42 4 11.19 4 11.19 
2 9.59 2 8.95     
Motor 14 3.2 14 2.24 14 1.86 14 1.86 
Converter 
AC/DC 
2 12.79 2 13.42 4 11.19 4 11.19 
2 9.59 2 8.95     
DC/AC 14 3.2 14 2.24 14 1.86 14 1.86 
Cables 
Transmission 
2 
12.79 
(1x30m, 
1x40m) 
2 
13.42 
(1x30m, 
1x40m) 
4 
11.19 
(2x30m, 
2x40m) 
4 
7.46 
(2x30m, 
2x40m) 
2 
9.59 
(1x30m, 
1x40m) 
2 
8.95 
(1x30m, 
1x40m) 
  4 
3.73 
(2x30m, 
2x40m) 
Feeder 
14 3.2 (14x5m) 14 
2.24 
(14x5m) 14 
1.86 
(14x5m) 14 
1.86 
(14x5m) 
    8 9.33 (8x5m) 8 
9.33 
(8x5m) 
    6 12.43 (8x5m) 6 
6.22 
(8x5m) 
Breakers 
AC 
2 12.79 2 13.42 4 11.19 4 11.19 
2 9.59 2 8.95     
14 3.2 14 2.24 14 1.86 14 1.86 
DC 
4 12.79 4 13.42 8 11.19 8 7.46 
4 9.59 4 8.95   8 3.73 
28 3.2 28 2.24 28 1.86 28 1.86 
    16 9.33 16 9.33 
    12 12.43 12 6.22 
  1 6.72     
Superconduct
ing Fault-
Current 
Limiters 
AC  
2 12.79 2 13.42 4 11.19 4 11.19 
2 9.59 2 8.95     
DC  
2 12.79 2 13.42 4 11.19 4 7.46 
2 9.59 2 8.95   4 3.73 
  1 6.72     
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4. Architecture Sizing Analysis 
Task1.d The Contractor shall propose an architecture for the power network, e.g. how many separate 
busses (transmission lines) should be used, how the generators and motors should be segregated or 
isolated from each other to avoid catastrophic faults, how faults should be isolated, etc.  
4.1 Component Power, Torque, and Current Densities 
Weight is the primary metric applied to compare these four architecture concepts. However, 
estimating unit weights requires projecting the power/torque/energy density of each component 
to the 2035 timeframe. Table 13 gives the component density values in terms of the TRL of the 
technology. The system weight is calculated by estimating component weight using linear 
density relationships. Device ratings are as indicated in the technology review section of this 
document (percent of min power required). 
Table 13. Component Weight Approximation Density Values 
Component TRL 7-9 TRL 5-6 TRL 3-4 TRL 0-2 
Electric Machines 
 
23 Nm/kg  
(Rolls-Royce 
Estimate) 
50 Nm/kg33 100 Nm/kg83 
Converters 
 8 kW/kg34,35 
26 kW/kg (Rolls-
Royce 
Estimate)36  
40 kW/kg37 
Cables  50 A/kg/m38 250 A/kg/m39 500 A/kg/m40 
SFCL  4.1 kW/kg 4.2 kW/kg41   
DC breakers 12 kW/kg42 
(lightning 
protection) 
93 kW/kg43  
60 kW/kg44 
14 kW/kg (solid 
state DC)45  
 
 
~200 kW/kg 
(solid state)46 
 
AC Breakers  260 kW/kg
47 
220 kW/kg48   
 
Due to uncertainty due to the 2035 entry into service date, the weight of the architecture 
concepts was evaluated for a range of component density values. The preferential architecture 
in terms of weight depends on how technology developed in the current years. As was 
discussed previously in section 3, the propulsors in architecture two both have a larger capacity. 
However, this architecture does not rely on multiple feeders for providing power to each 
propulsor. Architectures three and four reduce the propulsor size at the expense of added 
feeder weight. Therefore, depending on the component power/current density values, this 
architecture may or may not be preferential. Relevant parameters include power and torque 
density of the propulsor equipment, current density of the distribution lines, and power density of 
the AC and DC protection. 
It is important to note that energy storage and SFCL sizing was not performed during this 
stage of architecture analysis due to a lack of understanding of energy storage and fault 
interruption requirements. Additional information about the nature and role of these devices are 
necessary to determine the extent of their use within the system. Section 8.3 will discuss the 
trades between energy storage weight and fault recovery for energy storage devices.  
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4.2 Architecture Weight Comparison 
Architecture weights were estimated assuming a distribution voltage of ±10 kV. Section 
1.3.1 discusses DC voltage level selection considerations. For consistency with assumption 
made in previous NASA studies, a propulsor speed of 4,500 rpm and a turboshaft engine speed 
of 7,500 rpm were also used. 
Pair-wise comparisons of architecture weights are given in Figure 9. The information 
presented in this figure reflects weight approximations made using the current weight 
approximation tool. Component weight estimates are based on the assumptions regarding the 
level of protection required in each protection zone. Additionally, Fault current limiter and energy 
storage weights are not included for these weight comparisons. 
Each row of this grid shows the difference in weight between architecture concepts. Each 
cell in this grid represents the sensitivity of this difference in weight to the metric listed in the 
column. Positive values on the vertical axis indicate that the first architecture weight is greater 
than the second. Negative values indicate that the second weight is now greater than the first.  
The red numbers along the bottom of the graph matrix indicates the value of each 
corresponding component density value. These input values result in the delta weight values 
indicated by the red numbers along the left hand column. 
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Figure 9. Architecture Weight Comparisons in Terms of Component Density Values 
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Three observations are made from this figure. The first is, regardless of the component 
density values, the baseline concept is always heavier than the other three. Consider the ranges 
of the vertical axis for the first three rows in Figure 9. The weight of architecture 1 exceeds the 
weight of the other three architectures by between 800 and 3000 kg within the indicated ranges 
of component specific power, torque, and current. This higher weight is primarily due to 
propulsor sizing as indicated in the curves in the first two columns. The differences in weights 
are highly sensitive to power electronics power density and motor/generator torque density. 
Architecture 1 is only intended as a baseline example and is discarded as a competitive option 
due to its size issues.  
Secondly, Architecture 4 is always slightly lighter than architecture 3. This is apparent from 
the sixth or last row in Figure 9. The vertical axis of this row remains entirely positive. This offset 
in weight is primarily due to the circuit breakers on the feeder lines as is indicated by a high 
sensitivity to DC Breaker Power Density (column 4). This weight difference is not enough to 
disregard Architecture 3 as a potential solution. As discussed in section 3, the reduction of 
weight between Architecture 3 and 4 comes at the cost of added complexity. A 50-kg weight 
penalty may be acceptable if complex rerouting of power during failure scenarios is undesirable. 
The last observation regards the comparison between Architecture 2 and Architectures 3 
and 4. These comparisons are made in the fourth and fifth row of Figure 9. Any advantage, in 
terms of weight between these architecture concepts depends on the propulsor sizing and the 
feeder sizing. This is made evident by the high sensitivities in columns 1, 2, and 4. As discussed 
in section 3, Architectures 3 and 4 have a total propulsor capability of roughly 117% of the 
minimum power requirement while Architecture 2 has a total propulsor capability of roughly 
140%. This is achieved by applying more interconnections between the buses and the 
propulsors.  
The impact of feeder and propulsor weights is further illustrated in Figure 10. Again, these 
results represent weight approximations based on the current assumptions regarding 
component density values and the required protection equipment in each protection zone. This 
figure is essentially a combination of the data given in columns 1, 2, and 4 for row 5 in Figure 7. 
The two graphs compare the weight of architecture 2 and architecture 4 in terms of propulsor 
sizing metrics (power electronics and machine sizing) and the most significant feeder sizing  
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Figure 10. System Weight Trades in Terms of DC Breaker Power Density, Power Electronics Power 
Density, and Motor/Generator Torque Density 
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metric (DC breaker sizing). The deep blue area indicates portions of the design space where 
Architecture 2 is lighter than architecture4 (Delta Weight is negative). The green and red 
sections of this space indicate portions of the design space where Architecture 4 is lighter (Delta 
Weight is positive).  
The red dots on these figures represent the current TRL 5-6 technologies for converters, 
machines, and mechanically actuated breakers. The grey arrow indicates the position of current 
TRL 5-6 solid state breakers (14 kW/kg). The orange arrow represents the density values which 
may be available in the 2035 timeframe. These projected densities are the electric machine 
torque density of 100 Nm/kg, power electronics power density of 40 kW/kg, and solid-state 
circuit breaker power density of over 200 kW/kg.  
Depending on the progression of these technologies either architecture 4 may be the 
preferable architecture in terms of weight. Considering developments in high specific power 
solid state breakers, there is a high likelihood that Architectures three and four exhibit weights 
on the order of 100 to 200 kg lighter than Architecture 2.  
The weight breakdown for each of these architectures is illustrated in Figure 11. At 2035 
specific power, torque, and current values the weight differences between Architectures 2 and 4 
amounts to less than 5% of the total weight (~200 kg). 
Significant to this weight breakdown is the amount of protection equipment that is required. 
Depending on the architecture protection equipment adds between 1100 to 1500 kg to the 
architectures. Roughly 30% of the overall architecture weight is allocated to breakers. The  
 
30,000 hp Min Power Required 40 kW/kg  Power Electronics Power Density  
4500 rpm Prop. Speed 100 Nm/kg Motor/Generator Torque Density  
7500 rpm Turbine Speed 200 kW/kg DC Breaker Power Density  
±10 kV Voltage  350 kW/kg AC Breaker Power Density  
500 A/kg/m Feeder Linear Current Density  0 lb∙ft  Yaw Trimming Moment 
Figure 11. Weight Breakdown for all architecture concepts 
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weight approximations in this chart do not account for fault current limiter and energy storage 
equipment. In order to size these components, their transient requirements must first be 
understood. Energy storage is sized by the total energy it is required to provide, its power rating 
and transient requirements. Estimates for energy storage components size will be made 
following the dynamic modeling task. Fault current limiters are sized by nominal power, max 
fault current, and required reset time. Estimation of these parameters is limited due to the 
method of modeling used for this study. Power flow modeling limitations are discussed in 
section 7. 
Protection weight was not initially accounted for in NASA’s systems analysis. However, this 
architecture growth can be at least partially countered by a reduction in propulsor size. 
Propulsor motors and drives account for about 39% of the overall architecture weight (approx 
2000 kg with motors of 100 Nm/kg specific torque and drives with 40 kW/kg power density). 
Reductions in propulsor sizing requirement for Architecture 2 yield 620 kg loss in weight (30% 
reduction in propulsor weight). Architectures 3 and 4 are able to reduce propulsor weight by 
860 kg (~42%) of the baseline level.  
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5. Component Technology Evaluation 
Task1.d The Contractor shall propose an architecture for the power network, e.g. how many separate 
busses (transmission lines) should be used, how the generators and motors should be segregated or 
isolated from each other to avoid catastrophic faults, how faults should be isolated, etc.  
5.1 Superconducting Generator/Motor 
Presently, there are several superconducting field synchronous machines with room 
temperature or cryogenic high purity metal armatures.49 General Electric,50 Westinghouse, 
Reliance Electric/Rockwell Automation,51 American Superconductor,52 Siemens,53,54 and 
ALSTOM52 all have implemented high power generator designs based on superconducting field 
and conventional armature. Literature review shows no fully superconducting machines have 
been implemented due to alternating current losses in the armature and the expense of 
superconducting material.55,56 Both Long Engineering and General Electric have designed fully 
cryogenic machines for the Air Force Research Laboratory, yet the armatures were cryogenic 
metal not superconductor.57 There is a single example of a small prototype designed to be fully 
superconducting, yet has not been tested as an assemble unit. 58 The search also revealed no 
examples of flux pumped or flux pinned or trapped field designs.  
The field controlled machines are controlled under a slightly different feedback strategy, 
current mode instead of voltage mode, due to the negligible resistance of the field coil.59,60 
These machines would be controlled with a current mode buck power electronic converter and 
could support large flux density (>2 Tesla) due to the typical air core design.  
Contrary to the air core design, there is the homopolar iron core design, which alleviates the 
need to cool rotating superconducting material.58 In the homopolar design, the rotor is a variable 
reluctance structure around which a stationary field coil produces an axially directed magnetic 
flux in the rotor. The low reluctance paths vary with rotor angle and produce the time varying 
magnetic flux in the armature coils. 
Flux pinned or trapped superconductors use the Meissner effect. When a superconductor 
transitions from normal to superconducting states under a magnetic field, it will produce an 
equal and opposite magnetic field when the external field is removed. Thus, the term flux 
trapped or pinned. By using superconducting electromagnets, bulk superconductor disks have 
“trapped” magnetic flux as high as 15+ Tesla.61 
Flux “pumping” is a quantum effect, where either a small magnitude thermal transient62 or 
small magnitude magnetic field transient63 is induced in the superconductor in the 
superconducting state. Repeated induced of either field transient is converted to increased 
superconductor magnetic flux. This allows in situ magnetization of a superconducting field coil 
not with extremely large fields, but with the repeated application of either a small thermal or 
magnetic transient. This method could allow for re-magnetization of superconductors after 
unplanned quench, given sufficient time. 
Flux pinned or flux pumped field coils would be controlled as a low inductance permanent 
magnet machine. The lower inductance requires more detailed control and power electronics 
drive, such as a multilevel converter.64 So called “sensorless” control could be used on both the 
generators and propulsor motors. The generator back electromotive force (EMF) would be used 
to estimate angle for active rectification at optimal power factor. For propulsor motors, a slow 
acceleration from a defined electrical angle will allow for synchronization, since the propulsor 
torque will be negligible at start-up speeds. 
Research has been conducted for electric machines with superconducting rotors, but 
development of fully superconducting electric machines is still in the early stages. The Rolls-
Royce Strategic Research Center (SRC) has researched and developed prototypical electric 
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machines with DC superconducting field windings. Using a low-loss AC superconducting screen 
to prevent the strong magnetic fields produced by the superconductors from interfering with 
other systems, they have developed a machine with a torque density of 98.8 Nm/kg.83 The SRC 
has also designed superconducting stator and rotor electric machines using different materials 
for the screen. A recent study showed that a superconducting rotor and stator machine using an 
iron screen has an estimated torque density of 92 Nm/kg.65  
Another partially superconducting electric machine was developed for vehicle applications 
with a torque density of 50 Nm/kg33.  
A flux trapping and flux concentration superconducting rotor machine was designed for 
aviation. The machine was designed so that in the case of a cooling system failure, the machine 
could still provide 30% of take-off power in order to land safely.66 The field excitation was 
provided by Bi2223 Helmholtz type coils or NdFe magnets. YBCO plates were used to trap the 
magnetic flux. A squirrel cage shield was inserted in the air gap to generate asynchronous 
torque in the case of superconducting winding failure. The superconducting state of the machine 
provided 150 kW of power at 2700 rpm and weighed 28 kg. This prototype had a torque density 
of 19 Nm/kg.  
The present state of the higher torque density superconducting machine designs around 
100 Nm/kg shows that this type of machine may be feasible and developed enough for aircraft 
applications for the 2035. The low TRLs allow room for the technology and torque density to 
improve. This torque density allows the generators and motors to comprise a reasonable 
percentage of the electrical system weight 23-39% as estimated by the architecture weight 
comparison. 
5.2 Converter Technology 
Power electronics has increasingly replaced transformer and rectifier based conversion for 
better efficiency, power factor, and power quality at room temperature applications. Typical 
power converters use Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistors (MOSFETs), Bipolar 
Junction Transistors (BJTs), Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistors (IGBTs), Silicon Controlled 
Rectifier (SCRs), Integrated Gate Commutated Thyristors (IGCTs), Gate Turn-off Thyristors 
(GTOs), or other novel power semiconductor switches The characteristics of these power 
switching devices could be affected by cryogenic temperatures.  
There are several aspects to cryogenic operation of semiconductor switches. First, the 
carrier lifetime is increased. Second, the carrier density for a given doping is reduced. Third, the 
drift velocity increases. Fourth, the bandgap energy increases. These combine to affect devices 
that are based on carrier injection to have a higher junction potential drop (detrimental) and 
lower current gain (detrimental), such as BJTs and SCRs,67 whereas devices that are based on 
field induced depletion will have slower switching times (detrimental) and lower conduction 
channel resistance (beneficial).68,69 For devices such as IGBTs, these aspects align for an 
overall equal net efficiency of operation between room and cryogenic temperatures.70 However, 
according to some studies, utilization of GaN devices could mitigate all of these effects at 
superconducting temperatures71 
The typical doping magnitudes for semiconductors are designed for room temperature levels 
of performance. Aside from adjusting design parameters to meet performance at cryogenic 
temperatures, the most troublesome aspect is production and packaging devices to survive the 
thermal cycle, from a structural perspective. An example adjustment of room BJT devices 
include the addition of a lightly doped collector layers Studies have shown that devices 
specifically designed to operate at cryogenic temperatures.72 Particularly silicon germanium 
(SiGe) BJTs, which have shown useful current gains at deep cryogenic temperatures where 
silicon fails.  
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There are several possibilities for a three terminal superconducting devices.73,74 Literature 
search does not reveal any devices design for, or applied to, high power level electrical power 
conversion. Although, the reported action of single electron induce state transition between 
normal conduction and superconducting states seem to be scalable. 
With these advancements in mind, there is reasonable expectations that conventional and 
novel semiconductors or superconducting, transistor like, devices will perform at or above room 
temperature metrics. For instance, Ward et al.72 developed a 100 W converter to test at 30˚ K 
resulting in 90% efficiency. This laboratory prototype was designed specifically for the 
evaluation of semiconductor operation, not overall converter efficiency. Thus it would not be 
unreasonable to assume 95+% converter efficiency at cryogenic temperatures, or higher for the 
superconductor based devices, since modern power conversion equipment can exceed 98% 
efficient.75 
The Rolls-Royce SRC and NASA studies have looked into system level effects of high 
power density converters for motor drives. They concluded that a 5 kW/kg converter in ambient 
temperature be used, and this power density is considered current state of the art for 
aerospace. If the weight of the converters becomes prohibitively heavy, then different 
architectures could be considered to reduce the amount of conversion required while still 
maintaining high reliability. 
Cryogenically cooled converters that operate at high power levels with high power quality 
are still in the early stages of development with TRL 0-2. The power density of these converters 
is estimated to be 40 kW/kg.37 The present day converters with liquid cooling have a power 
density of about 26 kW/kg,36 which are being widely used in hybrid vehicle applications. These 
converters are being developed with a focus on high power quality at high temperature.  
5.3 HVDC Power Distribution 
5.3.1 Voltage Level 
Voltage levels on existing electrical systems for aircraft are relatively low. As power 
demands increase, it will be necessary to increase voltage levels so that conductor weight can 
be reduced. Standard DC voltage levels for Boeing 787 are ±270 VDC. The predominant reason 
for this voltage level limit is Paschen’s Law. This law describes the breakdown of an airgap in a 
uniform field versus the product of the distance between conductors and air pressure. Figure 12 
illustrates Paschen’s Law. The breakdown voltage is characterized for metal parallel plates in 
air. 
 
Figure 12. Illustration of Paschen's Law36 
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According to Paschen’s Law, the minimum breakdown voltage for any pressure-distance 
product is approximately 327 V. Voltage levels below this value at high altitude will not 
breakdown in an airgap. For this reason, existing aircraft DC voltages remain below the 327 V 
threshold. 
Higher voltage levels are desired in future aircraft electrical distribution systems as power 
demand increases. Increasing the voltage level allows the conductor current to decrease for the 
same power requirement. Reduced conductor current rating also reduces conductor weight. 
However, higher voltage levels require thicker insulation which contributes to an increase in 
cable weight.  
Operating the electrical system at a higher voltage increases the probability of breakdown in 
the airgap. The superconducting cables and physical layout of the electrical system must 
consider Paschen’s Law to avoid breakdown and discharge especially at high altitude by 
designing cable insulation and distance between conducting elements appropriately. The 
breakdown threshold voltage is also a function of temperature. For lower temperatures, which 
increase the air density, the strength of the gap is decreased. Since this electrical system is 
cryogenic, the breakdown voltage may be more sensitive to pressure and conductor distance 
than at the higher temperature curve for which Paschen’s Law is characterized. Other factors 
that should be considered when determining system voltage levels are contamination in the air 
gap, impact of vibration, abnormal system events, and transient events.76 
Superconducting cables are primarily constrained by the critical current density, JC, through 
the superconducting material. Superconducting cables are also evaluated by this critical current 
density over the entire cable area, which is called the engineering critical current density, JE. 
This metric is more appropriate since it considers the insulation and quench conductors required 
for a realistic cable. Figure 13 shows an example of critical current densities as a function of 
magnetic field and temperature for MgB2 conductors available today.77  
 
Figure 13. MgB2 Wire Performance Over Temperature77 
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Hyper Tech Research estimates that the available engineering current density of MgB2 
superconducting cables is 200-400 A/mm2, and that by 2035, the available engineering current 
density will be 2-3 times greater. As the current density increases, the quench conductor made 
of copper will also have to increase which may affect the cable weight. The quench conductor 
provides a fail-safe level of current carrying capacity during superconductor quench scenarios. 
To determine the optimal DC system voltage for minimum system weight or maximum power 
capability, a system level study should be completed considering the power densities, which are 
likely to be nonlinear, for each piece of equipment throughout the electrical system. Such a 
study requires reasonable estimates of power densities for superconducting generators and 
motors, cable, fault-current limiters, circuit breakers, and cryogenic converters. This fidelity of 
data is not available today, but as the technology evolves, the data could be collected or could 
be more accurately estimated in order to complete such a study. 
A similar type of study was conducted to estimate the optimal aircraft voltage based purely 
on standard wires, conductor radius, voltage rating, power rating, and weight for normal 
conductors at room temperature.78 This information was collected for wires of different gauges. 
Three plots showed how the optimal system voltage could be determined. The peak voltage 
rating vs. conductor radius, power rating vs. peak voltage rating, and power to weight ratio 
(kVA-m/kg) vs. peak voltage rating were plotted. As the conductor radius increased, the peak 
voltage rating decreased almost linearly. The power rating varied nonlinearly with voltage rating 
by increasing, cresting, then decreasing as voltage rating increased. A certain voltage yielded a 
maximum power rating. The power to weight ratio also varied nonlinearly with voltage rating, 
and a certain but different voltage yielded a maximum power to weight ratio. This voltage was 
slightly larger than the voltage that yielded maximum power. This study showed that the voltage 
could be chosen based on maximum power transfer capability or maximum power to weight 
ratio. This study acknowledges that this optimal voltage only considers cables and conductors. 
A better estimate of the system optimal voltage may be obtained if this study was extended to 
generators, power electronics, and loads.  
The manufacturability of the equipment also plays a major role in determining the optimal 
system voltage. Studies can show the theoretical optimal system voltage, but ultimately, each 
piece of equipment must be producible. When studying the optimal system voltage, 
manufacturability metrics should be included so that the ability to produce the equipment is 
taken into consideration when optimizing. 
The architectures discussed in section 3 assume a system DC voltage of ±10 kV. This 
voltage level may be reassessed as discussed in this section to determine the optimal DC 
system voltage. 
5.3.2 DC Voltage Configuration 
The voltage configurations considered for this DC distribution architecture are unipolar 
grounded, bipolar grounded with ground return, bipolar grounded with metallic return, and 
bipolar ungrounded systems. For example, if the maximum potential difference in the DC 
system is 20 kV, the unipolar grounded system would have DC rails at 0 kV and 20 kV, the 
bipolar grounded system would have DC rails at -10 kV and 10 kV, and the bipolar ungrounded 
system would have DC rails ranging from -20-0 kV and 0-20 kV. When a line-to-ground fault 
occurs on a unipolar system, the system cannot transmit power through the faulted section until 
the fault is cleared. However, when a line-to-ground fault occurs on a bipolar system, a partial 
amount of the system power can still be transmitted through the un-faulted line. When the 
bipolar system is grounded and a line-to-ground fault occurs, half of the system can still be 
transmitted. However, if the bipolar system is not grounded, zero to half of the system power 
can still be transmitted depending on the un-faulted line’s voltage relative to ground. From a 
reliability perspective, the bipolar grounded system is favorable over the other systems. 
Additionally, the cables for bipolar ungrounded systems must have insulation rated for the entire 
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system voltage even though it will not always operate at that voltage level. The optimal voltage 
study based on cable size previously referenced78 also concluded that a DC grounded system is 
capable of transferring more power and has a higher power to weight ratio if the proper voltage 
is selected than a DC ungrounded system. Such a study for superconducting cable or for a 
superconducting system is likely to have similar results. 
A bipolar grounded system that uses a metallic return rather than a ground return, which 
would be the airframe in this case, is preferred so that ground potential and current can be more 
readily controlled. If the metallic return is not electrically connected to the airframe, it may 
require increased protection to ensure its isolation from the airframe. 
5.4 Protection 
Four common protection design principles that should be considered are selectivity, 
sensitivity, reliability, and back up.79 Selectivity is determined by setting overcurrent protection 
levels at each protected device and subsequent zones that overlap with the device protection. 
The device’s protection should be most sensitive to a fault within the device. The next 
overlapping zone should be less sensitive than the device’s protection but should activate if the 
device’s protection does not detect a fault within the device. Overlapping zones coordinated 
properly for selectivity and sensitivity increase the protection system reliability to protect the 
electrical system from faults. Designing the control scheme with appropriate selectivity and 
sensitivity allows only the necessary sections of the distribution system to be isolated when 
necessary to protect the system from damage due to faults while still being able to transmit 
required power. 
Part of protection is the architecture design so that the system has enough redundancy to 
be able to reconfigure as necessary when one or more generators or one engine cannot provide 
power to the system. Under one of these scenarios, depending on the architecture, the system 
may use redundant propulsor motor feeder lines, distribution lines, or bus ties to reconfigure the 
system in order to provide required power to the propulsors. The protection equipment 
described in the following sections not only protect sections of the equipment from damage 
during abnormal operating conditions but also allow the system to reconfigure as indicated by 
the supervisory control. 
5.4.1 Protection Implementation 
The number and rating for the machines, converters, and cables as outlined in Table 12 
have been explained in the section 3. However, protection equipment represent significant 
contributions to the TeDP architecture overall weight. Protection equipment weight estimations 
were made by assigning protection equipment to each portion of the architecture. The use of 
protection equipment is illustrated in Figure 14. 
N.O.
N.O.
SCFCL SCFCL
Zone1
Zone2
Zone3
Zone4
Zone5
Zone6
Zone7
 
Figure 14. TeDP Protection Equipment Zones 
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Seven zones of protection were identified between a single generator to propulsor path. 
Zone one protects and isolates the generator. The generator is protected on the engine shaft 
side through the enforcement of engine limits. Over and under-speed limits are enforced by the 
engine Full Authority Digital Engine Controller. The generator is also protected on the AC side 
by breakers. The fault current rating for these breakers is limited by an AC superconducting 
fault-current limiter (SFCL or SCFCL) placed between the breaker and the AC/DC converter. 
Accordingly, each architecture concept requires 4 AC circuit breakers for Zone 1 protection. 
Additionally, a total of 4 AC SCFLs are used in all architecture.  
Zone 2 isolates the SFCL and AC/DC converter. An AC breaker isolates these components 
on the AC side and a DC breaker isolates on the DC transmission system side. The DC fault 
current is limited by a SCFL on the DC transmission line. This transmission line and SFCL are 
isolated by DC breakers at both the central bus and the generator (Zone 3). Architecture 1, 2, 
and 3 each use a total of 4 DC SFCLs and 8 DC circuit breakers for the power plant to central 
bus transmission lines. Architecture 4 requires an additional 4 DC SFCLs and 8 DC circuit 
breakers for the secondary transmission lines.  
Each device connected to the central bus uses a DC circuit breaker to isolate failures. This 
constitutes a protection zone (Zone 4) for the bus. Due to a bus tie between the inner buses, 
Architecture 4 requires an additional DC breaker and DCFCL. The feeder and bus share one 
point of protection. Each feeder (Zone 5) is isolated by two DC breakers: one at the bus and one 
at the propulsor. Therefore, Architectures 1 and 2 require 28 DC breakers in total on 14 feeder 
lines and architectures 3 and 4 require 56 DC breakers on 28 feeder lines 
The propulsor side protection zones 6 and 7 provide protection in similar fashion to zone 2 
and zone 1 respectively. However, due to the limited current rating of the propulsor side 
components SFCL are not used on these lines. In total, all architectures require 14 AC breakers 
to isolate faults at the propulsor motor. 
5.4.2 Strategies 
Protection strategies are the operation properties of the protection equipment that can be 
utilized to protect the device and the system. The superconducting capability of the electric 
machines may protect the machines from over-current. The converters have different 
configurations and modes of operation that can be utilized in different ways to protect the 
system. 
The fault-current limiting capability of a superconducting generator or motor is intrinsic to the 
machine. Superconducting stators inherently limit fault current similar to a superconducting fault 
current limiter. The superconducting machine will quench when the amount of current flowing 
through the stator is greater than the critical current limit of the superconductor. The nature of 
quenching reduces the current flowing through the stator since the resistance of the conductor 
significantly increases when quenched. This is the same principle that resistive-type SFCLs use 
to decrease fault current levels. If the critical current limit is designed appropriately, the 
quenching behavior of the machine can be used to provide over-current protection of the 
machine. In that case, a SFCL may not be necessary to protect the superconducting generator 
or motor.83 Not having to include a SFCL to protect the electric machines may be advantageous 
to the weight of the system. The overcurrent protection weight difference is a tradeoff between 
the SCFL weight and the added quench protection weight of the machine. When the electric 
machine sustains a fault, the machine may still need to be isolated from the system using AC 
circuit breakers (CBs).  
Another aspect to consider is the additional power required to return the machine to a 
superconducting state after quenching. The power level may be prohibitively large, so it may be 
desirable to keep the electric machines or other aspects of the system in a superconducting 
state and protect them from quenching. Additionally, the dynamic behavior of quenching and the 
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possibility of cascading thermal quenching needs to be studied to ensure that if quenching is 
used to protect the electric machines or other parts of the system, that quenching is controlled. 
The quenching effect of the superconducting generators does not protect the converters. 
The capacitors of the converters can still feed a significant fault current, so a fault current limiter 
for the converters may be beneficial.83 This applies to the generator rectifier as well as the motor 
inverters. It may be more likely to require a SFCL for the generator rectifiers than the motor 
inverters because the required power and current capability of the generator rectifiers is much 
greater than the motor inverters. The available device capability for normal and transient 
operation of the rectifiers and inverters will determine if the SFCL is necessary. 
The TeDP electrical system architecture is a multi-terminal DC system. In such a system, 
more than three converters are connected to the system. This presents challenges for converter 
power flow control and protection compared to a point-to-point DC system. The converters may 
be operated as current-sourced converters (CSC) or voltage-sourced converters (VSC).89 CSCs 
can inject power into the system more efficiently than VSCs. CSCs require reactive power 
support which can be provided by including reactors within or outside of the converter. This 
reactive support limits fault current and enables the converters to withstand short circuit 
currents. They can provide power in both directions if additional reversing switches are included 
in the converter. However, to provide power in the opposite direction, the voltage polarity must 
be reversed. The CSC control must be carefully designed so that the converter operation is 
stable during steady-state operation and transient events. DC systems where several CSCs are 
used may create control issues. During transient events, each converter may have a current-
dependent DC voltage between its terminals. For systems where CSCs are used to insert 
power, this control problem may need to be addressed. 89  
VSC operation and control may be more suitable for the multi-terminal DC electrical system. 
VSCs control the phase current for an essentially constant DC voltage. In the case of a 
superconducting system, the DC voltage is essentially constant and is independent of the direct 
current because the superconducting lines have almost no voltage drop. VSCs can produce 
reactive power and control active power, reactive power, and voltage in the AC sections of the 
system.81 However, this converter control is affected by line-to-ground faults.  
VSCs can reverse the flow of current without reversing voltage polarity. A DC 
superconducting cable is capable of safely handling this reversal in current flow.80 This type of 
control is advantageous if the power flow changes direction frequently. The current flow reversal 
causes the flow of power to reverse. If the converters are operated in this manner, one voltage-
controlling terminal is needed.81  
Using the converters to extinguish fault current requires the converters to reverse the flow of 
current, so this converter control capability is beneficial when using the converters for system 
protection. The rectifiers can be controlled to extinguish a temporary fault for a point-to-point 
and multi-terminal DC systems. When such a fault is detected and the supervisory control 
commands the rectifiers to extinguish the fault, each rectifier control operates the rectifier as an 
inverter by increasing the delay angle of the rectifier which controls the switching devices to 
reverse the flow of current.82,79 This reverse in current flow allows the energy driving the fault to 
reverse. This will drive the current in the fault to zero, allowing the fault to clear in the case of a 
temporary fault, or for equipment to isolate the faulted area from the system using circuit 
breakers, contactors, or switches.  
This property of VSC control is also advantageous for the propulsor electric machine control. 
In a two-engine failure scenario, the propulsors could be allowed to “windmill” and generate 
power for flight control. This may eliminate the need for a RAT. The capability to reverse the 
flow of current using VSC control allows the propulsor machines to act as generators if 
necessary. 
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Additionally, the VSC control system can use voltage droop monitoring to adjust power flow 
using the converters based on a change in DC voltage. The converter control should be 
designed to avoid fast voltage control of the converters since this operation may produce 
oscillations between the capacitor and any AC reactors within a converter. 
5.4.3 Detection 
Similar to terrestrial transmission and distribution protection and control, digital relays could 
be used to process measurements from potential and current transformers and other sensors to 
monitor component voltage and current levels as well as other component-specific 
measurements such as temperature to determine if the component is operating within normal 
limits. Depending on the measured values, the relays will determine whether the component is 
operating abnormally or there is a fault on the system. Relays will communicate with each other 
as necessary to isolate only necessary components or lines to protect equipment and maintain 
system stability without interrupting or reducing power distribution if possible. 
Typical detection schemes are non-directional over-current, directional over-current, and 
differential protection. Current protection involves sensing the current level on the distribution 
system near each component at both the input and output voltage connections. Over-current 
protection should include current level detection near the superconducting critical current level 
and low current levels that would occur after quenching to determine if the protected system is 
near quenching or has quenched. Directional over-current protection detects the direction of 
current flow in addition to magnitude. The directional information is useful to detect the location 
of a fault when buses are interconnected and a fault could be fed from both sides. Differential 
protection determines whether the current entering a protected section equals the current 
leaving it.  
The detection scheme used for each component depends on the component and 
architecture configuration. Generators should be protected using directional over-current. The 
quenching attributes of the superconducting generator may protect it from over-current; 
however, in the case of a sustained generator fault, protection equipment should be used to 
isolate the faulted generator from the system so that the fault does not persist. A persistent fault 
could damage or cause cascading quenching in neighboring equipment. The directional over-
current information is used to determine if the fault occurs in the generator or elsewhere in the 
system. 
Similar protection schemes should be used to protect the propulsor motors. The motors 
should be protected using a non-directional over-current scheme. Superconducting motors can 
also quench and protect themselves from over-current, but the system must be capable of 
isolating abnormally operating motors as necessary.  
The converter protection scheme should use differential protection to detect if the fault is 
within the converter or away from the converter. The converter protection scheme is different 
than schemes for other equipment since under normal operation, the converter actively controls 
the output current and voltage. Converters have several fault types malfunctions of switching 
devices, commutation failures, and short circuits in addition to overcurrent and overvoltage.79 
The converter controller should be designed to limit the effects on the system caused by 
transient disturbances from commutation failure and malfunctions of switching devices. For a 
configurable architecture, the differential protection of a converter may be difficult. Typical back-
to-back HVDC converter differential protection involves differential relays on the AC side of the 
rectifier and AC side of the inverter. In that scheme, the AC circuit breakers that protect the 
converters may trip if the AC current into the converters does not match the AC current out of 
the converters within a certain margin. For this aircraft electrical system involving multi-terminal 
converters, this differential protection scheme may be applied if it is known to which propulsor 
motors and converters the power from each generator converter is distributed. If the system is 
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highly interconnected, this protection scheme cannot be applied, and a different converter 
protection method must be developed. 
Bus bars should be protected using differential protection. Where buses are used to feed 
power through multiple lines, the relay must calculate the current flowing out of the bus as a 
sum of the feeder line currents connected to the bus. The differential relay then calculates the 
difference between the current flowing into and out of the bus.  
Transmission lines should use directional or non-directional over-current protection. 
Transmission lines in this architecture are the wing-central bus lines and propulsor motor feeder 
lines.  
5.4.4 Protection Equipment 
The protection equipment devices considered for the TeDP electrical system are circuit 
breakers, SFCLs, solid-state switches, converters, and reactors. Circuit breakers, solid-state 
switches, and converters are options to extinguish the energy from faults and isolate faulted 
sections of the electrical system. SFCLs and reactors can be used to limit fault current levels 
and the rate of change of fault current. These properties affect the system fault current level 
interruption requirements and system transient responses to faults which affects the operational 
requirements for the fault isolation equipment.  
5.4.4.1 DC Circuit Breakers Existing contactor or CB weight for a DC system is greater 
than for an equivalent AC system.83 DC circuit breakers operate by dissipating the energy of the 
fault in order to isolate the equipment they are designed to protect, whereas AC circuit breakers 
use the zero-current crossing nature of alternating current to extinguish the arc and isolate 
equipment. DC electromechanical circuit breakers or contactors rated for fault current vary in 
power density from 60 kW/kg to 200 kW/kg as the fault current rating varies. Existing aircraft 
have only used DC voltages up to ±270 VDC and solid state power controllers (SSPC) for 
protection. The SSPC are not capable of fault current breaking, but the devices can switch load. 
DC systems in existing aircraft are also not used to distribute power. The electric distribution in 
ships is developing towards DC distribution.84 The high voltage, high power DC circuit breaker 
requirement for the TeDP system is much greater than any previous aircraft electrical system.  
High powered DC circuit breakers have been developed for traction and industrial 
applications. Typical utility power systems use back-to-back HVDC converters where DC circuit 
breakers are not necessary since AC breakers and the converters can be used to isolate DC 
faults. Solid-state switches are an alternative protection device to electromechanical DC CBs. 
Section 5.4.4.3 discusses the use and development of solid-state switches.  
 Cryogenic DC circuit breaker technology has not been developed. For electromechanical 
DC circuit breakers, the cryogenic temperatures would cause the material to become brittle and 
fragile. Existing DC circuit breaker technology needs to be developed to operate in a cryogenic 
environment. 
Industrial DC circuit breakers for traction and industrial applications exist today. The DC CBs 
use arc chute technology to dissipate the energy from the fault. Presently available DC CBs 
have been nominally designed for approximately 4000A and up to several kV43. Such DC 
breakers have the ability to break up to 50 kA of short circuit current.42,43 These ratings show 
that DC contactors exist with approximate ratings for what is required for a system of this power 
level. With a weight of 160 kg, this circuit breaker has a nominal operation power density of 93 
kW/kg. This is within the range of 100-150 kW/kg as estimated by Edwards.83 This circuit 
breaker or contactor technology may develop to achieve an even high power density making it 
more suitable for aircraft electrical system protection.  
Electromechanical AC circuit breakers are also required to protect the distribution system. 
High power AC circuit breakers have been used for the terrestrial electrical grid for decades. As 
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the power level of aircraft increases, this technology can be adapted for aircraft applications. A 
sulfur hexafluoride gas-insulated AC circuit breaker operating nominally at approximately 12 kV, 
3600 A can break up to 50 kA.47 A different vacuum-insulated AC circuit breaker can operate at 
7.2 kV, 3150 A and break up to 40 kA.48 The power densities for these AC circuit breakers are 
262 and 227 kW/kg, respectively. The nature of fault interruption for AC circuits compared to DC 
circuits and the more developed AC CB technology contribute to the higher power density of AC 
CBs. 
If fully rated DC circuit breakers are assumed to have a power density of 100-150 kW/kg, the 
weight of the DC CBs can be estimated. Section 4.2 estimates the weight of the protection 
equipment which includes CBs and SFCLs for several architectures. The protection equipment 
weight estimate is approximately 30% of the entire electrical system weight. The architecture 
studies previously discussed show that protection equipment weight should be included in the 
weight estimate of the system. The system operates at high power levels and the projected 
power densities of protection equipment makes the protection weight equipment contribution 
significant. The initial NASA electrical distribution weight which did not include protection weight 
estimate was 10% of the electrical system weight.85 The circuit breaker technology power 
density must improve or different means of interrupting fault current, such as solid-state 
switches, must be used. The weight of DC CBs is considerable and should be included in the 
system weight and reliability optimization.  
If SFCLs are used in conjunction with circuit breakers, the weight and physical size of the 
circuit breakers may decrease due to the decreased level of required current interruption. The 
following section 5.4.4.2 discusses SFCL technology in more detail.  
5.4.4.2 Superconducting Fault Current Limiters (SFCLs) The current-limiting function of 
SFCLs allows these devices to play several roles in the electric power distribution system. 
Limiting current allows the nominal and fault level ratings of equipment, such as converter 
switching devices or CBs, to be lower than without the SFCL. Current limiting may also limit the 
actual current density flowing through superconducting cables and other equipment, reducing 
the likelihood of approaching the critical current density of equipment. 
The properly designed SFCL will limit the current so that the fault current level is high 
enough for protection systems to detect the fault but low enough so that protection devices do 
not have to be rated to handle or interrupt large currents. As a result of the reduction in fault 
current, the rating of the circuit breaker will be reduced as well as the weight and physical size 
of the CB. Using SFCLs with CBs may also increase the reliability of successful fault interruption 
because the SFCL, when operating as designed, will limit the fault current seen by the CB to its 
rated value. Requiring the CB to interrupt a smaller amount of fault current may also decrease 
the fault current interruption time since the CB will be required to dissipate less energy. 
However, typically for protection device coordination, larger currents will cause protection 
devices to trip faster than smaller currents. Careful use of SFCLs and protection control 
schemes need to be implemented to use SFCLs to give the system the most benefit of reduced 
fault current levels while still having reliable protection. When SFCLs are used throughout the 
system to reduce the overall system fault current level, magnetic and thermal stresses on 
distribution equipment, component cost, and voltage disturbances will be reduced.45 
A benefit of utilizing several fault current limiters in the electrical distribution system is that 
each fault current limiter can be rated based on the local source of fault current rather than the 
sum of all sources of fault current. When circuit breakers or contactors are used without SFCLs, 
the circuit breakers must be rated for the fault current generated by the whole network.83 Power-
flow studies should be conducted to fully understand the optimal placement for SFCLs on the 
electrical system. Several studies examined the placement of AC SFCLs on an AC system. 
They concluded that SFCLs placed with distributed generators help to limit system-wide fault 
current levels. For an AC system, SFCLs placed with distributed generators help to reduce the 
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transient recovery voltage of protection equipment (CBs) for equipment at the same voltage 
level as the generators.88,86 A separate study also recommends that SFCLs be placed in series 
with bus-coupling CBs (also called bus ties) so as to avoid inserting inductive impedance in the 
system.87 The use of SFCLs needs to be studied in further detail once the system and 
component inductances are known and the probability of faults and fault current magnitude are 
understood. 
SFCLs are used as separate current-limiting devices in existing systems that are normally 
conducting throughout the rest of the system. For this TeDP electrical superconducting system, 
all superconducting devices have the ability to limit current by quenching. For a smaller 
electrical system such as this, the distribution lines are short (compared to terrestrial electrical 
grids). When shorter distribution lines quench, they will have resistance, but not enough to 
adequately limit fault current, and they will not have as much resistance as dedicated SFCL 
devices. Using SFCL devices also allows the current limit to be controlled more precisely than 
mere distribution cables.  
There are two types of superconducting fault current limiters: resistive and inductive. 
Resistive-type SFCLs limit fault current by quenching the conductor at the conductor’s critical 
fault current level to a normally resistive state. Figure 15 illustrates how a SFCL reduces the 
current levels during a fault on an AC electrical system.41 
The critical fault current level is a function of conductor temperature, current, and magnetic 
field, allowing the desired critical fault current level to be controlled.88 The recovery time for the 
transition from quenched to superconducting state depends on the cooling method. A study of 
MgB2 SFCLs found that it took 0.05 s to quench at 280 A at 25K, and approximately 0.03 s to 
recover superconducting operation.89 A different study of DC SFCLs using YBCO 
superconductor and liquid nitrogen cooling took approximately 20 ms to quench and 17 ms to 
trip the DC CB and allow the superconductor to return to superconducting state.90 
 
Figure 15. Current waveforms for SFCL used on an AC system (reproduced with permission from 
EPRI)41 
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Inductive-type SFCLs remain superconducting and use quenching and saturation 
characteristics of coils to increase the inductive impedance of the device during a fault to limit 
fault current. The fault energy is stored within the superconducting coils. Shielded-core SFCLs 
are comprised of a transformer with the secondary side shunted by a superconducting element. 
Figure 16 illustrates the shielded-core SFCL concept.41 
 
Figure 16. Shielded-core SFCL Schematic Concept41 
When a fault occurs, the secondary side current increase causes the superconducting 
element to quench. This causes the primary side voltage to increase and oppose the fault 
current.41 Since the fault energy is stored inertially, the recovery time may be of the order of 
minutes depending on the mass of the components. According to Hyper Tech Research, 
inductive-type SFCLs are larger and more expensive than resistive-type SFCLs since the 
inductive-type SFCLs require a large superconductor volume.91 Saturable magnetic core fault-
current limiters are AC fault current limiters that do not quench, so they do not have long 
recovery times. When an AC fault occurs, the high AC current drives two coils into the high 
permeability region which increases the apparent coil inductance.92 Figure 17 illustrates the 
saturable magnetic core concept and operation.41 
 
Figure 17. Saturable Magnetic Core FCL Diagram and Operation41 
With potentially unknown recovery times for either type of SFCL, it is proposed that bypass 
switches be used in parallel with any installation of a SFCL on the system. This configuration is 
sometimes referred to as a hybrid resistive-type SFCL. Figure 18 illustrates bypass switches 
used with AC and DC SFCLs. Once the fault has cleared and it is desired that the SFCL return 
to superconducting state, rather than waiting for the SFCL to transition to superconducting state, 
the bypass switches can be closed so that current can flow to the connecting system. This 
allows generators to be connected and provide power to the system while the SFCL transitions 
to superconducting state after quenching. Once the transition is complete, the bypass switches 
can be re-opened so that current flows through the SFCL once more. 
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Figure 18. Bypass switches used with AC and DC SFCLs 
Table 14. High Power SFCL Installations for Power Density Estimate 
Installation 
Location 
SFCL Type Supercond. 
Material 
Rated 
Voltage 
(kV) 
Rated 
Current 
(A) 
Expected 
Max Fault 
Current (kA 
rms) 
Rated 
Power 
(MVA) 
Weight 
(kg/phase) 
Power 
Density 
(kW/kg) 
Avanti Los 
Angeles, CA 
Saturable core First Gen 
BSCCO 
15 800 23 12 18143 0.66 
SuperLimiterTM 
Los Angeles, 
CA 
Hybrid 
Resistive 
Second 
Gen 344S 
138 1200 63 165.6 40000 4.14 
HYDRA 
Manhattan, NY 
HTS Cable 
(with built-in 
FCL capability) 
Second 
Gen 344S 
13.8 4000 40 55.2 Not listed Unknown 
Lancashire, UK Resistive BSSCO-
2212 bulk 
tubes 
12 100 55 1.2 1814 0.66 
Boxberg, 
Germany 
Resistive BSSCO-
2212 bulk 
tubes 
12 800 63 9.6 2268 4.23 
North Italy Resistive First gen 
BSCCO 
9 250 30 2.25 3447 0.65 
Kunming, China Saturable core BSCCO-
2223 
35 1500 41 52.5 24494 2.14 
Gochang, 
Junbuk 
Province 
Hybrid 
Resistive 
YBCO 22.9 630 25 14.42
7 
907 15.90 
Nagoya, Japan Superconducti
ng transformer 
BSCCO 
and YBCO 
22/6.6 52.5/175 Unavailable 1.155 425 2.72 
 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 51 
With the addition of devices such as the SFCL, the tradeoff between added weight and 
reduced weight of other components due to lower ratings needs to be assessed. One Rolls-
Royce study estimates the weight of a SFCL is similar to the weight of a similarly rated inductor. 
The material used for the SFCL affects the weight. A MgB2 SFCL weighs about half as much an 
iron/copper FCL.  
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) compiled a technical document that 
summarizes the capability of high power SFCL installations throughout the world as of 2009. 
Table 14 lists these installations along with computed power densities.41 These installations all 
use liquid nitrogen as the cryogenic coolant, operate on AC systems, and operate in the range 
of 65-77K. These power densities can be used to assess the role of SFCLs in the electric 
distribution system along with the balance of their use with CBs and other equipment.  
Based on Table 14, hybrid resistive-type SFCL have the highest power densities of present 
installations of high powered SFCLs. The suggested architectures include this type of SFCL, but 
the type and placement of SFCL should be re-evaluated as technological developments are 
made.  
5.4.4.3 Solid-State Switches The converter can be protected using electromechanical AC 
and DC circuit breakers, but these devices have longer fault clearance times (tens to hundreds 
of milliseconds) than solid-state switches.93 Hence, solid-state switches may be viable 
alternative protection devices for the DC system. A DC electrical system operating at high 
power levels requires fast (several millisecond) and reliable equipment to isolate faulted 
sections of the system so that the system common DC voltage does not collapse.94 The longer 
the interruption device takes to break the circuit, the higher the fault current level will be (unless 
the conductor quenches). As a result, it is advantageous to the size and cost of the circuit 
breaking device to shorten the breaking time as much as possible. Limiting the fault current 
level also limits the fault energy that must be dissipated by the fast acting switch.45  
For a system that limits the fault current, the control and monitoring must be designed to 
differentiate a fault from a load transient. The expected load transients must be understood, and 
rate of change in current should be monitored. This type of control is practical for closed power 
systems such as those on ships and aircraft. 
IGBTs are one type of solid state switch that can be used as a DC network protection 
device. Such fast acting power semiconductors can detect a fault and block current in 
microseconds and are presently widely available commercially. Another type of switching 
device, the integrated gate-commutated thyristor (IGCT), may be more suitable for high power 
applications since it has lower conduction losses than the IGBT. The expected power density of 
these devices and capability to operate effectively in a cryogenic environment require further 
research and development before this technology can be used in such an advanced electrical 
system.. The use of wide-bandgap devices such as Gallium Nitride may further decrease the 
conduction losses. 
One study investigated the use of IGBT-Circuit Breakers (IGBT-CBs) in conjunction with 
each converter’s IGBTs to block fault current in a system with several interconnected voltage-
source converters (VSCs) operating at high DC voltages.93 Such a system is called a multi-
terminal high voltage DC system. This study also developed a control scheme using the IGBTs 
to extinguish line-to-line or line-to-ground DC fault current and determine on which DC line the 
fault occurred. Figure 19 illustrates how IGBTs can be used to block fault current. When fault 
current flows in the direction of the dotted line, the IGBT-CB can block the current but the 
converter IGBTs cannot since the current will flow through the diodes. When fault current flows 
in the direction of the solid line, the IGBTs in the converter can block the current but the IGBT-
CBs cannot since the current will flow through the diodes. Using sets of IGBTs in this manner 
allows for bidirectional fault current blocking. 
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Figure 19. IGBT-CB and One Phase-Leg of Converter 
To isolate a DC fault in this multi-terminal high voltage DC system, the entire interconnected 
DC system is de-energized for a short amount of time to extinguish the fault current. For the 
simulated study using IGBTs in this manner, the time to detect, block, and de-energize the 
faulted DC system is approximately 7 ms. The current and voltage waveforms for each DC line 
are captured before and after the fault. These waveforms can be used to identify the DC line on 
which the fault occurred. Essentially, assuming that the distribution lines do not quench, the DC 
line whose current rose rapidly before the other DC lines is the faulted line. All IGBTs are 
blocked for a certain amount of time, 50 ms in this study, to allow the fault to extinguish 
naturally. Then, the IGBT-CBs on the faulted line are momentarily unblocked to test whether or 
not the fault is permanent. This strategy is similar to AC temporary or permanent fault detection 
schemes. The scheme waits another 50 ms for the current energy to dissipate. If the fault has 
cleared, the DC voltage on the unblocked line will be nonzero and sustained. In this case, all of 
the IGBTs can be unblocked to resume normal system operation. If the fault is permanent, the 
DC voltage on the unblocked line will be zero. In this case, the IGBTs on the faulted line block 
the fault current, and once the fault current has extinguished, the non-load-breaking switches on 
the DC line open to isolate the fault. The IGBTs protecting the un-faulted lines are unblocked to 
resume normal operation on the rest of the system. From the time the original block signals are 
sent to the time the unblocking signals are sent to un-faulted lines, about 107 ms have 
elapsed.93  
This control scheme using IGBTs may be faster than using DC circuit breakers, but the 
scheme requires that the entire DC system connected to the DC fault be de-energized to isolate 
the fault. Using electromechanical DC circuit breakers with appropriate control as well as current 
and voltage sensing, only the faulted section may required to be isolated.  
Several IGBT-CB prototypes have been developed by power equipment manufacturers. A 
unidirectional IGBT-CB prototype was developed and tested by engineers at DRS Power & 
Control Technologies for navy ship power systems.45 It was rated for 2 kV, 800 A. With a power 
rating of 1.6 MW and weighing 250 lbs, the IGBT-CB has a power density of 14 kW/kg. This is 
low compared to the more developed technology for electromechanical DC CBs. However, high 
power density solid state CBs only have a TRL of 3-4, so the technology has time to develop 
and potentially increase the power density.  
Another solid-state CB prototype was developed for electric ship propulsion by engineers at 
Diversified Technologies.46 The interrupter was designed to be rated for 10 kV, 800 V. The 8 
MW interrupter weighed 60 lbs for a power density of 294 kW/kg. The 60-lb estimate may not 
include the supporting structure and gate drive weight, so the power density is lower and may 
be estimated to be 200 kW/kg.  
ABB developed a high-powered hybrid IGBT-CB prototype for electric utility applications.94 
The hybrid DC breaker prototype was designed to break 9kA DC at a rated voltage of 320 kV 
and rated current 2 kA DC. At a rated power level of 640 MW, this prototype was designed for a 
much higher power and voltage level than is required for this TeDP system. Figure 20 shows an 
operational schematic of the hybrid DC circuit breaker.  
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Figure 20. Hybrid IGBT DC Circuit Breaker Schematic 
During normal operation, the current flows through the auxiliary DC breaker. The losses are 
lower when the current flows through the auxiliary DC breaker rather than through the main 
breaker because the auxiliary DC breaker is composed of fewer IGBTs. During a fault, the 
auxiliary DC breaker blocks the fault current and the fast disconnect opens, causing the fault 
current to flow through the main DC breaker. The series connection of several switching 
elements allows the disconnect to open within 2 ms. The arrester across the main DC breaker 
allows a counter voltage to develop across the semiconductor switches in order to drive the DC 
circuit current to zero. The results from a typical DC breaker test for this high power breaker 
show that the DC breaker took approximately 0.2 ms to detect and block the fault current, then 
an additional 0.3 ms for the fault current to reduce to zero and dissipate the fault energy. This 
fast response for a high powered hybrid IGBT-CB shows that the challenge of interrupting high 
power and energy levels has been overcome.  
Solid-state switches such as the IGBT-CB have lower TRLs than electromechanical DC 
CBs, so this technology must be followed as the 2035 timeframe approaches to determine the 
viability of this technology for an advanced aircraft electrical system. The power density, fast 
and reliable control, level of current interruption capability, and ability to operate in a cryogenic 
environment are qualities that must be observed and evaluated as the technology evolves. 
5.4.4.4 DC Reactor DC reactors limit the rate at which the current rises in an electrical 
circuit. Because of this property, the size of the DC reactor affects the circuit breaker current 
interrupting capability requirement and the system voltage reduction that results from a fault on 
the DC system.94 The reactor should be sized so that the fault current interruption requirement 
does not reach a level greater than the interruption capability of the circuit breaker within the 
breaking time. The use of the DC reactor with SFCLs and CBs must be considered 
concurrently. Other factors that determine the size of the DC reactor are the cost and its affect 
on system stability.94 Converter design may include enough inductance such that an external 
DC reactor may not be necessary. 
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6. Architecture Selection 
Task1.e The Contractor shall propose an architecture for the power network, e.g. how many separate 
busses (transmission lines) should be used, how the generators and motors should be segregated or 
isolated from each other to avoid catastrophic faults, how faults should be isolated, etc.  
 
Weight comparisons alone do not warrant the selection of one concept over the others. 
Table 15 compares the four architecture concepts in terms of the architecture weight, the 
complexity of the response to failure, the component count, and the excess power available 
over the 30,000hp minimum power required. The last row of this column is the quality 
characteristic for the metric in each column.  
 
Table 15. Architecture Comparison 
 Weight 
Off-
Nominal 
Routing 
Complexity 
Componen
t Count 
Excess 
Power 
ARCH1:  
Baseline 5350 + 116 30,000 hp 
ARCH2:  
Inner Bus Tie 4436 + 118 12000 hp 
ARCH3:  
3-Bus Multi-Feeder 4337  158 5000 hp 
ARCH4:  
Cross-Redundant Multi-
Feeder 
4312 - 174 5000 hp 
Quality Characteristic  +   
 
While the Cross-Redundant Multi-Feeder Architecture exhibits the lowest architecture 
weight, it exhibits higher complexity in routing power during failure scenarios. It also includes 
more components. While it is able to meet the minimal power requirements with significant 
overhead, this architecture has less excess power available from reduced propulsor sizing.  
The 3-Bus Multi-Feeder architecture is slightly heavier than architecture 4 (25 kg). 
Management of failure scenarios is less complex with this architecture. The component count 
for this architecture is less than the Cross-Redundant system. However, it has the same low 
level of excess power available. 
 The architecture with the Inner Bus Tie is roughly 100 kg heavier than the two Multi-Feeder 
architectures. However, rerouting of power during failure scenarios is very straight forward. 
Additionally, this architecture component count is almost identical to the minimum used with the 
baseline architecture. It also has more power available over the minimum power requirement.  
Each of these architectures is attractive in its own respect and all warrant consideration as 
technology progresses. Under or overachievement in technology development may emphasize 
or diminish the weight improvements observed in this study.  
The importance of reduction in component count may also vary as technology develops. All 
of the architectures were sized for the critical failure scenarios and considering required 
reliability. However, ensuring adequate component reliability requires appropriate 
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maintenance/overhaul scheduling. Information regarding component lifing for these 
technologies as they develop may affect the way system architects consider component count. 
The amount of excess power available on the platform must be evaluated at the aircraft 
level. This excess power available affects aircraft performance by impacting the available 
control moment and rate of climb and service ceiling limits. 
For the purposes of future dynamic analysis Architecture 2 was selected for modeling and 
simulation. This architecture was selected for 3 reasons. 
o Focus on identifying nominal dynamic requirements 
The dynamic modeling, as discussed the first deliverable, focuses on identifying the 
nominal transient performance requirements. All of the architecture concepts operate 
similarly under nominal scenarios. Apart from the 3 bus architecture, each generator acts 
independently, driving its own set of propulsors. While the 3 bus architecture requires load 
sharing between the inner generators, this does not significantly impact the dynamic 
requirements of the system. Modeling Architecture 2 will be sufficient in understanding the 
transient requirements during nominal operations.  
o Simplicity in implementing failure response logic  
The first deliverable identified 3 off-nominal scenarios to be assessed during the 
dynamic modeling task. These included a single engine failure, a generator failure, and an 
energy storage failure.  
A single generator failure requires no rerouting of power for both Architecture 2 and 3. 
However, in the event of an engine failure, Architecture 2 responds by engaging the bus 
tie between the inner buses and increases the load on the remaining engines generators 
to their maximum. This response is applied symmetrically for either engine failure. 
Architecture 3 engages a similar response to the failure. However, instead of connecting 
the buses, power is routed to the propulsors through secondary feeders. The dynamic 
requirements for both architectures, under this failure scenario, are assumed to 
comparable.  
Responses to generator and engine failure scenarios differ significantly when imposed 
on the cross-redundant multi-feeder architecture. The responses are no longer symmetric 
due to the manner in which the secondary feeders are routed. Two layers of rerouting are 
also used in this architecture (secondary transmission lines and secondary feeders). The 
dynamics of this response may be different than that experienced with Architecture 2. 
These requirements may be evaluated in the next task; time and budget permitting. 
o Focus on identifying energy storage requirements 
The nominal dynamic role of the energy storage device is similar regardless of the 
architecture. However, the sizing of this device may scale in terms of the design capability 
of the bus to which is assigned. Energy storage requirements will be estimated for 
Architecture 2 and the energy storage components will be sized accordingly. The sizing 
rules used to estimate the energy storage attributes for this architecture will be applied to 
estimate energy storage size for the other architecture concepts. If applicable, variations 
to energy storage sizing for the other comments will be discussed and justified.  
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7. Model Overview 
Task1.e The Contractor shall develop a dynamic system model for the architecture chosen in d. and 
use the system model to assess the system issues chosen for study in the Task 
 
System modeling is used as a tool to simulate the behavior of the system and analyze key 
performance and operability metrics. The primary goal of the model is to investigate the 
sensitivity of the system response to failure and operating modes as a function of the 
constraints and capabilities of the components. Details such as how the aircraft responds to an 
engine out scenario or how much energy storage is required to maintain control during transient 
maneuvers are critical to understanding how an aircraft like this will look. On an aircraft with 2 
separate engines, 4 generators, 4 energy storage units, 14 independent propulsors, and an 
electrical bus to connect them all, each with different capabilities, response rates, and failure 
modes, the combination of possible operating modes is very large and includes hundreds of 
possible scenarios.  
Analytical methods and process are used with the model to investigate these operating 
modes. Using tools such as a design of experiments we can analytically test the system at 
various conditions, varying parameters such as response rate and energy storage, and testing it 
under varying operating modes or failure cases. The output of this is used to provide the base 
for a statistical analysis that is used to determine the trends and coupling between the input and 
output conditions. Thrust lapse as a function of engine response rate, energy storage 
requirement as a function of desired system response rate, and system stability compared to 
crosswind gust force are examples of the conditions that could be examined and used to 
enhance the design and used as feedback for the design of the next iteration of TeDP 
architectures. 
For this study the primary metrics of interest are the sensitivity of the system response as a 
function of component time constants during transient operation and failure modes. Component 
capability, including the power rating and response rate of the engines, generators, energy 
storage, electrical bus, and propulsors are the primary variables of interest. The operating 
modes to be investigated are transient maneuvers required to overcome crosswind gusts during 
takeoff or landing, cyclical thrust requirements, and fault conditions such as one engine out, 
generator out, or a bus failure.  
The RTAPS TeDP system was modeled at a high level using Matlab/Simulink®. The model 
includes the major physical components and the basic functional interfaces between them. The 
physical component models include:  
1. Turbine engines 
2. Generators 
3. Bus/distribution 
4. Energy storage 
These were identified as the core top level components. Several subcomponents could have 
been modeled, such as the cryogenic system and the switching and fault protection; however, 
we have chosen to omit those at this time and are instead using the output from the system 
analysis as feedback to the design and implementation of those systems. Once the required 
capability of the system components has been determined, we can then do a secondary 
analysis to determine the implementation details of the system components that are required to 
meet the high level capability requirements. 
In addition to these physical elements, three scenario management and load management 
subsystems were included in the model to allow for model batch mode execution. The high level 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 57 
structure of this model is shown in Figure 5. The seven component types are indicated by the 
boxes in Figure 21. 
An in-depth description of each of these model elements is provided in this document as 
outlined in Table 16. The number in the first column of the table corresponds with the number 
for each of the elements in Figure 5. The model element name/type, a brief description of its 
role, and the section number describing this model are also included in this table. 
 
 
Figure 21. High Level Model Overview 
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Table 16. Model Element Discussion Sections 
No. Model Element Role Section 
1 System Requirements 
Inputs 
Calculate Power Requirements from Thrust and Moment Loads and 
Flight conditions 
3.3.1 
2 System Attributes Inputs Set the Power Ratings for all component in the model from 
workspace data 
3.3.2 
3 Engine Models Represent the dynamics of the turboshaft engines by calculating the 
power provided to both generators based on the power demands, 
the use of the power (energy storage charging or thrust provision), 
thermodynamic time constant, saturation limits, and shaft inertia 
energy storage. 
3.2.1 
4 Generator Models Represent the dynamic response of the generators and converters 
through a time constant and saturation limits on the propagation of 
requirements upstream. 
3.2.2 
5 Bus and Energy Storage 
Models 
Represent the dynamics response while managing the energy 
storage device charge and discharge logic.  
3.2.3 
6 Propulsor Models Represent the dynamics of the propulsors by imposing time 
constants and saturation limits on the requirements propagated 
upstream and the propulsive power provided. 
3.2.4 
7 Propulsor Load 
Management 
Determine the propulsive power required from each propulsor 
based on the thrust and moment requirements and the state of the 
system. 
3.3.3 
7.1 Assumptions/Limitations 
Detailed system modeling of the full RTAPS TeDP system would require a prohibitive 
amount of information and details to be implemented for an accurate simulation.  
In typical physical domain modeling each component requires across and through variables 
to be implemented to represent the flow of energy between components (Figure 22). For the 
electrical domain this would be voltage and current. The mechanical domain would require 
velocity and force variables. The product of the across and through variables is power.  
“Power flow” modeling is an approach that allows for a compromise between the amount of 
information required for the detailed model while still maintaining the fidelity required to 
accurately represent the system interactions between components. In this case rather than 
simulating the across and through variables required for the energy flow system, only the power 
product is modeled (Figure 23). In this case detailed component attributes such as speed and 
torque of the rotating mechanical components and voltage and current of the electrical 
components are not modeled. Rather each component has a power capability that can be 
converted between the various domains.  
The layout of this model then becomes a series of interconnected devices that flow power 
from the upstream power provider (Gas turbine engine) through intermediate power conversion 
and routing to the downstream power consumers (propulsors) as shown in Figure 24. The 
power requirement originates at the downstream level and flows up through the components to 
the power providers. Power must be conserved throughout the simulation and is enforced by 
constraining power requirements and power commands to be equal. The power distribution 
block must also contain the electrical energy storage logic, while the engine, generator, and 
propulsors need to have the potential energy storage of the rotating equipment, along with the 
inertia and momentum of those components. 
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Figure 22. Energy Flow Model Using Across and Through Variables 
 
Figure 23. Power Flow Model Using Only Power Variables 
 
Figure 24. General Power Flow Structure 
Each component can be modeled in a very similar fashion and is made of the same core 
components. Figure 25 shows the template used for the basic components in the model and the 
sub-structure of each.  
The signal flow through each model starts with a power request (A). This is the power 
required by the connected downstream components. In the case of the propulsors or 
components that have no further downstream connections, this requirement would be set as a 
constant or supplied by an input variable defined by the mission. The power request is then 
limited (B) to cap the potential power provided to the capability of the component as specified by 
the user. Transient dynamics are represented by a first-order lag (C) that estimates the first-
order response rate and behavior of the component. This device then passes the power 
command upstream to the next device (D). In the case of a power providing component such as 
the engine, this would immediately loopback as the power input, the intermediate devices have 
an external power input (E) where power is brought in from the upstream device. If appropriate, 
power is converted between the mechanical and electrical domains (F), as would be the case 
for the generator or propulsor motors. That power is then passed to the next downstream 
component (G).  
Both electrical and mechanical energy storage are treated as a power accumulator that 
provides supplementary power within a certain range of power and response time (Figure 26). 
Each energy storage block also has a nominal percent charged it aims to be at, and can specify 
a charge command to the upstream devices in order to recharge when necessary and when 
excess power is available. Joules are the unit of measurement in both the mechanical and 
electrical energy storage, the difference being that one is stored in the form of shaft rotation and 
the other as an electric charge. The equations for managing this is the same between both, but 
just varies in the scaling factors used to convey this between the input and output ports of the 
subsystem. 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 60 
 
Figure 25. Component Structure 
 
Figure 26. Energy Storage Structure 
The advantages of a power flow model are primarily seen in the speed of development and 
flexibility of the model. This type of system can be implemented very quickly and does not 
require the detailed specifications of each component. Being able to ignore these parameters is 
particularly useful in the TeDP system where the bus voltage and machine speeds are 
unknown. Connections between the electrical and mechanical domains are also easily 
implemented by a simple conversion factor between horsepower and watts. A requirement for 
this study is that the model be flexible enough to test multiple configurations of component 
power ratings and capabilities for various operating modes, this type of general modeling is a 
good fit as it allows us to quickly and easily change the top level parameters through a single 
configuration file and easily track these changes against the change in system performance. 
Similarly, to perform a thorough sensitivity analysis we must test a large number of system 
configurations at many different operating modes. Due to the flexible nature of the model, this 
increases the amount of potential testing that can be performed. A benefit of using this type of 
high level system model is the speed of execution that can be had with moderate computing 
power. Even with the large system model that is comprised of over 1300 Simulink function 
blocks and embedded C function code, it is very possible to achieve runtime ratios comparing 
the passing of time in the simulation vs. true time of faster than 2:1. With more detailed models 
it can be difficult to achieve runtime ratios of even 1:100, leading to very long simulations and 
limiting the number of iterations performed. The speed of this model allows hundreds of 
iterations to be tested, increasing the total data set available to work with.  
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The drawbacks of a power flow model derive from the more simplified nature of the model. 
Dynamic energy flow can more easily be ignored in a steady state system; however the RTAPS 
TeDP model is specifically interested in looking at the dynamic behavior during transient 
maneuvers and failure modes. In these cases the specific response of the energy stored within 
the system is of particular importance. These dynamic events are directly coupled to the control 
logic that is used to control the subsystem components. Each component has an associated 
delay or response time which must be enforced by the control algorithm, as opposed to a more 
detailed physical model in which the delay and response time would be outputs of the model 
and depend on the physical configuration of the component. By relying on the control to enforce 
these rates it is possible to get into a situation that introduces undesirable side effects without 
developing very sophisticated component management control algorithms.  
Although the primary connection between components is power flow between devices, the 
fact that energy storage must also be accounted for requires a subset of the energy domain to 
be included into the simulation as power flow models. In both the mechanical and electrical 
domains energy is strictly calculated in terms of Joules. This requires additional complexity and 
logic to convert between the domains. Additionally complexity is introduced in trying to maintain 
adequate ‘state of charge’ of both the electrical and mechanical energy storage due to the lack 
of reference voltage or shaft speed which the controller would ideally have access to. Instead 
the energy storage must be used in terms of a percentage of total power available. As a result 
of this the energy storage block is more limited in its functionality and flexibility than is seen in 
the other component models.  
When investigating failures, across and through variables allow us to express detailed 
failure modes involving the speed, torque, voltage and current. Specific failures that would be of 
interest would be engine over-speed under-speed, current levels exceeding component 
capabilities, and bus voltage levels. In the system as modeled we can only express these 
failures as generic failures to provide the required power. As a result of this, some specific 
failures may not be captured at this time, specifically in cases where the power requirement is 
met but the physical system would have exceeded component capabilities. Figure 27 
demonstrates a possible failure scenario where the overall power is met within an acceptable 
response time; however, by looking at the detailed voltage and current we can see that 
component capability was exceeded and an overcurrent fault would have occurred. Similar 
analogies could be made for engine failure scenarios such as a shaft break, which would result 
in a large overspeed of the shaft. 
 
Figure 27. Example System Response and Limited Failure Analysis of Power Flow Model. Power 
Provided Meets Requirement, However Large Current Spike Would Have Resulted in Fault 
Condition  
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7.2 Model Elements 
7.2.1 Engine 
As illustrated in Figure 27 the engine model is comprised of 5 model inputs and 3 model 
outputs. Two inputs communicate the power request from each generator. The second two 
inputs indicate the magnitude of that power request which is earmarked for recharging the 
energy storage on the buses. The fifth input (“Capability”) is a failure toggle indicating the status 
of the model which is multiplied by the component rating to indicate the max capability.  
The outputs of the model are the power being delivered to each generator and the max 
power available from the engine to be communicated to the energy storage devices in the bus 
models. This status variable (Max Power) is used by the energy storage discharge logic and is 
subject to a delay associated with determining system status.  
Three additional pieces of information are made available to this model: the engine power 
rating (total_engine_power), the delay in responding to system failures (ResponseDelay), and 
the engine’s thermodynamic time constant (Engine_TcR). These inputs are indicated in dark 
green and are either read in from the workspace (delay and time constant), or as references 
from the model constants block.  
As with all of the components in the model, the dynamic response of the engine is modeled 
by a first-order transfer function, saturation limits, and a PI controller. The transfer function 
represents the response rate of the engine in terms of the prescribed time constant. Saturation 
limits are also set by the user. The upper limit corresponds to the rated power of the engine and 
the lower limit is set to zero. These elements are depicted in the center of Figure 28 as indicated 
by the dashed box labeled number 1.  
Other significant elements in the model include modeling the effects of shaft inertia on the 
dynamics of the system (dashed box 2), and the allocation of shaft power to each of the 
generators (dashed box 3). 
The dynamics of the power generated by this turboshaft engine are also affected by the 
amount of inertia on the engine shaft. For the purposes of this study, the inertia properties of all 
equipment mounted to the shaft are lumped into the engine inertia variables. Because the 
system was model in terms of power flow, the engine speed and inertia is modeled in terms of 
energy. The inertial energy storage model for the engine is illustrated in Figure 29. 
1
2
3
 
Figure 28. Engine Model 
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Figure 29. Engine Inertia Model 
This engine inertia model track the power request and the power provided by the engine and 
determines if the engine is speeding up or slowing down (charging or discharging) based on the 
amount of shaft energy is available. Two workspace variables are used for this estimation. 
These include the maximum amount of stored energy allowed on the shaft, and the status of the 
engine. The max energy value determines the current speed of the engine (state of charge), 
and the acceleration and deceleration rates of the engine (through the blue charging subsystem 
block). Acceleration of the shaft is perceived as a load on the engine cycle through the charge 
command output.  
Deceleration occurs when shaft power is transferred to the generators (shaft power out 
output). The “Stored Energy Consumption” block allows variations in engine inertia based on the 
speed limits of the engine.  
The last element in this model significant to the energy flow of the system is the power 
allocation block. This block determines which generator receives shaft power from the engine 
based on the ultimate use of that power. This block is indicated in Figure 28 by the dashed 
block labeled number 3. The internals to this block are given in Figure 30. The generators power 
commands (GR1 Cmd, GR2 Cmd) are given in units of hp and the charge requests are given in 
percent. 
The Simulink subsystem in the center of Figure 30, implements the following allocation 
equations. The difference between each generator commanded power and the charging power 
requirement (RGenx_charge) gives the magnitude of the requirement dedicated to thrust (RGenx_thrust). 
The power earmarked for thrust provided to the generators ( *genXP ) is given as a function of the 
power available and the thrust requirements as indicated in Equations (3) and (4). 
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Figure 30. Engine Generator Shaft Power Allocation Model 
Any additional power available from the engine is allocated to recharging the energy storage 
devices. This is calculated using Equations (5) and (6). 
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While an equal amount of power may be requested from each generator, the amounts of 
power provided by the engine to the machines may vary due to the sources of the requirements. 
Actual management of this logic would most likely reside with the power management system 
regulating the generator loads. However, for this conceptual power flow model, with no 
dedicated control system model, the engine is the only element aware of the multiple generator 
loads and the load sources. Therefore, for these requirements studies, this power management 
logic remains local to the engine model.  
7.2.2 Generator 
Generator dynamics approximations are the simplest of the models in this system. Similar to 
the engine model, the generator dynamics are represented by a first-order transfer function, 
saturation limits, and a PI controller as illustrated in Figure 31. Saturation limits are governed by 
the capability of the generator as defined by the user.  
The generator receives power requirements from the buses and communicates this 
requirement upstream, subject to the dynamic lag of the system. As power is provided by the 
engine, this power is simply communicated to the buses, subject to a conversion from 
horsepower to watts.  
The “Max Power” system status signal is only calculated from the inner two generators to 
assist in logic, which determines the magnitude of the power demand placed on the left or right 
engine from the central buses. In contrast to engine and bus models, the “capability” is not 
multiplied by the generator power rating in the model. This calculation is performed externally. 
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Figure 31. Generator Model 
7.2.3 Buses and Energy Storage 
The buses are the most complex models for this system, primarily due the logic required to 
manage the discharging of the energy storage device. This requires information about current 
and maximum potential state of the load and source. Two types of bus models were made for 
this system—the inner bus and the outer buses. The outer buses receive requirements from 
four propulsors and place requirements on a single generator. The inner bus receives 
requirements from six propulsors and places requirements on two generators on different 
turbine engine shafts. The outer buses are slightly less complex from than the inner bus and will 
be described first. Added requirements on the inner bus are then discussed. 
7.2.3.1 Outer Buses The dynamics associated with the central buses for the TeDP model 
are driven by the energy storage device. The Simulink model of an outer bus is given in Figure 
32. Inputs to this model include the electrical power request from the propulsors (inputs 2 
through 4), the electrical power received from the generators (inputs 1 and 6), and the power 
demanded by other buses on the same engine source.  
An electrical power request is received by a bus from the propulsors. The energy storage 
charging command is then added and the total is propagated upstream to the generators. This 
power request is limited, however, by the bus capability specified by the user (input 5 and the 
power rating “total_bus1_power”). The “capability” input to the bus model acts in a similar 
fashion to the engine model. It is multiplied by the bus power rating to limit the requirement 
propagated upstream through saturation limits.  
Any limitation to the power distributed to the consumers must be equally applied. The 
Simulink subsystems in the blue dashed box in Figure 32 allocate the power depending on the 
magnitude of the power requirement. 
The charge command is defined by the Simulink subsystem indicated by the red dashed 
block in Figure 32. Management of the energy storage device requires a characterization of 
both the source and load characteristics. Therefore, the energy storage Simulink subsystem 
references the electrical power demand from the propulsors and the propulsive power demand 
on the propulsors (“Power Request” and “Propulsor Shaft Demand” respectively) in addition to 
the maximum rated propulsor load. The electrical power provided by the generators and the 
maximum available generator power are also referenced.  
Figure 33 illustrates the Simulink subsystem for energy storage management on the outer 
buses. Similarities between energy storage management on the bus to inertia energy 
management on the engine are indicated. For information on this part of the model, see Section 
7.2.1. The additional portions of this model vary the power provided by the bus depending on 
the amount of energy available from the energy storage device.  
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Figure 32. Outer Bus Model 
 
Figure 33. Outer Bus Energy Storage Model 
Figure 33 illustrates the total amount of energy required from an energy storage device 
when the load time constant is smaller than the source time constant. Assume that the red 
curve labeled PL is the power requirement requested by the propulsor, and the blue curve PS is 
the power available from the source. Loads and sources are assumed to act exponentially 
according to Equations (7) and (8). The times tL and tS are the respective times it takes for the 
load and source to meet the required power. For t>tL the load remains at Preq.  
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Figure 34. Energy Storage Energy Required 
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The power that must be available from the energy storage device is shown in green in 
Figure 34. The time integral of this energy storage power yields the energy required to provide 
the minimum available response time (tL). The energy storage required is given by Equation (9) 
or (10). 
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Figure 35 illustrates the metering of the power provided by the energy storage device for the 
energy limited case. The red and blue lines in Figure 31, respectively, represent the load power 
request and the source power available. For energy limited operation and no discharge rate 
manipulation, the energy storage device power available is illustrated in by the green dashed 
line. With no energy storage discharge logic, the energy storage device is engaged to provide 
PL. Once the energy available is gone, the power must come from the slow responding source. 
This causes a secondary lapse in power between tL and tS.  
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Figure 35. Energy Storage Power Discharge Limit to Avoid Energy Limit 
To avoid this secondary lapse event, the energy storage required is calculated by solving for 
the time limits (tL, tS) and expansion yields a function for energy storage in terms of the time 
constants of the source and load (τS, τL), the power requirement (Preq), the maximum capabilities 
of the source and load (PSmax, PLmax), and the initial power provided by the source and load (PS0, 
PL0). 
Assuming a fixed value for the energy storage device maximum time constant that can be 
supported without a secondary power lapse is given by Equation (11).  
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The maximum achievable response without a secondary power lapse is labeled PL* in. The 
power required from the energy storage device is reduced to fill enable uninterrupted provision 
of the load. Energy expended to provide fast response is traded for energy later for sustained 
response. This is illustrated by areas A and B in Figure 35. 
To manage energy storage discharge with Equation (9), the time constant of the source 
must be available. For this system multiple sources are being used by multiple loads. Therefore, 
the time constant is not directly given by the time constant of the engine or generator. The time 
constant was estimated for this architecture model by observing the source behavior over 
previous time steps. Consider the variation of Equation (6) shown in Equation (12). Assuming 
an exponential response from the source, this equation predicts the power available at time t+Δt 
given the power available at time t, the source maximum power capability (PSmax), and the 
source time constant (τS). 
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Solving this equation for the variable τS yields Equation (13). Given the simulation time step, 
the source time constant can be estimated from previous knowledge of source response.  
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With the estimated source time constant in hand, the minimum allowable load time constant 
is found using this equation. This time constant is applied in a first-order lag response for the 
propulsive power demand which acts as an upper limit of the power demand from the bus.  
7.2.3.2 Inner Buses The inner bus acts in similar fashion to the outer bus with significant 
changes to manage power from multiple sources. Changes to the model structure are indicated 
by the dashed boxes in Figure 36. 
The inputs characterize either the load or the source. The load is characterized in terms of 
requirements (1.a in Figure 36) and attributes (1.b), and the source is characterized in terms of 
power provided (2.a), source limits (2.b), and source attributes (2.c).  
The block outputs are similar to the outer bus with the exception of two output ports that 
request power from the generators (3.a) and two output ports that indicate the power provided 
to the propulsors on bus 2 and 3 (3.b). Power requests are made proportional to the amount of 
power available from either engine source. As with the outer buses, power is allocated to the 
propulsors based on the demand from each propulsor and the amount of power available from 
the source and stored energy. However, power is allocated to six downstream loads (Figure 36, 
3.b) instead of four. 
 
Figure 36. Inner Bus Model 
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Lumping buses 2 and 3 into one bus simplifies the response to failure scenarios. Previous 
model iterations included independent models for each inner bus. However, shuttling power 
between the buses required the modeling of complex battery controls. For the final model 
delivery, energy storage dynamics are approximated assuming the two devices act as one. The 
energy storage subsystem is displayed in Figure 37.  
The structure of this model is similar to that of the outer bus energy storage. The only 
additions to this subsystem are the elements necessary to sum the requirements and 
capabilities of loads and sources. For additional information on how this model simulates the 
energy storage device’s dynamic performance, see Section 3.2.3.1, which provides an overview 
of the outer buses.  
Implementing the model in this fashion with a single simulated energy storage device is valid 
assuming that the bus tie is normally closed. While the models include source limits (2.b in 
Figure 36 and the dark green reference elements in Figure 37), additional effort is necessary to 
update the model to accurately simulate inner bus out scenarios. 
7.2.4 Propulsors 
The propulsor model is illustrated in Figure 38. The inputs to this model include the shaft 
power commanded from the propulsion thrust allocation logic and the power provided to the 
propulsor from its assigned bus. Additionally, a propulsor power limit is included that sets the 
saturation limit when modeling the propulsor dynamics.  
No energy storage calculation is made in this model to replicate propulsor inertia. All 
rotational and electrical dynamics are intended to be represented by a first-order transfer 
function with saturation limits and a PI control loop acting on the propagation of the 
requirements upstream. However, eliminating the need to track torque and speed required the 
inclusion of an additional first-order transfer function and limits to be applied to the power 
provided. While electrical power may be immediately available from the buses, the shaft power 
is limited by the rotational dynamics of the propulsor.  
 
Figure 37. Inner Bus Energy Storage Model 
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Figure 38. Propulsor Model 
Ideally, this propulsor model would include torque, speed, and propeller efficiency 
calculations to determine the propulsive power provided; however, this model is sufficient to 
assess the high level impact of the response rate of a propulsor system to overall system 
performance.  
7.3 Simulation Setup 
Dynamic requirements, system attributes, and failure response logic must be defined to run 
a simulation of this TeDP system. All requisite information is written to a Matlab workspace via 
an mfile, which is referenced by the Simulink Model.  
7.3.1 Scenario Requirements 
Operating conditions and requirements are fed to this model using the subsystem illustrated 
in Figure 39. The red boxes on the left are workspace variables indicating the altitude (Alt), 
Mach number (Mach), standard temperature offset (DTamb), the thrust required (T_R), the 
steady-state yaw requirement (Yaw), an oscillatory yaw requirement (SAS Yaw), and an 
estimate of propulsive efficiency. This information is used to calculate the overall power required 
and the differential power required for the specified yaw moment assuming all propulsors are 
available. This subsystem applies standard altitude calculations, the Mach number, and the 
thrust requirement to estimate the propulsive power required. 
Step changes in thrust requirements and yaw moment requirements require the referenced 
value to change during model simulation. Dynamic changes to requirements are managed 
through workspace variable arrays that are dependent on simulation time. The other variables 
(altitude, Mach, DTamb, and PEff) remain constant throughout the simulation.  
7.3.2 System Attributes 
All system attributes are specified by the same model execution mfile previously discussed. 
These variables are referenced by the model and made available to all model elements via 
global “Goto” elements. The block that sets all of the component ratings is shown in Figure 39. 
Component capability is specified in terms of the percentage of some reference power that 
the component can provide. For example, each engine may be sized to provide 100% of the 
minimum power required for takeoff. In this scenario, the reference power is set to the minimum 
takeoff power and the engine rating is set to 100%.  
NASA/CR—2013-217865 72 
 
Figure 39. Requirements Model Block 
 
Figure 40. System Sizing Model Subsystem 
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7.3.3 Failure Insertion/Response 
Failures are introduced into the system at a simulation time defined by the user. Boolean 
status variables are used to affect the maximum power ratings of a component. The saturation 
limit values are typically specified internally to a component model or, in the case of the 
generators, the component limits are set external to the system. The failure insertion subsystem 
for the right engine’s generators is shown in Figure 41. In this subsystem, the capability limits 
are set referencing the generators’ status and the total engine power. The global component 
capability value is also referenced to determine the component limit. 
A failure is imposed on the engine subsystem by manipulating the model elements 
illustrated in Figure 42. The capability input communicates the Boolean status of the engine to 
the engine model block (labeled No. 1 in Figure 42). The nominal input for this variable is 1. 
When an engine failure is specified, this value changes to 0 at the defined simulation time. This 
imposes a saturation limit of 0 on the engine cycle power provided. 
The shaft power dynamics associated with an engine failure scenario depend on the nature 
of the event causing it. Therefore, the time constant for the engine response first-order transfer 
function may vary during the simulation (No. 2). For a shaft break scenario, the sudden loss of 
power is represented by a very fast time constant applied at the moment the failure occurs. 
Additionally, this loss in engine power occurs simultaneously with a sudden loss in shaft inertia. 
Therefore, the “state of charge” variable for the shaft inertia simulation is a function of the status 
of the engine shaft.  
 
Figure 41. Generator Failure Insertion Subsystem 
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Figure 42. Engine Failure Insertion and Response 
As will be discussed in section 8.2, thrust loss dynamics are highly sensitive to the time it 
takes to sense and respond to a component failure. Knowledge of component status influences 
the response to a failure both in how propulsion requirements are allocated to the propulsors, 
and how power requirements propagate throughout the system. The time delay associated with 
failure response is applied through the variable “ResponseDelay.” A transport delay is used to 
impose a time delay for the status of the system to affect the energy storage device’s 
charge/discharge logic, inner bus load assignment logic, and propulsor propulsion allocation 
logic. This is illustrated by item No. 3 in Figure 42, and the delay blocks in the center of the 
thrust allocation subsystem block in Figure 43. The delay in Figure 42 inhibits engine failure 
information from propagating to the buses for a user-specified delay time. The buses and 
energy storage devices continue to allocate requirements and schedule charge and discharge 
nominally until this information is made available. Once the information is made available, power 
may be routed to minimize thrust loss.  
A system failure interrupts the supply power to some of the propulsors. Therefore, thrust 
requirements must be met with the remaining propulsors. This thrust management is 
accomplished in two steps. First, the effect of system status on propulsor performance is used 
to indicate the maximum thrust that can be supported from each propulsor. Second, this 
propulsor status information and the moment and thrust requirements are used to assign thrust 
requirements to each propulsor. This is performed by the right subsystem block in Figure 43.  
The effect of system losses on propulsor power is mapped in the left subsystem in 
Figure 43. The inputs to this subsystem are the reference sizing requirement for the system, 
propulsor max power available, and the digital status values for all model components. For 
purposes of this study, only engine and generator failures are considered. Therefore, only the 
effects of generator and engine failures are mapped to propulsor capability. The other 
component status values are fixed at 1, or un-failed. The outputs of this subsystem are 14 digital 
status variables indicating whether each propulsor is actively supported or not. 
Propulsion requirements on each propulsor are set by the right subsystem in Figure 43. The 
inputs to this block are the power and moment requirements, the fan diameter, and the status of 
each propulsor. While there may be aerodynamic benefits for each propulsor to be throttled 
independently, for the purposes of this study it was assumed that all powered propulsors on a 
side provide equal amounts of thrust and require equal amounts of power. Assuming a total of 
14 propulsors, total system thrust is calculated by Equation (14). In this equation, TL and TR are 
the left and right side thrust. The propulsor index increases from inboard to outboard. The 
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innermost propulsor has an index of 1 and the outermost propulsor has an index of 7. The 
status of the left and right side propulsors are indicated by the XL and XR matrices. 
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Figure 43. Propulsor Thrust Power Allocation Subsystem 
An asymmetric production of thrust may be applied to assist in aircraft trimming. The total 
moment provided is a function of the left/right propulsor throttling and the distance of the 
propulsors from the aircraft center line. This distance from the center line is a determined in 
terms of the fan diameter as illustrated in Figure 44. For a 14 propulsor aircraft, the innermost 
propulsors applies thrust on a moment arm of approximately half the fan diameter and the 
outermost propulsor acts on a moment arm of approximately 6.5 times the fan diameter.  
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Figure 44. Fan Center of Thrust Offset From Aircraft Centerline 
With this propulsor count and geometry, the yawing moment (Mtot) provided by the 
propulsors is given by Equation (15). The diameter of the propulsor is given by D.  
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Solving for TR in Equation (14) and substitution in to Equation (15) and solving for thrust 
gives the thrust command for both the left and right side of the aircraft. 
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As is illustrated by the time delays in Figure 43, the X variables are updated with the actual 
status after the failure occurs and the delay is enforced. During this delay the remaining 
powered propulsors receive no commands for additional thrust. Therefore, when failures cause 
propulsors to lose power, larger thrust lapses will occur with longer response. As is discussed in 
4.2, sensitivity to delay response was assessed for this architecture.  
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For the current model all thrust allocation occurs at the system level, based on knowledge of 
the source capability. However, the reaction time of the system can be assumed to be very 
short with the development of thrust control laws. For future model iterations, closed loop 
controls may be developed which monitor the power provided to the propulsors and respond to 
lapses in power by reallocating thrust requirements. Additionally, power interruptions or lapses 
could be monitored throughout the system to add accuracy and timeliness in the failure 
diagnosis and allow for a reduction in performance loss.  
More work is required to identify the equipment and levels of redundancy necessary to 
quickly and accurately identify failures, communicate this information throughout the system, 
and trigger appropriate responses.  
7.4 Simulation Outputs 
The primary outputs of interest from this dynamic TeDP system model are the total power 
provided to the propulsors, the corresponding thrust provided, and the yaw moment. When 
simulating dynamic events, the transient response is characterized by the maximum magnitude 
of the failure, and the system response time. Additional information is used to understand the 
details of the failure and the cause for dynamic features. This information includes the state of 
charge on the energy storage devices and the power requirements and power outputs from the 
distribution system buses. 
The first deliverable under this contract required that multiple scenarios be recommended 
under which to evaluate dynamic performance and energy storage requirements. 
Recommended scenarios include nominal operations, like acceleration and deceleration 
requirements and gust or crosswind requirements. Off nominal scenarios included three types of 
failure: engine failure, generator failure, and energy storage failure. 
Not all of these scenarios dominate energy storage requirements, or produce the most 
critical transient events in system performance. Subsections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 discuss the model 
outputs and metrics of interest for nominal and off-nominal scenarios which drive energy 
storage requirements. Dominant scenarios include step change in thrust requirements, gust and 
yaw moment requirements, and engine failure scenarios. Non-dominant scenarios include the 
generator failure scenario and gradual engine power losses. Notional dynamic outputs are 
compared for all scenarios except for yaw moment requirements. The challenges associated 
with relying on differential thrust to provide flight control are discussed in terms of the relevant 
flight control specifications.  
7.4.1 Nominal Operations: Command Response  
7.4.1.1 Step Thrust Command  Figure 45 displays the power provided outputs for a step 
change in thrust with asymmetric trimming thrust. The light blue solid line is the thrust request 
which occurs at the time t_event. The system responds by providing thrust from the left and 
right side propulsors while trying to maintain the trimming yaw (blue and green dashed lines). 
The total thrust provided by the propulsors is displayed by the red dashed line. This is the total 
amount of thrust provided by the TeDP system. 
FAR 33.73 specifies that a conventional aero engine must transition between flight idle and 
95% thrust within 5 seconds. The metric of interest, therefore, for a step change in thrust 
requirement is the time to 95% thrust as indicated on the x-axis in Figure 45. The magnitude of 
the thrust lapse is not a critical metric for a step change in thrust demand. 
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Figure 45. Step Change in Thrust TeDP Response 
If the propulsion system is tasked with providing trimming yaw control, step changes in 
thrust provided have the potential to introduce moment lapses. This TeDP system model 
indicates a yaw moment during a step change in thrust demand due, in part, to the means of 
modeling the propulsor dynamics. As discussed in Section 7.2.4, the propulsors dynamics are 
modeled with a first-order transfer function, saturation limits, and a PI control loop. The first-
order transfer function applies a time constant to the propulsor response, the saturation limits 
limit the commanded and available power, and the PI loop ensures fast response from the 
propulsors. This is illustrated in Figure 46. 
The lines in this figure represent the thrust required, thrust provided, and PI control 
command for both the left and right propulsors. The step thrust requirements are given in the 
solid light blue and light green lines, the PI command is given by the blue and green dashed 
lines, and the provided thrust is shown by the red and orange dashed lines.  
The difference between the initial thrust (T_0) and the maximum available thrust (T_max) is 
larger for the right propulsors than for the left propulsors. As such, modeled by saturation limited 
PI controllers with similar time constants, the right propulsor responds faster than the left 
propulsor and reaches the required thrust faster. This causes the yaw moment to decrease 
continuously until the right side propulsors reach their required thrust. This moment lapse is 
illustrated in Figure 47.  
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Figure 46. Moment Lapse from Propulsor Thrust Response 
 
Figure 47. Moment Lapse with Step Change in Thrust 
This temporary loss in moment during acceleration is not guaranteed to occur but is a result 
of the means for representing system dynamics. More intelligent control strategies could be 
applied which limit yawing during aircraft acceleration. However, this does highlight challenges 
in assigning yaw control functionalities to the TeDP system via differential thrust requirements. 
Electrical system dynamics and control must be integrated with flight control analysis to 
understand availability of differential thrust as a trimming moment source.  
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7.4.1.2 Flight Control System Power A BWB configuration does not have conventional tail 
surfaces for pitch (elevator) control The control surfaces on the wing trailing edge have to 
provide the required control power to stabilize and control the aircraft. 
With longitudinal and directional control power coming from control surfaces on the wing 
with shorter moment arm (compare to traditional tube and wing (T&W) aircraft), generating 
required pitching moment will require larger total control surface area. 
From the flight control system prospective, the total power required by the system is higher 
and it is a function of: 
• Level of airframe stability 
• Airframe flexibility 
• Control effector number and size 
• Control law response type and level of augmentation  
In general, power required to drive BWB aircraft control surfaces could be up to 50% higher 
compared to similar size T&W aircraft. This is due to the increase in number, size, bandwidth, 
and rate of control surfaces. Due to inherently low drag of the BWB configuration, this is 
particularly critical during approach and landing phase; thrust requirements will be low but the 
power required by the flight control system will be at its highest.  
7.4.1.3 Use of the Propulsion System for Control Power One design solution to reduce 
the flight control system power requirements is to use propulsion system (thrust) to provide 
some or all the control power required, in particular the directional axis (yaw).  
If the thrust is used to provide control power to the flight control system, the propulsion 
system then needs to also meet all the safety requirements as a part of the control system. This 
usually means the system needs to be fully operational after any single failure (fail-ops).  
To use propulsors for yaw control, the following list of additional criteria needs to be 
considered: 
• Required yawing moment (bandwidth and rate) can be achieved at all flight phases, in 
particular approach/ landing and rejected takeoff where engine power setting is low 
• Integration of engine yaw control with aero control surfaces 
• Pilot workload should be transparent to the pilot 
• Integration with reverse thrust (if required) 
• Fault detection and isolation for redundancy management  
• Cost/benefit complexity of hardware and software vs. reduction in drag/increase in 
performance 
For the propulsion system to handle various failure scenarios and still provide the necessary 
yawing moment to control the airplane, a significant level of complexity would have to be added 
to both vehicle and engine hardware and software. There is insufficient information at this time 
to define control requirements for this case. 
7.4.1.4 Control Power for Propulsion Failure Conditions With a turboelectric distributed 
propulsion system comes with a unique opportunity for the flight control system. In typical 
airplane, when an engine fails, sufficient control power is needed to control the airplane with an 
asymmetric thrust configuration and this is usually the condition that sets the size for the control 
surfaces, in particular the directional control surfaces which include vertical stabilizers, rudder, 
and for the BWB, drag rudder (split trailing edge). 
With TeDP, the symmetric thrust can be maintained by the propulsion system with engine, 
generator, or a limited number of fan failures. If the propulsion system is able to maintain 
symmetric thrust, the control surface sizes for the airplane may be able to be reduced, since 
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they no longer have to handle asymmetric thrust conditions. Having smaller and lighter control 
surfaces would result in reduced weight and drag for the airplane.  
To take advantage of this unique characteristic of TeDP propulsion, the propulsion system 
should be designed to adjust the propulsion system to produce the required thrust and cancel 
thrust asymmetries when experiencing a single engine or generator failure, or the failure of two 
outboard fans on the same side. 
7.4.1.5 Yaw Moment Response (Trimming and Dynamic Response) Differential thrust 
trimming requirements affect the sizing of the electrical system. Recall Equation (16) from 
Section 7.3.3. From this equation, a relationship governing propulsor thrust requirements was 
determined in term of the max moment required (Mmax) and the required thrust (TReq).  
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Each failure scenario presents a unique set of XR and XL matrices which may drive the 
propulsor sizing requirements. Figure 48 gives the thrust requirement versus moment 
relationship for 6 scenarios. These are illustrated by three lines. The red dashed line represents 
the propulsor sizing requirements necessitated by an engine, primary generator, or outer bus 
failure scenario. The blue dashed line represents the requirements necessitated by an inner bus 
failure scenario. The green line gives the requirements necessitated by a secondary generator 
failure or a no failure scenario. The x-axis in this figure is the trimming yaw moment required for 
a cross-wind scenario. The y-axis is the propulsor thrust requirement normalized by the 
minimum thrust required at takeoff.  
 
Figure 48. Original Required Propulsor Sizing in Terms of Differential Thrust Requirements 
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The engine, generator 1, and outer bus failure scenarios drive propulsor sizing for the inner 
bus tie architecture. The original architecture sizing did not consider trimming moment and the 
electrical system was sized to provide 40% excess thrust. However, as differential thrust yaw 
trimming requirements are defined the architecture may grow significantly.  
Considering these differential thrust yaw requirements also changed the allocation of 
propulsors to distribution buses. The initial architecture placed outboard propulsors on the inner 
bus. However, for this architecture, a single point inner bus failure imposes large thrust 
requirements on the propulsors. This is alleviated by assigning inboard propulsors to the buses 
supporting an odd number of propulsors. This alteration change is illustrated in Figure 49. 
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R1 R7L1 R6L2 R5L3 R4L4 R3L5 R2L6L7
Bus 1
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Figure 49. Propulsor Bus Assignment Alteration Considering Yaw Requirements 
This reconfiguration creates symmetric thrust loss scenarios for all bus failure cases and 
decreases the propulsor sizing requirements. This effect on requirements is illustrated in 
Figure 50. The dark blue single dashed line is the final configuration and the aqua dotted and 
dashed line is the original configuration of this architecture.  
 
Figure 50. The Effect of Propulsor Bus Assignment on Sizing Requirements 
For the original configuration, the inner bus failure scenario introduced sizing critical 
propulsor requirements because of undesirable yawing. Instead of the 40% oversizing, the 
system would need to be over 50% oversized for zero yaw trimming.  
Regardless of the final architecture selected, differential thrust for cross wind yaw trimming 
will increase the power requirements for the electrical system. Additionally, if a wholly thrust-
based control system is desired, TeDP system dynamics and flight dynamics interactions must 
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be explored further to understand control limitations. Some hybrid (thrust and control surfaces) 
approaches may be feasible. However, further studies are necessary to weight the TeDP 
system weight and complexity increases against pros and cons of traditional flight control 
methods or vectored thrust.  
7.4.2 Off-Nominal Operations: Failure Recovery 
7.4.2.1 Thrust Moment Lapse with Engine Failure Scenario Figures 51 through 53 
illustrate some notional dynamic events which occur for component failures assuming some 
energy storage is available. The notional failure which initiates this lapse is an instantaneous 
right engine failure with loss in engine inertia assuming no asymmetric trimming thrust is 
required. The solid red and green lines in Figure 51 and 52 represent the power provided by the 
left and right engines during a right engine failure scenario. The dashed blue lines represent the 
power provided by the energy storage devices and the dotted line represents the propulsive 
power provided by the propulsors. The red solid line is the thrust provided by the system and 
the other dashed lines illustrate thrust in terms of the left and right propulsors. 
The energy storage devices in this example are assumed to be energy limited; meaning that 
the energy storage device is insufficient to accommodate for the failure completely and the 
device is discharged to depletion. An initial lapse in propulsive power occurs as the energy 
storage device is engaged to provide fill-in power at t_fail. At this time, the energy storage 
device on bus 1 is discharged rapidly because its sole power source has failed. Therefore, when 
the power is lost at t_fail, the energy storage provides fill-in power until the energy storage has 
been depleted (time t* shown in Figure 53). The time at which this occurs depends on the delay 
associated with thrust allocation response and the capacity of the bus 1 energy storage device. 
Regardless, when and if it does occur, the propulsors assigned to the right bus lose their 
support and the propulsor power decreases on the time constant of the propulsor.  
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Figure 51. Power Provided by Right Bus During Right Engine Failure 
If no local control logic is implemented to reallocate thrust requirements, half of the thrust 
power is lost at the time constant of the propulsors. This occurs until the thrust demand can be 
reallocated to the remaining powered propulsors. This is subject to a response delay as 
illustrated in Figure 52. As the load is reallocated, energy storage devices on the powered 
buses discharge to support the additional power loads while the healthy engine can spool up. 
Additional thrust lapses may occur depending on the capacity of the energy storage devices and 
the response rate of the engine.  
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Figure 52. Power Provided by Central Bus During Right Engine Failure 
The dynamics illustrated in Figures 51 and 52 lead to the transient thrust lapse 
characteristics illustrated in Figure 53. Energy limited failure events result in three transient 
features: the initial engagement of the energy storage devices, a loss in energy storage on the 
bus supported solely by the failed engine, and secondary lapses in power when other energy 
storage devices are depleted.  
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Figure 53. Thrust Response for a Right Engine Failure 
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Figure 54. Energy Limited Energy Storage State of Charge for Right Engine Out Scenario 
The nature of the events which occur depends on the amount of energy storage available. 
Therefore, the occurrence the dynamic events in Figure 53 are directly influenced by the state of 
charge of the energy storage devices as illustrated in Figure 54. This figure shows the state of 
charge for all bus energy storage devices during the right engine failure. Lapses in power occur 
when the energy storage devices can no longer supply current for fill-in power. The state of 
charge of Bus 1 reaches its minimum state of charge at t* which initiates the largest lapse 
depicted in Figure 53. The state of charge of Bus 4 is unaffected until the thrust requirements 
are reallocated at t_recover. The small thrust lapse which occurs before t_final occurs when the 
energy storage device on Bus 4 is completely depleted.  
In general, the magnitude and duration of the lapses in thrust are affected by the amount of 
energy available from the energy storage devices. Non-energy limited failures exhibit only one 
initial transient lapse when the energy storage engages. Additionally, the thrust lapse 
associated with an engine failure with no energy storage is depicted in Figure 55. Comparing 
this figure with the results shown in Figure 53, the benefit of energy storage is ready observable. 
For the non-energy storage case, roughly 50% of the thrust is lost during an engine failure and 
recovery time is driven directly by the engine time constant and the response delay.  
  
Figure 55. Thrust Response for a Right Engine Failure with No Energy Storage 
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Intelligent control of energy storage devices, and increases in energy storage size has the 
potential to dramatically reduce the effect of component failures on the TeDP’s provision of 
thrust. However, these benefits come at the cost of weight and complexity. The severity 
associated with the magnitude and duration of a thrust loss must be balanced with the weight 
and complexity required to provide energy storage to accommodate faults. Section 8.3 will go 
into depth in how this multi-objective trade was framed using Pareto optimization.  
7.4.2.2 Yaw Moment Lapse with Engine Out Scenario The instigating factors for the 
yawing moment dynamics events depicted in Figure 56 are similar to those affecting thrust. The 
primary difference between the dynamics occurs after the thrust reallocation. As was discussed 
in the previous section, this large magnitude moment lapse is specific to the architecture 
concept used for baseline analysis and caused by the manner in which the propulsor dynamics 
are estimated. Higher fidelity control laws for symmetric thrust management must be developed 
in combination with aircraft level stability and control analysis to ensure that these transient 
moment lapses can be reduced or eliminated, or that they do not adversely affect aircraft 
stability.  
 
Figure 56. Moment Response for a Right Engine Failure 
7.4.2.3 Non-Critical Thrust Lapse Failure Scenarios The engine failure scenario with 
immediate power loss was determined to be the driving failure scenario for which energy 
storage requirements should be determined. As is illustrated in Figure 57, the transient effects 
of single generator out scenarios and gradual engine power loss scenarios are less critical than 
engine failure scenarios with immediate power loss. The solid gray line in this figure is the 
dominating case: immediate engine failure. The other lines represent dominated transient 
events. All of these cases exhibit less of a thrust lapse than the immediate engine loss case. 
Additionally, for the generator failure cases, the system is able to recover in roughly half the 
time compared to the engine failure cases. The time to generator failure recovery is t_recovery1 
in Figure 57, and the time to engine failure recovery is shown as t_recovery2. 
Naturally, the gradual loss of engine power yields less thrust lapse than the immediate failure. 
However, it should also be noted that additional controls sophistication could decrease the 
thrust lapse even further. During the response delay, power is still available from the engine 
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depending on the time constant of engine power loss. When the failure is observed the thrust 
load is reallocated and the generator loads from the failed engine cease. This is evident by the 
sharp decrease in thrust directly after t_response. With no energy storage in the system, the 
power available from the system depends on the power available from the non-failed engine. 
The transient impact of this logic is shown by the dashed gray line in Figure 57, directly after 
t_response. If the nature of the engine failure is known, the sharp decrease may not be 
necessary and the max thrust lapse may be reduced.  
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Figure 57. Thrust Lapse Comparison Between Component Failures with No Energy Storage 
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Figure 58. Thrust Lapse Comparison Between Component Failures with Energy Storage 
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When energy storage is added to the system, the immediate engine failure remains the 
dominant failure case as illustrated in Figure 58. The magnitude of the thrust lapse associated 
with the immediate engine loss is the greatest. However, it has reduced to the magnitude that 
occurred for the generator 1 failure scenario.  
Regardless of energy storage available, this case continues to generate dominant transient 
thrust loss events. Therefore, this event was used to determine energy storage requirements. 
The process for this energy storage sensitivity study is discussed in Section 8.2.  
7.5 Modeling Section Review 
This section outlined the overall methodology applied for system modeling and simulation. 
The models are discussed at length and the type of dynamic outputs which are monitored to 
evaluate system performance. The fidelity and breadth of study results presented in the next 
sections are affected by assumptions outlined in this section.  
The selection of power flow modeling instead of through and across variable representations 
introduced limitations in the way system dynamics could be approximated. Additionally, failures 
were expressed generally, in terms of loss of power, not in terms of effects on torque, speed, 
inertia properties, voltage, current, or other physical attributes of the system.  
Some dynamic events discussed in this section are a direct result of the control logic 
implemented for this system. These include adverse yaw moments during acceleration, 
additional thrust lapse after the response delay when additional power from the failing 
component is available. Additionally, power flow models made modeling of the energy storage 
charge and discharge logic challenging because the control laws could not be conditioned 
around bus voltages. 
This section also introduced the dynamic features which are used to identify the sensitivity 
of system performance to component attributes. Additionally, justification was given for applying 
specific focus on two scenarios during sensitivity analysis: step change in thrust demand, and 
rapid engine power loss. Generator failure scenarios were shown to be dominated by engine 
failure scenarios for this architecture. Additionally, the challenges associated with capturing 
TeDP yaw moment requirements were discussed in this section. Gust and stability 
augmentation scenarios were not targeted for sensitivity analysis. In order to perform these 
system design trade studies, future work is required to integrate the modeling and analysis of a 
TeDP system dynamics and the N3-X aircraft stability and control.  
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8. System Sensitivity Study 
Task1.e The Contractor shall develop a dynamic system model for the architecture chosen in d. and 
use the system model to assess the system issues chosen for study in the Task 
 
Task1.f The requirement, if any, for energy storage shall be assessed with respect to type and capacity 
and the general requirements for a control system shall be determined. 
 
Sensitivity/uncertainty analysis was performed on this N3-X TeDP architecture model to 
determine which component attributes have the largest effect on the system’s transient thrust 
performance and engine failure response. The framework for this analysis followed the 
LibertyWorks parametric optimization process as illustrated in Figure 59. This process requires 
first, the integration of vehicle system models, second, an intelligent sampling of these models 
through design of experiments, third, meta-modeling, and finally, design space exploration.  
The process illustrated in this figure includes a feedback loop in which technology solutions 
are selected and their specific benefits are assessed. However, for the purposes of this study, 
technology benefits analysis is omitted and the process ends with the sensitivity analysis. 
The previous section discusses the first steps of this process: component and system 
modeling. This section discusses the design of experiments used for this study, the surrogate 
modeling, and finally, study results.  
 
 
Figure 59. LibertyWorks Performance Optimization Process 
8.1 Design of Experiments 
A design of experiments requires model input variables which are characterized by their 
sampling ranges. For purposes of this study, exact values for these variables are unnecessary. 
Ranges for the system parameters are intended to get a reasonable feel for the impact of 
component performance on system dynamics.  
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Tables 17 and 18 give the input parameters and their ranges for both the thrust response 
and engine out scenarios. Both scenarios are at an altitude of 5,200 ft and a standard day 
temperature offset of +27°F. The flight Mach number for these scenarios was set at 0.2. The 
conditions were set to represent a Denver, hot day conditions at takeoff and landing velocity. 
Thrust requirements were derived assuming a fan efficiency of 0.94%.  
 
Table 17. DOE Variable Ranges for Thrust Response Sensitivity Analysis 
Condition Value   System Variable Range   
Thrust_init 1000 lbf (approach) Reference Min Power 25000 40000 hp 
Thrust_final 55000 lbf (aborted landing) Engine/Gen Inertia 1 500 lb ft2 
Alt 5200 ft ES 1_4 Pow 0.0001 100 (% of Bus Capability) 
Mach 0.2  ES 2_3 Pow 0.0001 100 (% of Bus Capability) 
DTamb +27 °F ES Energy 1_4 0.0001 10 (seconds ES @ full power) 
 Peff 0.94   ES Energy 2_3 0.0001 10 (seconds ES @ full power) 
     Engine TC 1 6 s 
     Generator TC 0.01 0.5 s 
     Energy Storage TC 0.01 0.05 s 
     Propulsor TC 0.01 2.5 s 
     Min Engine Speed 0.75 0.99 % speed 
Denver, Hot Day, Approach 
 
The step change in thrust scenario is meant to represent the step change in thrust required 
for an aborted landing. The landing thrust was set at 1000 lbf due to model minimum thrust 
limitations. After the model reaches steady state conditions, the thrust required changes to 
55,000 lbf (the estimated max thrust required for this vehicle [ref]).  
 
Table 18. DOE Variable Ranges for Engine Power Loss Sensitivity Analysis 
Condition Value   System Variable Range   
Thrust 55000 lbf (approach) Reference Min Power 25000 40000 hp 
Alt 5200 ft Engine/Gen Inertia 1 500 lb ft2 
Mach 0.2  ES 1_4 Pow 0.0001 100 (% of Bus Capability) 
DTamb +27 °F ES 2_3 Pow 0.0001 100 (% of Bus Capability) 
 Peff 0.94   ES Energy 1_4 0.0001 10 
(seconds ES @ full 
power) 
   ES Energy 2_3 0.0001 10 
(seconds ES @ full 
power) 
     Engine TC 1 6 s 
     Generator TC 0.01 0.5 s 
     Energy Storage TC 0.01 0.05 s 
     Propulsor TC 0.01 2.5 s 
     Response Delay 0 2 s 
     Min Engine Speed 0.75 0.99 % speed 
Denver, Hot Day, Takeoff 
 
The flight conditions and system component variable ranges are the same for the two 
sensitivity studies. The engine loss scenario, however, is performed assuming a fixed 55,000 lbf 
thrust requirement. This requirement does not vary as the failure is imposed. 
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Each simulation run involved 30 seconds of simulation time with a run time ratio of roughly 
1:1 real time to simulation time. For each scenario, data was gathered with a 1200 run Latin 
hypercube design of experiments. Of these runs, 1000 were randomly selected to fit single 
hidden layer neural net regression with hyperbolic tangent activation functions. The remainder is 
used to assess model error checking.  
All surrogate modeling, fit error checking, and data analysis was performed using the JMP 
(SAS Institute Inc.) software produced by SAS.  
8.1.1 Thrust Response Scenario Neural Net Error Overview 
A regression for the time to 95% thrust recovery was made to determine the sensitivity of the 
thrust response time to system parameters. Moment related regressions were not created 
because all moment loss dynamics are dominated by the propulsor control issues discussed in 
Section 7.4.1.  
Multiple error checks were used to ascertain the accuracy of the fits used for this sensitivity 
analysis. Visual inspection of the predicted and residual plots, model fit and representation error 
histograms were used to determine accuracy. Additionally, the mean and standard deviation of 
these errors provided indication of fit.  
Many sources for fitting inaccuracies may be present in these model fits. In addition to the 
error inherent in numeric fitting, the data to which the fit is made was generated by identifying 
dynamic features from a transient model. The tolerances for feature identification can introduce 
discrete jumps in the metric of interest. This is especially prevalent in recovery time estimates 
for energy limited simulation cases. As discussed in the previous section, energy limited cases 
may introduce secondary lapses in thrust. These lapses have the potential to defer the recovery 
time till seconds later. 
While fitting inaccuracies do introduce challenges, this study is interested primarily in 
general trends and variable sensitivities. Exact fits are unnecessary and the fitting fidelity 
outlined in this section for this study is sufficient for our needs. 
8.1.1.1 Error Analysis Time to 95% Thrust Recovery An 8-node, single-hidden-layer 
neural net regression was used to approximate the response time for the TeDP system to a step 
change in thrust demand. Figure 60 illustrates the error associated with the fit for this surrogate 
model. A model with a perfect fit would have all points lined up along the diagonal on the figure 
to the left, corresponding with zero residuals in the figure to the right. Red points on these plots 
represent the 200 points of hold back data which was not included in the neural net fits. The rest 
of the points were used to generate the surrogate model. The abscissa unit for these plots is 
given in seconds (the number of seconds till thrust is recovered).  
The regression equation for the thrust step change scenarios are provided in Appendix B. 
The data from these plots is distributed closely around the diagonal on the left plot in 
Figure 60. There are several outliers where the neural-net-predicted recovery time is too 
optimistic compared to the observed simulations. The outliers were investigated and seven of 
them were eliminated due to simulation issues.  
Table 19 gives the model fit and representation error for this neural net regression. The 
model fit error (MFE) is the difference between the actual output and the predicted output for the 
points used to generate the fit. The model representation error (MRE) is the difference between 
the actual and predicted outputs for the hold back points not used in the fit. Both distributions 
are fairly normally distributed around zero and have a standard deviation is less than 0.4 
seconds. 
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8.1.2 Engine Failure Scenario Neural Net Error Overview 
Two neural net regressions were made for the sensitivity analysis of system performance 
following an engine failure. The two outputs of interest were the magnitude of the thrust lapse 
incurred and the duration of the thrust loss following the failure. Engine failure scenarios affect 
propulsor performance symmetrically. Therefore, impacts on moment observed during this 
scenario were due to propulsor control issues, not loss in power available. These issues were 
observed and characterized in the thrust response study and are not repeated for engine 
failures.  
Both regression equations for the engine out scenario are provided in Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 60. Thrust Response Model Prediction and Residual Error Compared to Simulation Outputs 
Table 19. Model Fit and Representation Error for Thrust Response Recovery Time 
Thrust 95% Recovery MFE Thrust 95% Recovery MRE 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
Stats 
    
Mean 0.0008515 
Std Dev 0.2446445 
Std Err Mean 0.0077363 
Upper 95% Mean 0.0160329 
Lower 95% Mean -0.01433 
N 1000 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
Stats 
    
Mean 0.0143568 
Std Dev 0.3748512 
Std Err Mean 0.026506 
Upper 95% Mean 0.0666254 
Lower 95% Mean -0.037912 
N 200 
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8.1.2.1 Error Analysis of Thrust Lapse A 10-hidden-node, single-layer neural net was 
used to estimate the magnitude of the thrust lapse associated with an engine failure. The 
summary of the fit is given by Figure 61 and Table 20. The lapse was recorded in terms of 
percent thrust loss, with a max loss of roughly 50%. All axes in these figures are in units of 
percent. 
In contrast to the step change in thrust data, the thrust lapse data for engine out scenarios 
exhibits significant groups or clusters. These groupings are indicated in Figure 61 and occur on 
thrust lapses ranges centered around 30% thrust loss and 50% thrust loss. Between these 
points the fit does an acceptable job at predicting the lapse. However, the data is more 
dispersed and less dense.  
The cluster at 50% thrust loss occurs because this is the maximum thrust lapse that can 
occur assuming the other engine functions. Any combination of system parameters which is 
insufficient to provide fill-in power and to respond quickly to the failure will have a thrust loss at 
or near this limit.  
The second cluster around 30% corresponds to the lapse which occurs when power is 
reallocated. This corresponds to a group of cases with moderate to long response time delays, 
high energy storage capacity on the inner bus, and moderate to low energy storage capacity on 
the outer bus. When the failure occurs, the central bus energy storage device is used to fill in 
the lost power for 3 of the propulsors. If the delay is too long, the energy storage device is 
energy limited. Therefore, before power is reallocated to the inner bus, the resulting lapse is 
roughly 30% of the total power.  
Model fit and representation errors are given in Table 20. The standard deviation of the error 
is less than 3.5 percent and the error is distributed with a slight positive offset of the mean.  
All of the regressions reviewed in this report are used to determine the sensitivity of the 
system response to transient requirements in terms of system attributes. However, because the 
engine failure scenario introduces the most taxing energy storage requirements, this regression 
will also be used to determine the trade-off between loss of thrust and energy storage weight.  
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Figure 61. Thrust Lapse Prediction and Residual Error Compared to Simulation Outputs 
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Table 20. Model Fit and Representation Error for Engine Failure Thrust Lapse Magnitude 
Thrust Lapse MFE Thrust Lapse MRE 
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
 
Stats 
   
Mean -0.056786 
Std Dev 3.0535387 
Std Err Mean 0.0965614 
Upper 95% Mean 0.1326999 
Lower 95% Mean -0.246273 
N 1000 
 
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
 
Stats 
   
Mean 0.1437117 
Std Dev 3.4950489 
Std Err Mean 0.2471373 
Upper 95% Mean 0.6310557 
Lower 95% Mean -0.343632 
N 200 
 
 
8.1.2.2 Error Analysis of Time to 95% Thrust Recovery The second 10 hidden node 
neural-net was made to estimate the time to recover 95% of the required thrust when an engine 
failure occurs. The error associated with these fits is illustrated in Figure 62 and Table 21. All 
axes in these figures are in units of time in seconds. 
As is apparent from the disperse nature of the points in this figure, the complex dynamics of 
the system and the ability to accurately identify a recovery make fitting difficult. While a trend 
can be identified, regressions generated from this data are insufficient to be used as a predictive 
model. The main factors which impact recovery time are discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
Model fit and representation errors for this surrogate model are given in Table 21.  
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Figure 62. Thrust Lapse Prediction and Residual Error Compared to Simulation Outputs 
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Table 21. Model Fit and Representation Error for Thrust Response Recovery Time 
Thrust 95% Recovery MFE Thrust 95% Recovery MRE 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
Stats 
   
Mean 0.0115621 
Std Dev 0.6594549 
Std Err Mean 0.0208538 
Upper 95% Mean 0.0524844 
Lower 95% Mean -0.02936 
N 1000 
 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
 
Stats 
   
Mean 0.0657737 
Std Dev 1.1728885 
Std Err Mean 0.0829357 
Upper 95% Mean 0.2293194 
Lower 95% Mean -0.097772 
N 200 
 
8.2 Sensitivity Analysis Results 
In order to understand the dynamics of the system and what drives system transient 
performance, the neural net regressions were used to identify which factors impact system 
dynamic performance the most.  
8.2.1 Step Change in Thrust 
As is apparent from Figure 63, the propulsor and engine time constants are the primary 
drivers for the transient response of the aircraft to a demand in thrust for the aborted landing 
scenario. Figure 63 shows a sensitivity profile for the thrust response output in terms of all 
system variables. Each window in this chart is a two dimensional slice of the neural net 
discussed in Section 8.1.1. This row of graphs shows the variation in time to 95% thrust 
available as a function of each of the system parameters independently. From this figure, it is 
observed that an increase or decrease in either of these two factors yield similar effects on the 
thrust response. 
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Figure 63. Independent Effects of System Parameters on Thrust Response 
These results come as no surprise. Given each factor independently, the propulsor is the 
only component whose response rate is guaranteed to affect propulsor response. Additionally, 
the engine time constant may affect thrust response if it is longer than that of the propulsor and 
insufficient energy storage capability is available.  
The importance of the propulsor and engine time constants is also illustrated in Figure 64. 
This figure contrasts the effect of each independent variable on the response and gives rank 
order to the impact of each factor given the range over which it was exercised. Logically, the 
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first two factors, propulsor time constant and engine time constant, account for more than half of 
the variability associated with the thrust response scenario.  
 Thrust Step Change (Time to 5% Thrust Lapse)
(Denver, Hot Day, Touch and Go)
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Duration (s)
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Duration (s)
MinEngSpeed (%)
Generator_Tc (s)
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Relative Factor Contrast Magnitude  
Figure 64. TeDP System Component Capability Importance for Thrust Response 
The step change in thrust requirements for an aborted takeoff illustrates the relative impact 
of each of the system parameter and the importance of propulsor response and engine 
response metrics. However, it does not introduce sizing critical energy storage trades. None of 
the cases simulated for this scenario failed to achieve the 5 seconds to go from flight idle to 
95% thrust required. This includes cases which included very little to no energy storage 
available.  
Each individual engine is sized to provide 100% of the required thrust. Assuming each 
engine can accelerate from idle to 95% thrust in 5 seconds as specified by FAR requirements, 
then the combined acceleration of two engines is more than sufficient. The thrust response 
capability can be achieved without the addition of energy storage devices. Additional 
maneuverability may be available with energy storage, but energy storage devices are not 
performance critical for the thrust response scenario.  
Sensitivity results do provide insight into which energy storage devices are more critical to 
increase response time, if desired. From Figure 64, we see that the charge capacity of the outer 
bus energy storage devices (Energy_Storage_1_4 Discharge Duration) is more critical to thrust 
response than the capacity of the inner bus energy storage devices (Energy_Storage_2_3 
Discharge Duration) for this architecture. Considering the step-change-in-thrust-demand 
scenario in isolation, energy storage on the outer buses is preferable to energy storage on the 
inner buses.  
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8.2.2 Engine Failure 
The sensitivity analysis considered the effect of system parameters on the magnitude and 
duration of thrust loss during an engine failure scenario. Using the regressions discussed in 
Section 8.1.2, Figure 65 shows the impact of each system parameter on both the maximum 
thrust loss incurred and the time it takes to recover 95% of the original thrust requirement.  
Consider first the trends associated with recovery time as profiled in the first row in 
Figure 65. The results in this row are not intended to denote exact results, but rather to show 
the general effects of the system parameters on the recovery time. 
In contrast to the previous scenario, engine time constant and energy storage parameters 
critically affect on the time to recover thrust. For the engine loss scenario, emphasis is placed 
on providing un-interrupted power to the propulsor. Hence the emphasis placed on energy 
storage factors, system delay, and the sizing parameters. The propulsors need not accelerate 
and decelerate with a fast time constant.  
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Figure 65. Independent Effects of System Parameters on Thrust Recovery 
Contrasting the first and second rows in Figure 65, the propulsor time constant has a large 
effect on the magnitude of the thrust loss incurred during failure. However, a large time constant 
propulsor is advantageous for this case. With a long time constant, the thrust does not lapse as 
quickly, allowing more flexibility in providing fill-in power and engine response. The time 
constant at which the engine responds has a limited effect on the magnitude of the loss. The 
magnitude of the loss is also not affected by increasing the overall system capacity.  
Figure 66 ranks the system parameters in terms of the variability of both the thrust loss 
magnitude and recovery delay. Engine time constant has the largest impact on the lapse 
duration and the inner bus energy storage device has the largest impact on the magnitude of 
the lapse. As expected, the effect of system delay is great. The thrust required cannot be 
provided until the recovery logic has been engaged. While all other parameters affect this metric 
through the system dynamics, the delay acts as a time offset during which energy storage 
capacity is depleted.  
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Figure 66. TeDP System Component Capability Importance for Thrust Recovery 
Figure 66 again indicates which energy storage device has a greater impact on system 
dynamics. While the thrust demand prefers energy storage on the outer buses, the engine out 
scenario prefers energy storage available on the inner bus. However, both inner and outer 
energy storage devices can have a large impact on the magnitude of the lapse. Both devices 
are needed to fill in power during the system delay. In addition, the inner energy storage must 
continue to fill in power after power has been reallocated.  
Energy storage benefits come at a cost of weight to the system. Although fill-in power is 
required for only a few seconds during engine failure, the weight of an energy storage system 
can be significant. The benefits of reducing thrust lapse must be balanced with the potential 
impacts on weight.  
8.3 Energy Storage Pareto Optimization  
There is a threshold for improvement and a point of diminishing return for the energy 
storage system in terms of energy and power. Consider the effect of energy storage capacity on 
the predicted thrust lapse (max_TLapse) occurring with engine failure which is depicted in 
Figure 67. The areas of interest are highlighted in red for the energy storage discharge time on 
the inner (Energy_2_3(s)) and outer (Energy_1_4(s)) buses. These example profiles reflect the 
conditions: system response delay equal to 2 seconds, all energy storage devices sized at 5 
MW rating, propulsor time constant of 1 second, and an engine time constant of 4 seconds. The 
ranges indicated on this figure float depending on the values of the other system parameters.  
Looking at the outer bus energy storage devices (ES Energy_1_4(s)), there is little benefit to 
having less than 5 MW-s an energy storage capacity. On the other hand, energy storage 
capacities or greater than roughly 15 MW-s provide no additional benefit in terms of the 
magnitude of thrust lapse compared with the cost of additional weight. Similar ranges are 
observed for the inner bus energy storage device. For the parameter values used in this figure, 
energy storage on the inner bus need not exceed roughly 6 MW-s capacity because no 
additional benefit in thrust lapse reduction is achieved. 
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Figure 67. Area of Interest for Energy Storage Capacity 
The two competing objective (minimize weight, minimize thrust lapse) can be balanced by 
varying the extent to which energy storage is used as illustrated in Figure 68. Ideally, the system 
would exhibit no thrust lapse and incur no cost in terms of energy storage weight. This ideal 
point is indicated by the star at the origin in this figure. While this point is desirable, it is not 
feasible or viable. A compromise must be made depending on the importance of both of these 
metrics. 
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Figure 68. Notional Pareto Front for Thrust Lapse versus Energy Storage Weight Trades 
The blue and green points on this figure represent the desired solutions under different 
specific preferences. If minimizing weight is the only weighted objective to be achieved 
regardless of the impact on thrust lapse, then the green point on the lower right corner of the 
graph would be the decided ideal. Conversely, if system weight is insignificant and the 
minimizing thrust lapse is crucial then the blue point on the upper left would be the selection. In 
reality there is a tradeoff between the two metrics which is limited by the physics of the problem. 
Pareto optimal solutions represent the best set of compromises. For these solutions, there is no 
way of making improvements to one metric without expense to another. From a Pareto optimal 
set of solutions, a Pareto front can be identified. This Pareto front is represented by the red 
dashed line in Figure 68. This Pareto front of best compromises characterizes the tradespace 
between the two metrics.  
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To characterize these trades, a series of optimizations runs was performed on the neural net 
regression for thrust lapse magnitude discussed in Section 8.1.2. The independent variables for 
these optimizations were the sizing parameters for both outer and inner bus energy storage 
devices (power rating, and total capacity). Using the surrogate model for dynamic performance, 
the expected thrust lapse (TLapse) for an engine out scenario was estimated. By assuming 
energy and power density values for the energy storage devices, the total energy storage 
weight (WES) was also estimated. The optimization objective function takes the form: 
]1,0[,]1,0[,1    ,
__
∈∈=++= BABA
W
WB
T
T
AObj
refES
ES
refLapse
Lapse  (19) 
Optimizations were performed by varying the preferences between weight and lapse 
minimization. The A and B values in Equation (19) are the weighting values for the two 
objectives. The values for TLapse_ref and WES_ref were set to normalize the thrust lapse and weight 
values and were given the values of 50% and 500 kg, respectively.  
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The optima were filtered to reduce clustering of solutions and to identify all Pareto solutions. 
From these solutions, a regression was made to numerically approximate the Pareto front. The 
form of this regression follows Equation (20).  
Figure 69 illustrates the data processing used in this process. The weights and lapses 
illustrated in this figure were generated at a specific setting of system parameters and values for 
energy storage specific power and energy. This figure is meant for illustrative purposes only.  
 
Figure 69. Example Energy Storage Pareto Front for Engine Power Failure at Takeoff 
All the points on this graph represent an optimum obtained for one setting of the weighting 
values. Due to the non-convex nature of the objective function and potentially ill-tuned 
convergence criteria, not all of the points found by the optimizer were Pareto optimal. The non-
Pareto optimal points were eliminated and are depicted with a blue ring around each dominated 
point in Figure 69. Pareto optimal points in this figure are displayed in solid green and the 
Pareto front was estimated by the regression given by the red line.  
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From the Pareto front estimate in Figure 69, there is fairly linear relationship between the 
magnitude of the thrust lapse and the weight of the energy storage devices for large thrust 
lapses. However, for low values of thrust lapse improvements, there is a point of diminishing 
return. The energy storage weight increases asymptotically as it approaches some low end 
thrust lapse limit.  
The effect of system parameters on this Pareto front was captured by running series of 
optimizations with one-at-a-time factor variation. Eleven Pareto fronts were identified to 
characterize the five variables most significant to thrust lapse magnitude: energy storage 
specific power, energy storage specific energy, system response delay, engine time constant, 
and propulsor time constant. The parameter values and ranges used here are given in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Design of Experiments Factors and Ranges for Energy  
Storage Pareto Optimum Analysis 
 
Factors 
Factor Ranges 
Low  Med High 
A Specific Energy (W×h/kg) 50 150 250 
B Specific Power (kW/kg) 20 70 120 
C Response Delay (s) 0 1 2 
D Propulsor Time Constant 0.1 0.5 1 
E Engine Time Constant (s) 2 4 6 
 Engine Inertia (lb×ft2) - 150 - 
 Yaw Moment (ft×lb) - 0 - 
 Min Engine Speed (%) - 85 - 
 Energy Storage Time Constant (s) - 0.01 - 
 Generator Time Constant (s) - 0.1 - 
 System Reference Power Rating 
(hp) - 30,000 - 
 
The medium range is used as the baseline case for this sensitivity evaluation. Results are 
plotted in Figure 70 A through E. Each plot in this figure corresponds to the case indicated in 
Table 22. 
Regardless of the factor parameters evaluated, hundreds of kilograms of energy storage are 
necessary to yield the maximum reduction in thrust lapse during engine out. However, these 
plots show that partial mitigation of thrust lapse is available with a lesser weight cost. Additional 
studies are necessary to extend this Pareto analysis to consider additional dimensions of this 
thrust lapse trade. More accurate estimates of thrust lapse duration would be necessary to 
perform this analysis.  
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Figure 70. Sensitivity of Pareto Optimal Energy Storage Weight versus Thrust Lapse to 
Technology Factors 
As is to be expected from the sensitivity study, variations in the energy storage energy and 
power density yield the largest impact on the energy storage tradespace. The effects of these 
parameters on the Pareto fronts are non-linear. This is observed by the larger displacement 
between the blue and green curves than between the orange and blue curves in Figures 70-A 
and B.  
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Additionally, the duration of the delay between failure and thrust reallocation has a large 
effect on the energy storage weight versus lapse Pareto fronts. However, the response delay 
must be less than 1 second to alter the tradespace. All l but one of the Pareto front from 
Figure 70 intercept the abscissa at roughly 50% thrust lapse. The only parameter which effects 
the zero energy storage weight thrust lapse is the response delay variable. While changes in the 
delay time from between 1 and 2 seconds has no impact on the energy storage tradespace, 
reducing the delay time to 0.5 seconds decreases the zero energy storage weight thrust lapse 
to 40%. Fast acting failure identification and thrust allocation response has a critical impact on 
the magnitude of hazard incurred during an engine out at takeoff failure scenario.  
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9. Conclusions 
The N3-X aircraft concept has the potential to provide significant improvement in fuel 
efficiency in pursuit of NASA’s N+3 goals. However, significant advances in component 
technology and systems integration remain for these benefits to be realized. This research effort 
endeavored to get a better sense of the critical transient performance issues for a TeDP 
electrical system, mature the TeDP system concept, identify technology gaps, and investigate 
the challenges of utilizing this system for flight critical thrust and control requirements.  
9.1 Key Observations and Challenges 
9.1.1 Issue Identification and Selection 
Initial issue identification required the identification of potential problems that originate within 
the system or from the environment in which the system must operate. Each component within 
the system presents a significant number of design issues for safe and effective integration 
within the context of the system. Additionally, each flight phase introduces a variety of 
operational challenges for the electrical system. All issues were evaluated on a basis of 
probability that the event in question will occur, significance/severity of the requirements that are 
introduced by the event, triviality of the technical solution, and programmatic limitation of this 
research.  
The issues selected for further evaluation were introduced in Table 6. The focus with this 
selection of issues is understanding the fundamental dynamic requirements of the TeDP system 
during scenarios that are either expected to take place for an aircraft (acceleration/deceleration, 
cross-wind, control) or have probable occurrence for a fleet of commercial aircraft (engine, 
generator failure). Many additional issues that present component design and system 
integration challenges were discussed and evaluated. These challenges must be addressed 
during concept design in order for this electrical power system to be sufficiently demonstrated. 
(From Section 2.2) Table 1. Recommended Issues 
Category Questions to be answered Issue 
Nominal 
Operations 
What is the baseline system performance?  
What does the system need to look like? 
Acceleration/Deceleration 
Gust/Crosswind 
Aircraft Control and Stability Augmentation 
What is the role of energy storage? Identifying Energy Storage Requirements 
Off-Nominal 
Operations 
What is the system level effect? 
Is this failure a design show-stopper? 
What additional requirements need to be 
included? 
Engine Shutdown 
Loss of Energy Storage 
Internal Short on Generator 
 
A key observation from this issue identification and selection exercise regards the limitations 
of FAR 25 requirements in framing the critical failure requirements for this nontraditional 
commercial aircraft concept. Sizing critical requirements are derived from architecture specific 
off-nominal operating scenarios. In the case of this revolutionary system, traditionally applicable 
rules of thumb may not be sufficient in estimating required component size. While FAR does 
express some minimum levels of aircraft level performance that must be achieved during off-
nominal states, the premise of these standards reflects the heritage of conventional tube-and-
wing aircraft with podded propulsion. For a BWB with TeDP, standard failure cases like single-
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engine out at takeoff and bird strike present different challenges than those perceived and 
expressed by federal standards. The definition and evaluation of this flight critical vehicle 
system requires a departure from existing FAR requirement and a focus on the operational 
hazards that must be mitigated when failures occur. These evaluations should be performed 
concurrent to concept definition in order to accurately predict the sizing critical requirements for 
each component or subsystem.  
9.1.2 Architecture Selection and Sizing 
9.1.2.1 Contingency Requirements The identification of sizing critical scenarios was 
required to compare the efficacy of the candidate architectures considered for this study. 
Therefore, a formal contingency analysis was performed for several candidate TeDP 
architectures. The level of system redundancy and interconnectivity was shown to affect which 
failure scenarios drive component requirements. Interconnectivity reduced the propulsor 
redundancy required to provide flight-critical thrust. However, the associated reduction in 
propulsor weight was counteracted by the equipment weight and system complexity associated 
with rerouting power during a failure condition. 
9.1.2.2 Architecture Evaluation Four metrics were considered for architecture comparison: 
weight, component count, excess power available, and failure response complexity. While the 
inner bus tie architecture represented the best compromise between these considerations, all 
concepts exhibit advantageous attributes that may be preferable depending on the emphasis 
placed on each of the metrics. Both technology progress and changes in metric preferences 
must be projected in order to accurately select the right architecture. 
The results of the architecture study, a review of current TeDP electrical system component 
technology, and a review of how technology may develop were presented. Superconducting or 
cryogenic electrical system component technology is progressing but still needs to improve in 
terms of power density in order for the N3-X aircraft to be possible. The type of superconducting 
electric machine, SFCL, converter, cable, protection, and energy storage as well as voltage 
level used for the N3-X aircraft all depend on the progression of technology to maximize power 
density and minimize system weight.  
9.1.2.3 Differential Thrust The TeDP system power requirements and subsequent 
component weights are highly sensitivity to the magnitude of the yaw moment steady-state trim 
requirements. The inner bus tie architecture requires 40% propulsor oversizing to provide fail-
safe performance. However, this oversizing will increase linearly with increases to the 
magnitude of yaw support provided by differential thrust. This is illustrated in Figure 71 which 
shows the ratio of the overall propulsor thrust available to the minimum takeoff thrust under 
varying aircraft directional control moments.  
Trimming Differential Thrust Yaw Moment Required  
Figure 71. The Effect of Aircraft Directional Control Trimming on Propulsor Sizing 
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Dynamic requirements for this system must also be considered when determining the extent 
to which differential thrust is used for yaw control.  Latency, bandwidth, rate, and certification 
requirements for aircraft directional control on a BWB aircraft may prove challenging for a 
differential thrust only flight control solution. The magnitude of this challenge is highly dependent 
on propulsor technology progression.  
Additional analysis is necessary to integrate dynamic aircraft performance analysis with that 
of the TeDP electrical system. This relationship between TeDP system dynamics and flight 
dynamics will govern the electrical system control requirements to avoid adverse moments. 
Propulsor acceleration must be synchronized and account for all non-linearities in aircraft 
performance, deviations due to boundary layer issues, and deviations due to component 
degradation. Additional work is necessary to configure the balance between traditional and 
differential thrust yaw control for static and dynamic moment requirements.  
This study recommends assigning propulsors to central distribution buses in a symmetric 
fashion to minimize adverse yaw moments during electrical distribution system faults or failures. 
This was challenging given the number of propulsors for the baseline N3-X concept. With 14 or 
15 propulsors, an odd number of propulsors was assigned to some of the buses for all 
candidate architecture considered. Bus number, propulsor number, and propulsor assignment 
must be considered during TeDP concept development. For simplicity, it is preferable that an 
even number of propulsors be assigned to each central distribution bus whenever possible.  
9.1.2.4 Protection Systems Another key observation with this architecture study is the 
significant contribution of protection systems to overall architecture weight.  Approximately 25% 
of the TeDP architecture weight can be attributed to protection equipment (note: weight trades 
did not include energy storage and SFCL weight). Depending on how technology progresses, 
the protection of the electrical system may rely more heavily on circuit breakers alone or SFCLs 
in conjunction with circuit breakers. The protection scheme also depends on whether the circuit 
breaker used is electromechanical or solid state.  
9.1.3 System Modeling and Factor Sensitivity 
9.1.3.1 System Modeling Initial assumptions were that power flow modeling would be 
better to understand system and component requirements interaction. This proved accurate. 
The form of the models was sufficient to detail some high level system requirements. However, 
there were limitations to the types of conclusions that could be made based on the form of the 
model.  
Component modeling and system integration was relatively simple by eliminating the 
necessity to enforce conservation throughout a complex system. However, defining the controls 
with no traditional state information posed difficulties especially for energy storage devices. 
Additionally, all failures had to be posed in terms of power flow. Future TeDP system 
developments should consider through and across variable modeling to explore additional 
safety critical scenarios. Benefits would include being able to represent failures in terms of more 
meaningful variables like torque, speed, and current.  Additionally, some control strategies 
would be more easily implemented (engine inertia, energy storage). Different control issues 
would arise with through and across variable modeling, and charge and discharge logic would 
have to maintain intelligent use of energy storage. 
Additional control challenges include the coordination of propulsor control to mitigate yaw 
lapses during thrust modulation and developing means for alleviating the fighting between 
energy storage devices (engine shaft inertia and bus energy storage). 
9.1.3.2 Factor Sensitivity Analysis of the inner bus tie architecture concept discussed in 
the second deliverable showed the sensitivity of the TeDP system level transient performance in 
terms of the component level technology metrics. 
NASA/CR—2013-217865 107 
The propulsor and engine time constant values affected the variability of response time to 
thrust the most. The TeDP system had no challenge providing the idle to 95% thrust 
requirement within the allotted 5 seconds over all the ranges of technology parameters 
exercised. As such, energy storage is not necessary for thrust response. However, the use of 
energy storage has the potential to improve performance beyond the requirement as specified 
by FAR regulations. 
The thrust lapse incurred during an engine out scenario with loss in engine shaft inertia 
imposed the most significant dynamic performance interruption compared to all other failure 
modes considered. The duration of the thrust lapse is highly sensitive to the engine time 
constant and the magnitude of the thrust lapse is sensitive primarily to energy storages 
attributes (power and energy ratings of the devices).  
As is expected, the time constants of the electrical equipment have very little impact on the 
provision of thrust. This is due to the relative magnitude of these time constants compared to 
those for mechanical systems.  
9.1.3.3 Energy Storage All FAR requirements may be met with no fill-in energy storage 
capability. Energy storage is not needed to provide the specified 5-second thrust response 
capability. Additionally, an engine out scenario with a conventional platform or with a TeDP 
system with no energy storage has the same effect. A 50% lapse will occur until the remaining 
engine accelerates to maximum thrust. However, including energy storage with a TeDP 
provides the ability to increase thrust response and curb the impact of component failures on 
thrust lapse. This added capability may not buy the energy storage system onto the platform by 
itself; however, the energy storage device has the ability to provide fail-safe redundancy to 
many functions simultaneously. Other roles of the energy storage device may include the 
support of engine start/restart capabilities, the provision of avionics, control, and/or auxiliary 
power for fail-safe operations, and the improvement of transient thrust response. 
9.2 Future Work 
While no showstoppers were identified that refute the TeDP electric grid concept, many 
challenges remain with regards to its design and implementation. Several avenues of continuing 
research in this area are discussed in the following subsections.  
9.2.1 Vehicle Level Requirements Update 
The results of this study should be used to update the system level performance models of 
the aircraft. Weight estimates of the electrical system should be updated to include the 
oversizing considerations of the propulsors for fault tolerant provision of thrust and yaw 
trimming. This overall weight must include approximations of all electrical equipment weight, 
including protection devices. Propulsor size has an impact on the number of propulsor devices 
used on the aircraft. Decreasing the maximum thrust rating of the propulsors allows for 
reductions in the fan area required. As the fan diameter shrinks, the number of propulsors that 
fit spanwise on the BWB increases. The results of adding propulsors include increased 
redundancy of the propulsors and increased responsiveness due to decreased propulsor inertia. 
The impact of the electrical systems architecture on the other vehicle systems must also be 
assessed. In particular, the TeDP electrical system and cryogenic systems architecture designs 
are highly interdependent. The structure, composition, spatial integration, and interoperability of 
these two systems should be determined via a coordinated multidisciplinary architecting effort. 
Safety, reliability, and stability analysis must be performed for these two systems in combination 
to determine feasibility of the N3-X TeDP concept. Architecture trades should consider 
nonpropulsive power requirements, variations in number and placement of the engines and 
propulsors, and an expansion of the metrics used for concept evaluation (performance, cost, 
maintenance, complexity, integration into the current air traffic system, etc).  
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9.2.2 Directional Control Modeling and Trade Studies 
A second area that must be addressed to mature the N3-X TeDP concept is the extent to 
which differential thrust is used to support aircraft directional control requirements. Providing 
yaw control via differential thrust is aerodynamically attractive with drag inducing vertical tails 
and control surfaces removed. Additionally, the size, weight, complexity, and power demand 
from the control system can be dramatically reduced. However, these benefits come at 
significant cost. This study indicated the magnitude of the yaw moment provided by differential 
thrust has a large impact on the propulsor and electrical system sizing. Additionally, response 
rates required for fast acting directional stability augmentation may pose challenging for 
differential thrust concepts.  
A dedicated research effort is required for developing the N3-X directional control system. 
This study should consider alternative flight control methods for providing both dynamic control 
response and steady-state trimming for directional control. Potential solutions may consider 
combination of differential thrust (e.g., propulsor speed modulation, variable pitch fans, variable 
guide vanes, and fan duct geometry manipulation), vectored thrust, and aerodynamic control 
(e.g., vertical surfaces, spoilers, split flaps).  
Aircraft level considerations may also be considered in differential control concept trades. 
These may include propulsor placement and inboard versus outboard throttling. The selection of 
the preferred directional controls architecture must consider integrated dynamic analysis of the 
propulsors, TeDP system, and aircraft. Other significnant factors include overall system weight, 
complexity, and safety.  
9.2.3 Architecture Modeling 
Assessing the failure response characteristic in this study was performed with simple power 
flow models. While this allowed for the characterization of component requirements sensitivities, 
all failures were imposed and observed in terms of a loss in power available or provided. 
Therefore, increased model fidelity is recommended to enable more physically representative 
insertion and observance of failures. This will assist in developing the unit and non-unit 
protection strategies necessary to sense and respond to a failure. Additionally, constructing 
these models will allow for the development of detailed control laws for this TeDP electrical grid. 
9.2.4 Protection and Control Studies 
The architecture definition and selection exercises discussed in this document 
recommended the inner bus-tie TeDP architecture as the best compromise architecture. 
However, additional weight benefits may be achieved by increasing redundancy and 
interconnectivity. Failure accommodation with these more complex architecture concepts 
requires the development of more extensive logic for load allocation and power rerouting. It is 
therefore recommended that further studies look at the implementation of more advanced 
protection strategies for these highly interconnected concepts. Coupled with more detailed 
system models, logic should be developed that monitors failures in terms of system states (e.g., 
voltage, current, torque, and speed).  
Failure analysis should also extend to consider interactions between vehicle systems and 
include common cause failure considerations. 
9.2.5 Wholly Cryogenic System Demonstrator 
The final recommendation for future work relates to the fundamental research necessary to 
progress superconducting electrical components to maturity. While research and development 
has been done to develop individual cryogenic, superconducting technologies, the implication of 
integrating all of these components in a wholly-cryogenic, superconducting system has not been 
fully evaluated. As such, it is recommended that plans should be put forth for the development 
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of a laboratory demonstrator of a wholly-superconducting electrical system. This demonstrator 
need not reflect all of the redundancy and interconnectivity recommended for the candidate 
architectures in this study, but it must reflect the basic structure of the system as is illustrated in 
Figure 72.  
Construction of this proof of concept system represents a large undertaking, but would act 
as a test bed for future technology developments and assist in maturing this TeDP concept 
towards a 2035 EIS date. Such a demonstrator would not only increase component technology 
readiness, but also answer questions concerning the integration, maintenance, and cooling of 
these technologies in a wholly superconducting system environment. This recommended future 
research work would help identify the limitations of such a system and other unknowns that 
must be accounted for in TeDP design.  
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Figure 72. TeDP Protection Equipment Zones 
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Appendix A. Candidate Architectures 
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Figure 73. Baseline Architecture (Diagrams not to Scale) 
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Figure 74. Inner Bus Tie Architecture (Diagrams not to Scale) 
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Figure 75. 3-Bus Multi-Feeder Architecture, Dashed Feeder Lines Indicate the Secondary 
Connections (Diagrams not to Scale) 
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Figure 76. Cross-Redundant Multi-Feeder Architecture, Dashed Feeder Lines Indicate the 
Secondary Connections (Diagrams not to Scale) 
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Appendix B. Thrust Response Regression Equation 
This single hidden layer neural net regression with hyperbolic tangent activation functions 
calculates the time to achieve 95% thrust required for the step change in thrust demand thrust 
response scenario.  
T95 = 3.0020306364202 … 
+ 0.362006816139137 * Tanh(… 
 0.5 * (12.8362451435072 + -0.489485952500546 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ -0.818854667529427 * ES2_3_energy + 0.104404699391162 * ES1_4_power …  
+ -0.124478063141393 * ES2_3_power + -0.00277232050886049 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -3.11059390801946 * EngSpeedMin + -0.0003354208208423 * RefPower … 
+ 25.6281265582209 * ES_TC + 0.496991009637499 * Engine_TC … 
+ 4.93183826377582 * Gen_TC+ 0.947833520504417 * Prop_TC) … 
+ -0.432688906591847 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * ((-4.47446342245943) + 2.70452281078683 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ 0.151422631153139 * ES2_3_energy + 0.616193043469226 * ES1_4_power … 
+ 0.0707132251303455 * ES2_3_power + -0.00205433906995409 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -2.26411299506077 * EngSpeedMin + 0.000239354493625826 * RefPower … 
+ -8.2043845649541 * ES_TC + -1.88028371326538 * Engine_TC … 
+ -0.638546543876446 * Gen_TC + 1.33354042192191 * Prop_TC) … 
+ 0.876682934444622 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * (3.71376433788591 + 0.0603025504015973 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ -0.970842807295277 * ES2_3_energy + 0.0998977231945828 * ES1_4_power … 
+ -0.09982958583305 * ES2_3_power + -0.0000788407485535615 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -2.10765847173311 * EngSpeedMin + -0.0000900024221096066 * RefPower … 
+ -12.3235553506909 * ES_TC + 0.502408308827524 * Engine_TC … 
+ -0.883389151812908 * Gen_TC + -0.507281874129977 * Prop_TC) … 
+ 0.15714883785515 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * ((-0.569200706971496) + 0.239153909317465 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ -0.270734594566643 * ES2_3_energy + -0.368149186906807 * ES1_4_power … 
+ -0.252862169369751 * ES2_3_power+ -0.00552043217367565 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ 3.77416829819402 * EngSpeedMin + 0.000137526683162744 * RefPower … 
+ -66.2942345681836 * ES_TC + -0.208145545995181 * Engine_TC … 
+ -3.31357874777013 * Gen_TC + 0.755914830027238 * Prop_TC) … 
+ 1.1598936009069 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * ((-7.40868732466166) + -0.140383549239692 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ 0.373005194524681 * ES2_3_energy + -0.0738175837710996 * ES1_4_power … 
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+ 0.0000197193900058783 * ES2_3_power + 0.00139952390780768 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ 0.448427119403499 * EngSpeedMin + 0.000248079561579556 * RefPower … 
+ -6.45422147820156 * ES_TC + 0.150941162724559 * Engine_TC … 
+ -2.27653807044365 * Gen_TC + -1.318264839474 * Prop_TC) … 
+ 0.20982357803928 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * ((-0.47919937385128) + -0.366191940180995 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ -0.0153718838478685 * ES2_3_energy + -0.0247791222164518 * ES1_4_power … 
+ 0.534885760176834 * ES2_3_power + -0.000280079186030327 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -3.46485933730473 * EngSpeedMin + -0.0000105378115189607 * RefPower … 
+ -19.7282913755282 * ES_TC + -0.0654203310994235 * Engine_TC … 
+ 2.1948201634828 * Gen_TC + 0.105782006075441 * Prop_TC) … 
+ -0.442475622889655 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * (0.65967841695111 + -1.45822577332781 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ 0.303880765007871 * ES2_3_energy + 0.174820424284601 * ES1_4_power … 
+ 0.0317438897464478 * ES2_3_power+ -0.0017771502241699 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -2.78620551366278 * EngSpeedMin + 0.000125691082732376 * RefPower … 
+ -19.4618469850837 * ES_TC + 0.0236753078582184 * Engine_TC … 
+ 1.35553052105625 * Gen_TC + -0.781174849224912 * Prop_TC) … 
+ -0.885063422355431 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * ((-5.18986050058694) + 1.99561079870287 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ 0.951823064391685 * ES2_3_energy + 0.612771007496574 * ES1_4_power … 
+ 0.177849888149659 * ES2_3_power +-0.00100557034831976 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -1.61470889423016 * EngSpeedMin + 0.000071302283213513 * RefPower … 
+ -4.85866812960397 * ES_TC + -0.371538335013754 * Engine_TC … 
+ -2.77787008491966 * Gen_TC + -1.23309513008536 * Prop_TC) … 
+ 1.86789557272772 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * (1.37089365629821 + 0.0353403706260534 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ 0.0980477243204255 * ES2_3_energy + 0.0992641595914051 * ES1_4_power … 
+ 0.012588660659254 * ES2_3_power +-0.0005906904314849 * Engine_Inertia … 
+ -0.202036497869066 * EngSpeedMin + -0.000103168903109325 * RefPower … 
+ 3.16402750971223 * ES_TC + -0.268672572174927 * Engine_TC … 
+ 0.885016590546804 * Gen_TC + 1.33550884875758 * Prop_TC) … 
+ -0.784280326472774 * Tanh(… 
0.5 * (4.05022769970042 + -1.68559401798463 * ES1_4_energy … 
+ -1.1473876844055 * ES2_3_energy + -0.598133360505805 * ES1_4_power … 
+ -0.19581269756194 * ES2_3_power + 0.000165104311701644 * Engine_Inertia … 
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+ 1.30878080826364 * EngSpeedMin + -0.0000270320045639853 * RefPower … 
+ 9.063285200469 * ES_TC + 0.0707535276037323 * Engine_TC … 
+ 2.64782930005472 * Gen_TC + 1.56093879582782 * Prop_TC); 
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Appendix C. Thrust Recovery Regression Equations 
These single hidden layer neural net regressions with hyperbolic tangent activation functions 
calculates the time to restore 95% of the thrust required and the magnitude of the thrust lapse 
for the single engine failure scenario.  
ThrustLapse = 35.6157356889034 + 7.96921159955812 * tanh( 
0.5 * (5.1981171298889 + 5.15935752141622 * Sys_Delay  
+   0.789740612931058 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.740307041979953 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
+ -0.0215473224847165 * Sys_ESPow_1_4 + -0.0160309182794944 *  Sys_ESPow_2_3 + 
0.000421717706007633 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -1.88771230022545 * Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
+ -0.0000813137684986572 *  Sys_RefPower + 6.27595801126346 *  
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
+ 0.255587195946162 * Sys_Tc_Engine  + 0.847521625959051 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
+ -1.63036730713318 *  Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
+ -0.604647387851743 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
+ -0.0766155504876909 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
+ 0.0553069555142171 * ES1_4_Power + 0.182736121079305 * ES2_3_Power))  
+ -1.39861930968599 * tanh( 
0.5 * ((-50.1897066301145) + -0.986764728898563 * Sys_Delay  
+  0.426920956763784 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 1.02109554034764  * ES_Energy_2_3_s + -
0.0702859603343362 * Sys_ESPow_1_4 + 0.012728694304325 * Sys_ESPow_2_3  
+ 0.0153946943318596 *  Sys_Inertia_Engine + 8.5507419961246 *  Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
+ 0.000961662918898844 * Sys_RefPower + -174.641487346437 *  
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
+ 0.888093489570623 * Sys_Tc_Engine  + 20.1646963074645 * Sys_Tc_Generator 
+ -0.639131152699948 *  Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
+ 0.403439075547142 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
+ -0.401220090744879 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
+ 0.342293872799091 *  ES1_4_Power + 0.0470828066144193 * ES2_3_Power))  
+ 10.425882740946 * tanh( 
0.5 * (1.58393639984248 + 2.19396529155223 * Sys_Delay  
+ 0.393844341849774 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.481588061432554 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
+  0.00414139285461143 * Sys_ESPow_1_4 + 0.00814156861351476 * Sys_ESPow_2_3  
+  0.0000606968122724451 * Sys_Inertia_Engine +  0.170708873096137 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed + -0.0000056699619919093 *  Sys_RefPower + -5.71987421880282 *  
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
+ 0.0611827070862472 * Sys_Tc_Engine + 0.476253652215123 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
+ -0.226754088689734 *  Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
+ -0.0705204851678623 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
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+ -0.941256480232967 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
+ -0.0675748496481914 * ES1_4_Power + -0.0192891677078575 * ES2_3_Power))  
+ -4.90843514270608 * tanh( 
0.5 * (0.603012431742199 + 4.3405547722301 * Sys_Delay  
+ 1.62376254521244 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -2.11800343426427  * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
+ -0.0797827795357116 * Sys_ESPow_1_4 + 0.0192790887409868 *  Sys_ESPow_2_3  
+ -0.0020121328773128 *  Sys_Inertia_Engine + 1.14702492461783 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
+ 0.000220229068618212 * Sys_RefPower + -35.4848528104855 *  
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
+ -0.571813516421218 * Sys_Tc_Engine + -1.16209806829036 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
+ 2.54530560396117 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
+ -0.195237825710394 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
+ 0.157956031945819 *  (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
+ 0.364888917447581 * ES1_4_Power + -0.372158910112989 * ES2_3_Power)); 
 
TLapseDuration = 3.06670086935241 + 2.40816380353065 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (9.04930615184478 + 1.46252900612838 * Sys_Delay  
 + -0.411030105190234 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.552072141956109 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.0011417899794921 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100) 
 + -0.0288644211952457 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.000491455466193494 *Sys_Inertia_Engine + -0.0367525601825437 
*Sys_MinEngineSpeed 
 + -0.000241721379233685 *Sys_RefPower  
 + -8.58335999342275 * Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage + 0.30585411340664 * 
Sys_Tc_Engine 
 + -1.12951501095914 * Sys_Tc_Generator + 0.677541538559171 *Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.11151509617393 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
 + -0.020992320221514 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.142207896878321 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0380546085981262 * ES2_3_Power 
 + -0.023197056407973 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -1.11741846616179 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (14.5020438675078 + -0.00663408302117506 * Sys_Delay  
 + -0.271040829679196 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -1.66902848754794 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.0150542223025735 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100) 
 + -0.0195842768621117 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
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 + -0.00748206607083317 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -7.84417388966642 *
 Sys_MinEngineSpeed 
 + -0.000146160799467573 *Sys_RefPower  
 + -32.4179026387655 * Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage + 0.293062426160559 * 
Sys_Tc_Engine 
 + -0.834513446164708 * Sys_Tc_Generator + 1.45491732443952 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.0301518925918615 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.10369243338659 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.00923246186299741 * ES1_4_Power + -0.0891792540410199 * ES2_3_Power 
 + -0.0340964719456208 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -2.92632458567025 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (15.4552061173105 + 0.537448968656437 * Sys_Delay  
 + -0.91957419168892 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -0.136851149277878 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.0169312107631047 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + -0.0012516001024469 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.00373077172154229 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + 2.11624576690557 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + -0.000475511508364143 * Sys_RefPower + -27.8813793576826 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + 1.2709871089781 * Sys_Tc_Engine +- 0.785619988899329 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -1.528446335668 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.0824468400978958 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + -0.226595038263897 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.0162728046295004 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0648519450486576 * ES2_3_Power 
  + -0.0639901016301821 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -2.01418830346807 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (5.89618492567684 + 1.45721365890979 * Sys_Delay  
 + -0.0816799138107279 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -1.11513004717364 * 
ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.00866116894675238 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + -0.000454309331946496 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.00120882210444396 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + -0.67948676725367 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + -0.000114559939583915 * Sys_RefPower + -36.809636477447 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.0106334356562381 * Sys_Tc_Engine + 0.792340902190444 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 0.2004607684258 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.115559365232893 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
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 + 0.113472193186944 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.108060428484004 * ES1_4_Power + -0.00568640857767903 * ES2_3_Power 
  + 0.00110932634304895 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -3.74489336352664 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-17.4425980312368) + -1.25132044721124 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.33542177130355 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.0900631720151254 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.00271579155013109 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0132746240447146 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.00173460751296057 * Sys_Inertia_Engine   
 + -0.926116537389074 * Sys_MinEngineSpeed + 0.000661287609492374 * 
Sys_RefPower  
 + 25.58436853366 * Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage + -1.9732486382018 * Sys_Tc_Engine 
 + -1.43473365841404 * Sys_Tc_Generator + 0.970001356526215 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.151218891522779 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
 + 0.265293093087258 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.0182132434795957 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0178201208993116 * ES2_3_Power 
  + 0.0374732440797624 * ThrustLapse))  
+ 2.37716956928073 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-14.1350261639086) + 0.667416178047211 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.287631639990092 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.403704612673455 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.0165195671779091 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0237572571225334 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.00242893638268061 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + -0.142442714973703 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed 
 + 0.000193767180823362 * Sys_RefPower + 30.9445475564691 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.185450976097139 * Sys_Tc_Engine + 1.34620516176366 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 1.77686337483927 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.0356656302478473 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.0545478487655127 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.0216600052955054 * ES1_4_Power + -0.151094501611091 * ES2_3_Power 
  + 0.0149934705620967 * ThrustLapse))  
+ 2.5955058603549 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-8.23258314926347) + 0.323776566006775 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.482651669990974 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 1.61133856712083 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.00465812123392629 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.017175950987301 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
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 + 0.00143425204912732 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -0.709432713039373 *
 Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000274886471023977 * Sys_RefPower + 4.80641102580437 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.687515223729349 * Sys_Tc_Engine + -2.98262601755922 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 0.642875058254761 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.0355294423368474 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + -0.0706580279713116 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.20214349051986 * ES1_4_Power + 0.162664663256285 * ES2_3_Power  
 + -0.0587194358164366 * ThrustLapse))  
+ 2.57129597090635 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (3.7533589316228 + -1.33582147198955 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.949362018913721 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -0.798485134543326 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.0157441703123445 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + -0.0159422324358242 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.000672295721721802 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + -3.94514691054923 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000245165007240908 * Sys_RefPower + -20.0194161240966 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -1.56577892462743 * Sys_Tc_Engine  + -2.23959377593091 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -0.048437097629361 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.118465470829261 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.195426924371908 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.0613151890991552 * ES1_4_Power + 0.00647968762097799 * ES2_3_Power 
  + 0.000267526575118983 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -2.81890732005287 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-9.31608600988355) + -0.802547086090387 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.930985492589012 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.562304674167787 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.00886149906263079 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + -0.0146643516398474 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.000758142482547047 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + 2.45879391885548 * 
 Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000255696696157314 * Sys_RefPower + 36.4372391717609 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.369523969568563 * Sys_Tc_Engine + -0.737689698123882 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 0.34837615772975 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.163426812494911 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
 + -0.0582080315045352 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
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 + -0.0465597549610404 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0218309137099311 * ES2_3_Power  
 + -0.0361478910544058 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -2.47818910887275 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-8.36303596825612) + -0.510972286811236 * Sys_Delay  
 + 1.57998361984482 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 1.76856284907642 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.00238768540629691 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0334669584678839 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.0022673401845767 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + -3.24913564487657 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000285587548268689 * Sys_RefPower + -13.0514444296879 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -1.20303942599795 * Sys_Tc_Engine + -4.21440910840291 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 0.630449258988299 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.137195576358047 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.0497887036298354 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.0895466651474429 * ES1_4_Power + 0.142481205832216 * ES2_3_Power  
 + 0.0108243447002853 * ThrustLapse))  
+ 1.24141577088537 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-11.5001457889274) + 1.91732043584861 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.388640181605488 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.982314985692286 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.0194403668686888 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.008078795146404 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.00165207866403105 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -0.0926589833561836 
*Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000124337189668071 * Sys_RefPower + 14.2545981712997 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + 0.423438359143574 * Sys_Tc_Engine  + 4.83507596723955 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -1.65508342971971 *  Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.133917000358995 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.0257100052728105 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.141688797234124 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0283655936877366 * ES2_3_Power  
 + 0.0048894517516182 * ThrustLapse))  
 + 0.720060590129468 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (13.7362582290245 + 1.17275234872591 * Sys_Delay  
 + 0.100058044677588 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -2.26964027986264 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.00890260929994147 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0280590152287409 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
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 + -0.00455577921283265 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -23.5821217510554 
*Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.000186051310728264 * Sys_RefPower + -1.74234326344152 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.380306699453568 * Sys_Tc_Engine + 4.72804338667241 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -0.0445852126480734 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.0936788204516773 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
 + -0.0443388275771044 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.0861695546494063 * ES1_4_Power + 0.114664002722124 * ES2_3_Power  
 + -0.0125182187611107 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -1.97328127792377 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * (2.3577697119558 + 1.63574791725517 * Sys_Delay  
 + -0.0528359586695485 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.612912161095345 * 
ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.00756118600067893 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0167436459708461  * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.000905706293576514 * Sys_Inertia_Engine + -7.11572492910405 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + -0.0000083700338534979 * Sys_RefPower + 19.4798562966882 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + 0.350081291865482 * Sys_Tc_Engine  + 3.10453178559089 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -0.280460149402042 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + -0.0110495746414453 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + -0.121956911448755 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.113657922535698 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0534871758176783 * ES2_3_Power  
 + -0.00590407470415017 * ThrustLapse))  
+ 1.37070564498888 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-6.34359243321685) + 0.149433140495308 * Sys_Delay  
 + -2.05482172046513 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + 0.269100522685077 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + -0.0106816877956069 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + 0.0036296876276504 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + 0.00304707464010469 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + 1.10829724060742 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.00013430566296102 * Sys_RefPower + 60.7859867989976 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + 0.860275282560504 * Sys_Tc_Engine + -2.50825831996496 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + -1.20921021217135 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.207013290556808 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)  
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 + -0.18711293750281 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + -0.134883283972375 * ES1_4_Power + 0.0459271274936178 * ES2_3_Power  
 + -0.060056904083629 * ThrustLapse))  
+ -2.40940009835262 * Tanh( 
 0.5 * ((-6.81744752423186) + 0.746325097200751 * Sys_Delay  
 + 1.07676604332432 * ES_Energy_1_4_s + -0.590047415006336 * ES_Energy_2_3_s  
 + 0.0221622660679345 * (1000000 * ES1_4_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 40 100)  
 + -0.0179659786430506 * (1000000 * ES2_3_Power) (Sys_RefPower * 60 100)  
 + -0.000330955860060723 * Sys_Inertia_Engine  + 2.34549833493041 * 
Sys_MinEngineSpeed  
 + 0.0000323348715095266 * Sys_RefPower + 22.4598049464221 * 
Sys_Tc_EnergyStorage  
 + -0.00444292303151667 * Sys_Tc_Engine + 0.040819330366173 * Sys_Tc_Generator  
 + 0.225890487548306 * Sys_Tc_Propulsor  
 + 0.00908640712205997 * (ES1_4_Power * ES_Energy_1_4_s)   
 + 0.115145588473303 * (ES2_3_Power * ES_Energy_2_3_s)  
 + 0.0762470950019859 * ES1_4_Power + 0.00446236294950914 * ES2_3_Power 
  + -0.0224044821409776 * ThrustLapse)) 
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